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You are here: Home1 / Education-School Law
Civil Procedure, Education-School Law, Negligence

THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (OF THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT) AND NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN (THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE; THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED PLAINTIFF WAS SENT TO A PRIEST NOT EMPLOYED BY THE SCHOOL FOR DISCIPLINE AND WAS MOLESTED BY THE PRIEST (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the negligent supervision and negligent failure to warn causes of action against defendant Catholic school should not have been dismissed in this Child Victims Act case. Plaintiff alleged he was sent by the school to a priest, who was not employed by the school, for discipline. Plaintiff alleged he was molested by the priest and the school knew or should have known of the priest’s propensity:

The complaint alleges … the defendant knew or should have known of the priest’s propensity to molest children, that the defendant had a duty to exercise the same duty of care of supervision over its minor students as a reasonably prudent parent would, and that the defendant breached its duty to adequately supervise the plaintiff which caused him to be sexually abused by the priest. …  … [T]he fact that the sexual abuse occurred off school premises does not require dismissal of the cause of action alleging negligent supervision since, here, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant released the plaintiff into a potentially hazardous situation and directed him to see a certain priest for discipline knowing that the priest had a propensity to sexually abuse children … . … [T]he criminal intervention of a third party may be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of circumstances created by the defendant, for example where, as here, the plaintiff was permitted to meet with the priest, a person who allegedly had a propensity to abuse children, alone and behind closed doors … .

… Supreme Court erred in determining that the cause of action alleging negligent failure to warn was subject to dismissal because it was duplicative of the cause of action alleging negligent supervision. … [T]hese causes of action are based on distinctive facts, one based on failing to warn the plaintiff about the priest and the other based on the defendant’s failure to adequately supervise the plaintiff … . Sullivan v St. Ephrem R.C. Parish Church, 2023 NY Slip Op 01207, Second Dept 3-8-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff alleged the Catholic school sent him to a priest, who was not employed by the school, for school-related discipline and the priest molested him. The causes of action for negligent supervision of the plaintiff-student and failure to warn the plaintiff-student should not have been dismissed. The fact that the priest was not employed by the school did not require dismissal because the school allegedly released the plaintiff into a dangerous situation. Nor did the fact that the priest allegedly committed criminal acts relieve the school of potential liability.

 

March 8, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-08 11:35:172023-03-12 12:00:23THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (OF THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT) AND NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN (THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE; THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED PLAINTIFF WAS SENT TO A PRIEST NOT EMPLOYED BY THE SCHOOL FOR DISCIPLINE AND WAS MOLESTED BY THE PRIEST (SECOND DEPT). ​
Education-School Law, Evidence, Negligence

PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S CHEMICAL BURNS WERE CAUSED BY THE INTENTIONALLY WRONGFUL, SPONTANEOUS, UNFORESEEABLE ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES OVER WHOM DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAD NO CONTROL OR AUTHORITY; STUDENTS HAD APPARENLY PUT DRANO IN A WATER BOTTLE WHICH PLAINTIFF KICKED; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE SCHOOL DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF ON ITS LACK OF NOTICE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant charter school [Mission] did not have notice of the dangerous condition which allegedly caused plaintiff-student’s chemical burns. Plaintiff kicked a plastic water bottle which had Drano in it, called a Drano bomb. Plaintiff alleged school personnel knew or should have known other students were making the Drano bombs:

The court properly granted Mission’s summary judgment motion, even assuming that a triable issue exists as to whether plaintiff was participating in Mission’s afterschool program at the time she was injured. Plaintiff testified that, before she was injured, she had seen other children, who were not participating in Mission’s afterschool program, on a different basketball court in the public park pouring a liquid into a Poland Spring bottle, not a Vitamin Water bottle. Plaintiff theorizes that Mission’s staff should have observed the conduct of these children and intervened to stop them. However, plaintiff’s own testimony, on which Mission was entitled to rely to satisfy its prima facie burden on the summary judgment motion, established that the actions of the children — even indulging the speculative assumption that they created the Drano bomb that later injured plaintiff — were the intentionally wrongful, spontaneous, and unforeseeable acts of third parties over whom Mission had no control or authority … .

From the dissent:

Mission’s motion presented no evidence whatsoever from any of its employees, teachers, supervisors, or in the form of records from the afterschool program. Mission consequently failed to address, in the first instance, the issue of whether it had “notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury” … . Under the circumstances, Mission’s reliance on the testimony of other parties was insufficient to carry its prima facie burden. S. G. v Harlem Vil. Academy Charter Sch., 2023 NY Slip Op 01069, First Dept 2-28-23

Practice Point: Here the school successfully argued the plaintiff-student’s chemical burns were caused by the intentionally wrongful, spontaneous, and unforeseeable acts of other children over whom the school had no control. Plaintiff kicked a water bottle which had Drano in it (a Drano bomb). Two dissenters argued the school did not present sufficient evidence of its lack of notice.

 

February 28, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-28 09:07:292023-03-04 09:44:52PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S CHEMICAL BURNS WERE CAUSED BY THE INTENTIONALLY WRONGFUL, SPONTANEOUS, UNFORESEEABLE ACTS OF THIRD PARTIES OVER WHOM DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAD NO CONTROL OR AUTHORITY; STUDENTS HAD APPARENLY PUT DRANO IN A WATER BOTTLE WHICH PLAINTIFF KICKED; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE SCHOOL DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF ON ITS LACK OF NOTICE (FIRST DEPT). ​
Education-School Law, Evidence, Negligence

HERE THE STUDENT WITH DISABILITIES WAS UNSUPERVISED IN GYM CLASS WHEN SHE WAS INJURED; THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT SUCCESSFULLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT MORE SUPERVISION OF THE STUDENT WAS NEEDED BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE PURPORTEDLY CONFLICTED WITH THE STUDENT’S “AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 504 PLAN” (WHICH DID NOT CALL FOR EXTRA SUPERVISION) AND THEREFORE EXTRA SUPERVISION WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO DISCRIMINATION; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT REJECTED THE ARGUMENT FINDING THAT THE 504 PLAN DID NOT ACT AS A CEILING FOR THE LEVEL OF SUPERVISION TO BE AFFORDED THE STUDENT AND ORDERED A NEW TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial, determined expert evidence and lay-witness testimony should not have been excluded from this negligent-supervision-of-a-student trial. The student had some physical disabilities and a “504 plan” had been developed for her pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plan did not explicitly call for extra supervision. The student was injured when she was practicing jumps in gym class while the teacher was working with other students. The school district successfully argued to the judge that any evidence that the “504 plan” was inadequate to protect the student amounted to discrimination because the plan did not call for extra supervision. That argument was rejected by the Third Department:

… [A] school district’s written 504 plan does not operate as a supervision ceiling in all respects and circumstances.The central purpose of Section 504 is to assure that students with disabilities receive equal treatment in relation to their peers … , that is, that they receive support, based on their individual needs, so that they may also meaningfully access a given educational experience … . This stands in stark contrast to defendant’s reliance upon federal antidiscrimination law as a shield from liability. Plainly put, if two kindergarteners have difficulty performing a skill in a mainstream physical education class, adequate support should be provided to both of them — not, illogically, only the one who does not have a 504 plan. Yet that is precisely what defendant’s argument devolves to. Jaquin v Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 01039, Third Dept 2-23-23

Practice Point: Here the injured student had certain disabilities and the school district put in place a 504 Plan pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act to accommodate for her disabilities. The plan did not call for extra supervision. The student was injured while unsupervised in gym class. The school district successfully argued evidence that more supervision was needed conflicted with the 504 plan. The argument was rejected and a new trial ordered.

February 23, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-23 15:36:362023-02-28 13:12:54HERE THE STUDENT WITH DISABILITIES WAS UNSUPERVISED IN GYM CLASS WHEN SHE WAS INJURED; THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT SUCCESSFULLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT MORE SUPERVISION OF THE STUDENT WAS NEEDED BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE PURPORTEDLY CONFLICTED WITH THE STUDENT’S “AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 504 PLAN” (WHICH DID NOT CALL FOR EXTRA SUPERVISION) AND THEREFORE EXTRA SUPERVISION WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO DISCRIMINATION; THE THIRD DEPARTMENT REJECTED THE ARGUMENT FINDING THAT THE 504 PLAN DID NOT ACT AS A CEILING FOR THE LEVEL OF SUPERVISION TO BE AFFORDED THE STUDENT AND ORDERED A NEW TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Education-School Law

THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT, QUASI CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF SCHOOL BUS COMPANY WAS SEEKING PAYMENT FOR THE MONTHS THE SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED DUE TO COVID-19 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this breach of contract, quasi contract, unjust enrichment complaint should have been dismissed. Defendant school-bus company was demanding payment for those months the schools were closed due to COVID-19:

… [T]he complaint failed to specify the provision of the parties’ contract that was allegedly breached … . … [N]o provision was identified which would permit the plaintiff to demand payment from the defendant in exchange for merely remaining available to provide transportation services … . In addition, the evidentiary material submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant’s motion failed to remedy this defect in the complaint … .

… “[T]he existence of a valid contract governing the subject matter generally precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter” … . “[T]he theory of unjust enrichment lies as a quasi-contract claim. It is an obligation the law creates in the absence of an agreement” … . “An unjust enrichment claim is not available where it simply duplicates, or replaces, a conventional contract or tort claim” … .

“The essential inquiry in any action for unjust enrichment or restitution is whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered” … . “A plaintiff must show that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the [defendant] to retain what is sought to be recovered” … . Here, the complaint fails to sufficiently allege that the defendant was enriched or otherwise received a benefit at the plaintiff’s expense to support a cause of action for quasi contract sounding in restitution or unjust enrichment … . Pierce Coach Line, Inc. v Port Wash. Union Free Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 01018, Second Dept 2-22-23

Practice Point: An unjust enrichment cause of action will not fly if there is a contract covering the same subject matter (here there was such a contract). Unjust enrichment sounds in equity and addresses when it is unfair for a party to retain what the other party is seeking to recover. The defendant school district was not unjustly enriched by not paying the plaintiff school bus company for those months when the school was closed due to COVID.

 

February 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-22 09:25:102023-02-26 09:51:28THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT, QUASI CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF SCHOOL BUS COMPANY WAS SEEKING PAYMENT FOR THE MONTHS THE SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED DUE TO COVID-19 (SECOND DEPT).
Administrative Law, Arbitration, Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Education-School Law, Employment Law

THE CHALLENGES TO THE PROCEDURES FOR RELIGIOUS AND MEDICAL EXEMPTIONS FROM THE COVID-19 VACCINE MANDATE FOR NYC TEACHERS, AS WELL AS “LEAVE WITHOUT PAY” FOR THOSE WHO DID NO APPLY FOR AN EXEMPTION, WERE PROPERLY REJECTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a dissent, determined the COVID-19 vaccine mandates imposed by the arbitrator for NYC Department of Education (DOE) employees properly survived the hybrid Article 75/78 challenge. The arbitration initiated by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) resulted in the September 10, 2021 Impact Award which established procedures for religious and medical exemptions:

The article 75 claims were properly dismissed, as petitioners lack standing to challenge the Impact Award and failed to join UFT as a necessary party. The article 75 claims also fail on the merits. As to the article 78 claims, petitioners are unable to show that DOE made an error of law or acted irrationally. * * *

Petitioners are similarly situated teachers employed by DOE. All received notification by email that they were being placed on Leave Without Pay (LWOP) status because they were not in compliance with DOE’s COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate. They were informed that they could not report to their school sites as of Monday, October 4, and that, in order to return to work, they were required to upload proof of having received the first vaccine shot and “E-sign the attestation stating that you are willing to return to your worksite within seven calendar days of submission.” The notifications also summarized the options for separation and leave extensions. Petitioners, with the exception of Loiacono, did not submit proof of vaccination or request religious or medical exemptions. * * *

When a union represents employees during arbitration, only that union — not individual employees — may seek to vacate the resulting award … .

Petitioners also failed to join UFT as a party. UFT advocated successfully for the exemptions, accommodations, and extended benefits for teachers otherwise unwilling to be vaccinated, all of which were prescribed in the Impact Award. Accordingly, UFT would be adversely impacted by a judgment favorable to petitioners and is thus a necessary party (CPLR 1001[a] …). Matter of O’Reilly v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 2023 NY Slip Op 00957, First Dept 2-21-23

Practice Point: The individual NYC Department of Education (DOE) employees did not have standing to challenge the results of the COVID-19 vaccine-mandate arbitration initiated by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). The UFT was a necessary party to the challenge but was not made a party. The DOE did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Essentially the procedures for religious and medical exemptions to the vaccine mandate were upheld. Teachers who did not apply for an exemption and were not vaccinated were deemed properly placed on leave without pay (LWOP).

 

February 21, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-21 09:32:532023-02-25 11:26:51THE CHALLENGES TO THE PROCEDURES FOR RELIGIOUS AND MEDICAL EXEMPTIONS FROM THE COVID-19 VACCINE MANDATE FOR NYC TEACHERS, AS WELL AS “LEAVE WITHOUT PAY” FOR THOSE WHO DID NO APPLY FOR AN EXEMPTION, WERE PROPERLY REJECTED (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Education-School Law, Negligence

THE REVIVED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR LAWSUITS ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE PURSUANT TO THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT (CVA) DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Bannister, determined the revived statute of limitations for law suits based upon sexual abuse under the Child Victims Act (CVA) did not violate due process:

… [I]t is well settled that “a claim-revival statute will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the [New York] State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice” … . Addressing the second prong of that standard first—i.e., whether the statute “remed[ied] an injustice”—the Court of Appeals recognized that, “[i]n the context of a claim-revival statute, there is no principled way for a court to test whether a particular injustice is ‘serious’ or whether a particular class of plaintiffs is blameless; such moral determinations are left to the elected branches of government” … . Here, as evidenced by the legislative history of the CVA, the legislature considered the need for “justice for past and future survivors of child sexual abuse” and the need to “shift the significant and lasting costs of child sexual abuse to the responsible parties” … . Specifically, the legislative history noted the significant barriers those survivors faced in coming forward with their claims, including that child sexual abuse survivors may not be able to disclose their abuse until later in life after the relevant statute of limitations has run because of the mental, physical and emotional injuries sustained as a result of the abuse … . As explained in the Senate Introducer’s Memorandum in Support, “New York currently requires most survivors to file civil actions . . . against their abusers by the age of 23 at most, long before most survivors report or come to terms with their abuse, which has been estimated to be as high as 52 years old on average” … .. Because the statutes of limitat ions left “thousands of survivors” of child sexual abuse unable to sue their abusers, the legislature determined that there was an identifiable injustice that needed to be remedied … . PB-36 Doe v Niagara Falls City Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 00598, Fourth Dept 2-3-23

Practice Point: The revived statute of limitations in the Child Victims Act is constitutional.

 

February 3, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-02-03 15:47:312023-02-05 16:09:02THE REVIVED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR LAWSUITS ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE PURSUANT TO THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT (CVA) DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS (FOURTH DEPT).
Education-School Law, Municipal Law, Negligence

THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SCHOOL PLAYGROUND ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PETITIONER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE SCHOOL HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE POTENTIAL NEGLIGENT-SUPERVISION CLAIM AND PETITIONER DID NOT OFFER A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the school board should not have been granted. Petitioner alleged her child was not properly supervised at recess. The child apparently ran into a piece of equipment when being chased by classmates. There was an accident report and the three recess supervisors indicated they did not see the incident. The Second Department held that the school did not have timely notice of the potential claim and petitioner did not have an adequate excuse for failing to timely file:

… [T]he accident claim form states that three school employees were supervising recess but did not see the infant petitioner become injured. This, standing alone, is insufficient to establish actual knowledge of a potential negligent supervision claim because it is well established that schools “‘cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students'” …  The petitioners also failed to establish that the School Board had actual knowledge of the facts constituting their other two claims … . The petitioners identify no factual connection between the recess supervisors not seeing the infant petitioner’s injury and either the allegedly defective nature of the playground equipment or the instruction given or not given to students at recess. It is not even clear from the description of the incident on the accident claim form whether the school was aware that the infant petitioner injured himself on a “metal joint” as alleged in the petition and the notice of claim. Thus, the petitioners failed to establish that the School Board had actual knowledge of the facts constituting their claims … . Matter of R. M. v Board of Educ. of the Long Beach City Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 00320, Second Dept 1-25-23

Practice Point: Here the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim should not have been granted in this school-playground accident case. There was an accident report but the report did not demonstrate the school had timely knowledge of the potential lawsuit. in addition, petitioner did not offer a reasonable excuse for failing to timely file.

 

January 25, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-01-25 17:43:542023-01-29 17:46:13THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SCHOOL PLAYGROUND ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PETITIONER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE SCHOOL HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE POTENTIAL NEGLIGENT-SUPERVISION CLAIM AND PETITIONER DID NOT OFFER A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE (SECOND DEPT).
Corporation Law, Education-School Law, Real Property Tax Law

TOWNHOUSES PURCHASED BY A NOT-FOR-PROFIT SCHOOL TO HOUSE FACULTY ARE TAX EXEMPT (SECOND DEPT),

The Second Department, reversing the city board of assessment review (BAR) determined that townhouses purchased by the Rye County Day School (RCDS), a not-for-profit school, to house faculty were tax exempt:

RPTL 420-a(1)(a) provides that “[r]eal property owned by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational, or moral or mental improvement of men, women or children purposes, or for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes either by the owning corporation or association or by another such corporation or association as hereinafter provided shall be exempt from taxation as provided in this section.” The word “exclusively” in the statute has been broadly defined as “principally” or “primarily” … , such that “purposes and uses merely auxiliary or incidental to the main and exempt purpose and use will not defeat the exemption” … . Thus, the two-part test for determining entitlement to a property tax exemption under RPTL 420-a is “(1) whether the owner of the property is organized or conducted exclusively, or primarily, for an exempt purpose; and (2) whether the particular property for which the exemption is sought is itself primarily used for an exempt purpose” … .

RCDS demonstrated that the “primary use” of the faculty-occupied townhouses furthered its “primary purpose” of operating as a school.

… RCDS demonstrated that the “primary use” of the faculty-occupied townhouses furthered its “primary purpose” of operating as a school … . Matter of Rye Country Day Sch. v Whitty, 2023 NY Slip Op 00323, Second Dept 1-25-23

Practice Pont: Faculty housing for a not-for-profit school is tax exempt.

 

January 25, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-01-25 16:36:222023-01-29 16:39:14TOWNHOUSES PURCHASED BY A NOT-FOR-PROFIT SCHOOL TO HOUSE FACULTY ARE TAX EXEMPT (SECOND DEPT),
Civil Procedure, Education-School Law, Municipal Law, Negligence

THE ONE-YEAR-AND-NINETY-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR A SUIT AGAINST A SCHOOL DISTRICT IN GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 50-I(1)(C) IS SUBJECT TO THE INFANCY TOLL IN CPLR 208 (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the infancy toll (CPLR 208) applies to the one year and 90-day time limit for a suit against a school district (General Municipal Law 50-i(1)(c)). Therefore the application for leave to file a late notice of claim in this action on behalf of an infant student against a school district should have been granted in its entirety:

Supreme Court erred in concluding that any claim by the infant plaintiff based upon incidents that occurred prior to May 31, 2017, would be time-barred. CPLR 208 tolls a statute of limitations for the period of infancy, including the limitation set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-i(1)(c) … . It is undisputed that the infant plaintiff was an infant at the time of the events underlying this action and at the time that the action was commenced. M. S. v Rye Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 00343, Second Dept 1-25-23

Practice Point: The infancy toll of the statute of limitations in CPLR 208 applies to the one-year-ninety-day time limit for a suit against a school district in General Municipal Law 50-i(1)(c).

January 25, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-01-25 14:07:372023-01-31 09:48:44THE ONE-YEAR-AND-NINETY-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR A SUIT AGAINST A SCHOOL DISTRICT IN GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 50-I(1)(C) IS SUBJECT TO THE INFANCY TOLL IN CPLR 208 (SECOND DEPT). ​
Defamation, Education-School Law

THE LETTER CRITICIZING THE FORMER DEAN OF THE FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY WAS NOT DEFAMATORY ON ITS FACE, BUT THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION BY IMPLICATION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s defamation-by-implication complaint should not have been dismissed:

… [P]laintiff, the former Dean of Graduate Studies at defendant Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT), was placed on leave following criticisms over culturally insensitive accessories presented in an FIT-sponsored alumni fashion show. Plaintiff alleges that a letter published by defendants contained defamatory remarks on its face, implied, or both, and impugned plaintiff’s reputation…. .

… [T]he letter implies that plaintiff was responsible for the show and failed to recognize the accessories as insensitive, even though she took no part in managing, directing, or approving the show. The complaint contains references to publications from other sources that interpret the letter as placing the blame on plaintiff and deeming her leadership inexcusable and irresponsible … . On a CPLR 3211 (a)(7) motion to dismiss, denial is warranted if taking the words used both in their ordinary meaning and in context make them susceptible to a defamatory connotation as occurs in this case … . The letter also contains statements of mixed opinion, “While a pure opinion cannot be the subject of a defamation claim, an opinion that ‘implies that it is based upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it, . . . is a ‘mixed opinion’ and is actionable'” … .

The letter omitted plaintiff’s nonparticipation in the production, direction, and management of the fashion show; her unawareness as to the accessories the designers planned to present; the FIT policy precluding academic deans from evaluating, censoring, or approving student and alumni work; and plaintiff’s prompt response to student concerns and her proactive approach to address those concerns; and implied that plaintiff was responsible for the show, was aware of the accessories, could approve them, and failed to respond to student concerns. Davis v Brown, 2022 NY Slip Op 07147, First Dept 12-15-22

Practice Point: Here the writing was not defamatory on its face. But the complaint stated a cause of action for defamation by implication. The letter included actionable statements of “mixed opinion” and omitted important facts which relieved plaintiff of responsibility for the claimed misconduct.

 

December 15, 2022
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-12-15 17:35:162022-12-16 18:15:30THE LETTER CRITICIZING THE FORMER DEAN OF THE FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY WAS NOT DEFAMATORY ON ITS FACE, BUT THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION BY IMPLICATION (FIRST DEPT). ​
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