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Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

PLAINTIFFS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT (1) WHETHER THE POLICE ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS DURING A HIGH-SPEED CHASE AND IN FAILING TO NOTIFY THE DISPATCHER OF THE CHASE, AND (2) WHETHER THE CHASE WAS A PROXIMATE OR CONCURRENT CAUSE OF PLAINTFFS’ ACCIDENT (THERE WAS NO CONTACT WITH EITHER VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE CHASE) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined plaintiffs raised questions of fact about whether the police acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others during a high-speed chase, and whether the chase of the BMW driven by Llewellyn was a proximate or concurrent cause of the accident (neither vehicle involved in the chase struck plaintiffs’ vehicle):

… [T]he motion court properly held that the reckless disregard standard applied in evaluating the City defendants’ conduct in pursuing Llewellyn (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1104[b], 1104[e]). However, the motion court erred in determining that “there is no evidence that the NYPD officers acted recklessly as a matter of law, and that the pursuit was not the proximate cause or a concurrent cause of this incident” … . …

Plaintiffs … submitted evidence that the City defendants initiated a high-speed chase of Llewellyn’s BMW at close proximity after observing it run a single red light, and continued the high-speed chase, which included crossing over a double yellow line and running two red lights, in a known congested and heavily populated residential area which at the time of the pursuit had moderate to heavy traffic and numerous pedestrians…. . …

Plaintiffs also raised an issue of fact concerning whether the NYPD officers acted recklessly in failing to notify the radio dispatcher at the start of the pursuit and inform headquarters with relevant information, including the nature of the offense. Handelsman v Llewellyn, 2022 NY Slip Op 04093, First Dept 6-23-22

Practice Point: Here there were questions of fact whether the police acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others during a high-speed chase such that the city would be liable for plaintiffs’ accident, and whether the high-speed chase was a proximate or concurrent cause of plaintiffs’ accident (there was no contact with either vehicle involved in the chase). There were questions of fact whether the police drove “in reckless disregard of the safety of others” and whether their failure to notify the dispatcher of the chase was also reckless.

 

June 23, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-23 13:01:232022-06-25 13:42:12PLAINTIFFS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT (1) WHETHER THE POLICE ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS DURING A HIGH-SPEED CHASE AND IN FAILING TO NOTIFY THE DISPATCHER OF THE CHASE, AND (2) WHETHER THE CHASE WAS A PROXIMATE OR CONCURRENT CAUSE OF PLAINTFFS’ ACCIDENT (THERE WAS NO CONTACT WITH EITHER VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE CHASE) (FIRST DEPT).
Municipal Law

ITHACA’S FEE SCHEDULE FOR PERMITS ALLOWING THE CLOSURE OF STREETS AND SIDEWALKS FOR CONSTRUCTION ON PRIVATE PROPERTY IS VALID, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined the respondent city demonstrated its fee schedule for permits allowing the closure of streets, sidewalks and parking spaces during construction on private property was valid. The decision is too detailed and comprehensive to be fairly summarized here:

… City officials had a rational basis for calculating the public costs arising from permitted street and sidewalk closures and … the new street permit fee structure imposed a reasonable approximation of those costs upon permit applicants. …

… [P]etitioner [owner of the property on which the construction was done] failed to raise a question of fact as to the reasonableness of the new street fee structure, respondents were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the challenge to that structure and a declaration that it is valid … .Matter of 201 C-Town LLC v City of Ithaca, N.Y., 2022 NY Slip Op 04069, Third Dept 6-23-22

​Practice Point: A city can impose daily fees for permits allowing the closure of streets and sidewalks to allow construction on private property.

 

June 23, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-23 11:01:472022-06-29 08:46:40ITHACA’S FEE SCHEDULE FOR PERMITS ALLOWING THE CLOSURE OF STREETS AND SIDEWALKS FOR CONSTRUCTION ON PRIVATE PROPERTY IS VALID, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).
Employment Law, Municipal Law

A FIREFIGHTER INJURED ON THE JOB RETURNED TO THE JOB BUT COULD NOT WORK THE 10 TO 24 HOUR SHIFTS WHICH ARE THE “REGULAR DUTIES” OF A FIREFIGHTER; BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT OFFERED THE FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT OF THE SHORTER SHIFTS OR LIGHT-DUTY WORK, SHE WAS ENITLTED TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-A BENEFITS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner, a firefighter who had injured her shoulder on the job, was entitled to General Municipal Law 207-a benefits:

A firefighter seeking section 207-a benefits must show “that his or her injury or illness results from the performance of his or her duties and that he or she is physically unable to perform his or her regular duties as a firefighter … . The regular duties of a firefighter for the City required shifts of between 10-24 hours, and the medical evidence is undisputed that petitioner could work only 8-hour shifts. Inasmuch as the evidence established that petitioner could not work the longer shifts, and she was not offered the full-time equivalent of the shorter shifts or light-duty work, the determination that she is not entitled to General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits is arbitrary and capricious. Matter of Newman v City of Tonawanda, 2022 NY Slip Op 03834, Fourth Dept 6-9-22

Practice Point: Here petitioner-firefighter was injured on the job. When she returned to the job she could not work the 10 to 24 hour shifts which are the “regular duties’ of a firefighter. She was assigned shorter shifts which resulted in less pay. She was therefore entitled to General Municipal Law 207-a benefits.

 

June 9, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-09 12:39:092022-06-12 12:58:45A FIREFIGHTER INJURED ON THE JOB RETURNED TO THE JOB BUT COULD NOT WORK THE 10 TO 24 HOUR SHIFTS WHICH ARE THE “REGULAR DUTIES” OF A FIREFIGHTER; BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT OFFERED THE FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT OF THE SHORTER SHIFTS OR LIGHT-DUTY WORK, SHE WAS ENITLTED TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-A BENEFITS (FOURTH DEPT).
Arbitration, Contract Law, Employment Law, Municipal Law

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FIREFIGHTER’S GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-A INJURY CLAIM SHOULD BE PROCESSED IS ARBITRABLE BECAUSE THE ISSUE IS ADDRESSED IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGANING AGREEMENT (CBA); THE PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition to stay arbitration in this General Municipal Law 207-a injury claim by a firefighter should not have been granted. The manner in which a section 207-a claim is processed is an arbitrable matter:

… [T]he union filed a grievance alleging, inter alia, that the City was in violation of the CBA [collective bargaining agreement] and the negotiated General Municipal Law § 207-a policy by failing to adhere to the required procedures in processing a claim by one of the union’s members for General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits. . …

It is undisputed that there is no constitutional, statutory, or public policy provision prohibiting the arbitration of the dispute at issue in this matter…. [G]iven the breadth of the arbitration clause in this case, the dispute regarding the City’s processing of claims for General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits bore a reasonable relationship to the general subject matter of the CBA, since Article 10 of the CBA expressly refers to the negotiated policy for the provision of such benefits … . “[T]he question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA is a matter of contract interpretation and application reserved for the arbitrator” … . Matter of City of New Rochelle v Uniformed Fire Fighters Assn., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03722, Second Dept 6-8-22

Practice Point: Here the issue (how a firefighter’s General Municipal Law 207-a injury claim should be processed) was addressed in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was therefore arbitrable. The petition to stay arbitration should not have been granted.

 

June 8, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-08 14:09:062022-06-11 14:31:24THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FIREFIGHTER’S GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-A INJURY CLAIM SHOULD BE PROCESSED IS ARBITRABLE BECAUSE THE ISSUE IS ADDRESSED IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGANING AGREEMENT (CBA); THE PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Municipal Law

DEFENDANT DID NOT FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF VILLAGE IN THIS CONTRACT ACTION AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 9802; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S ANTICIPATORY-REPUDIATION COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE VILLAGE’S PARTICIPATION IN DISCOVERY WAS NOT DESIGNED TO MISLEAD THE DEFENDANT AND DID NOT TRIGGER THE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s failure to file a notice of claim required dismissal of its counterclaim (anticipatory repudiation of contract) against the village:

Pursuant to CPLR 9802, “no action shall be maintained against the village upon or arising out of a contract of the village . . . unless a written verified claim shall have been filed with the village clerk within one year after the cause of action shall have accrued.” “‘[S]tatutory requirements conditioning suit [against a governmental entity] must be strictly construed'” … . This is true even when the municipality “‘had actual knowledge of the claim or failed to demonstrate actual prejudice'” … .  …

… [T]he plaintiff’s exchanging of discovery and participation in the depositions of witnesses did not estop it from raising a defense pursuant to CPLR 9802, as mere participation in litigation does not constitute action calculated to mislead or discourage the defendant from filing a notice of claim … . Incorporated Vil. of Freeport v Freeport Plaza W., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03713, Second Dept 6-8-22

Practice Point: In a contract action against a municipality, here an anticipatory-repudiation-of-contract counterclaim, a notice of claim must be filed (CPLR 9802). No notice of claim was filed here and the counterclaim should have been dismissed. The fact that the municipality participated in discovery did not give rise to the estoppel doctrine because there was no intent to mislead the defendant with respect to the notice-of-claim requirement.

 

June 8, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-08 12:05:032022-06-11 12:30:12DEFENDANT DID NOT FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF VILLAGE IN THIS CONTRACT ACTION AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 9802; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S ANTICIPATORY-REPUDIATION COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE VILLAGE’S PARTICIPATION IN DISCOVERY WAS NOT DESIGNED TO MISLEAD THE DEFENDANT AND DID NOT TRIGGER THE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).
Municipal Law, Negligence

IN THIS Y-INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, (1) THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED WRITTEN NOTICE THAT OVERGROWN FOLIAGE BLOCKED LINES OF SIGHT; (2) QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING INADQUATE SIGNAGE AND NEGLIGENT ROADWAY DESIGN (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court Y-intersection traffic accident case, determined:(1) the cause of action against the town alleging overgrown foliage blocked drivers’ line of sight should have been dismissed because the town demonstrated it did not have written notice of the condition; (2) the written-notice requirement does not apply to the causes of action alleging inadequate signage and negligent design, which properly survived summary judgment:

By its submission of the affidavits of its Town Clerk and Superintendent of Highways who both averred that, after review of the pertinent records, no written notice was received pertaining to any alleged defective or dangerous condition caused by or from overgrown trees … , the Town successfully shifted the burden to plaintiffs to establish an issue of fact as to prior written notice, which plaintiffs failed to do … .

As to plaintiffs’ claims pertaining to inadequate signage and negligent design of the intersection, we agree that prior written notice requirements do not apply to these alleged defects … . * * *

… [T]he record demonstrates that, at the very least, at some point in the modern era the roads were paved and signage was installed. The Town has provided no proof as to when or how often these activities have been undertaken or that they were completed in compliance with the standards in place at the time … .

We further agree that Supreme Court properly rejected the Town’s contention that plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence by the Town were negated by [the drivers’] familiarity with the intersection. …  … [I]t cannot be said that this Y intersection was reasonably safe as a matter of law, nor did the Town conclusively demonstrate that placing the stop sign in a different location would have resulted in the same conduct by [the drivers]. … [T]riable issues of fact exist as to whether the signage at the intersection was a proximate cause of the accident … . Read v Bell, 2022 NY Slip Op 03563, Third Dept 6-2-22

Practice Point: In a traffic accident case, a municipality will not be liable for overgrown foliage which blocks lines of sight if the town has not been provided with written notice of the condition. The written-notice requirement does not apply to causes of action alleging the accident was caused by inadequate signage or negligent roadway design.

 

June 2, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-02 15:18:412022-06-03 15:45:15IN THIS Y-INTERSECTION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, (1) THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED WRITTEN NOTICE THAT OVERGROWN FOLIAGE BLOCKED LINES OF SIGHT; (2) QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING INADQUATE SIGNAGE AND NEGLIGENT ROADWAY DESIGN (THIRD DEPT).
Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Municipal Law

THE NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE PROVISION WHICH PROHIBITS “COMPRESSION OF THE DIAPHRAGM” (BY KNEELING, SITTING OR STANDING ON A PERSON) WHEN EFFECTING AN ARREST IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the NYC Administrative Code provision prohibiting and criminalizing the use of certain methods of restraint in effecting an arrest was not void for vagueness.

Plaintiffs challenge Administrative Code § 10-181 as unconstitutionally vague and preempted by New York State law. This provision, which became effective July 15, 2020, makes it a criminal misdemeanor to use certain methods of restraint “in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an arrest” (Administrative Code § 10-181[a]). Specifically, the statute prohibits “restrain[ing] an individual in a manner that restricts the flow of air or blood by compressing the windpipe or the carotid arteries on each side of the neck [the chokehold ban], or sitting, kneeling, or standing on the chest or back in a manner that compresses the diaphragm [the diaphragm compression ban]” ,,, , …

The only language plaintiffs take issue with is “in a manner that compresses the diaphragm.” But the meaning of this language, even if “imprecise” or “open-ended,” is sufficiently definite “when measured by common understanding and practices” … . Police officers — the targets of the law — can be (and are) trained on the location and function of the diaphragm. And even plaintiffs have no difficulty understanding the meaning of the word “compress[]” when used in the context of the accompanying chokehold ban, which they do not challenge. That it may not be the most accurate word, from a medical standpoint, to describe what happens to the diaphragm when someone sits, kneels, or stands on it does not mean that it is incapable of being understood. Police Benevolent Assn. of the City of N.Y., Inc. v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 03329 First Dept 5-19-22

Practice Point: The NYC Administrative Code provision which prohibits and criminalizes “compressing the diaphragm” by sitting, kneeling or standing on a person when effecting an arrest is not void for vagueness.

 

May 19, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-19 17:31:392022-05-21 17:48:38THE NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE PROVISION WHICH PROHIBITS “COMPRESSION OF THE DIAPHRAGM” (BY KNEELING, SITTING OR STANDING ON A PERSON) WHEN EFFECTING AN ARREST IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS (FIRST DEPT).
Municipal Law, Negligence

THE NEGLIGENT ROADWAY DESIGN CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THE ABSENCE OF TURNOUTS FOR DISABLED VEHICLES CREATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligent roadway design cause of action against the city should not have been dismissed in this traffic accident case. Plaintiffs alleged the absence of turnouts for disabled vehicles on Harlem River Drive created a dangerous condition:

Defendants failed to establish that they were unaware of dangerous highway conditions on the northbound Harlem River Drive where the decedent’s accident occurred … , or that the previous accidents in that area of the Drive disclosed by the record were not of a similar nature to the decedent’s accident, or that the causes of those accidents were not similar to the alleged design-related cause(s) of the decedent’s accident … .

… [I]n or about 1983, “the City had received a study recommending that shoulders be added to this section of the Harlem River Drive, and even the City’s engineer admitted that the absence of a shoulder or other place of refuge created an unsafe traffic condition” … . … [T]he record in this case discloses that at least 11 more motor vehicle accidents occurred on the Harlem River Drive between 165th and 183rd Streets between October 1990 and September 1993 that were “related to disabled vehicles in the travel lanes that could be directly attributed to the Drive’s lack of shoulders.” The record also reveals that … the City has justified its inaction by minimizing the significance of pertinent accident data, suggesting that the safety benefit of adding shoulders or turnouts to the Harlem River Drive would be outweighed by the onerousness of the undertaking, and estimating a multimillion-dollar cost of the endeavor. A municipality breaches its “nondelegable duty to keep its roads reasonably safe . . . when [it] is made aware of a dangerous highway condition and does not take action to remedy it” … . Chowdhury v Phillips, 2022 NY Slip Op 03067, First Dept 5-10-22

Practice Point: Where, as here, the municipality (or the state) has undertaken studies which concluded a roadway design, here the absence of turnouts for disabled vehicles, created a dangerous condition, the city (or the state) will be liable for an accident caused by that dangerous condition.

 

May 10, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-10 09:05:002022-05-14 09:40:30THE NEGLIGENT ROADWAY DESIGN CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THE ABSENCE OF TURNOUTS FOR DISABLED VEHICLES CREATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FIRST DEPT).
Contract Law, Municipal Law, Negligence

A CONTRACTOR WHICH CREATES A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON A PUBLIC SIDEWALK MAY BE LIABLE FOR A SLIP AND FALL BY A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant sidewalk-repair contractor’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. There was a question of fact whether the contractor who repaired the sidewalk created the hole which caused plaintiff to trip. A contractor may be liable for an affirmative act of negligence which results in a dangerous condition on a public street or sidewalk:

“A contractor may be [held] liable for an affirmative act of negligence which results in the creation of a dangerous condition upon a public street or sidewalk” … . Here, Amato [the defendant contractor] failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

At his deposition, Victor Amato, Amato’s owner, testified that his company had replaced a portion of the sidewalk at the subject location.  … He acknowledged … that a two-by-four had been installed as a vertical “stake” to support a form that was used when the concrete was poured, and that he or one of his employees would have removed the stake after the concrete had set.

… [T]he plaintiff testified that she had not seen the hole because, from the direction she was walking, it was on the other side of an uneven, or sloped, portion of the sidewalk. Victor Amato admitted that this slope had been created deliberately (through a process known as “feathering”) because the new portion of the sidewalk was at a different height from the existing sidewalk. Pizzolorusso v Metro Mech., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03018, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: Contactors which create a dangerous condition on a public sidewalk or road may be liable to a member of the public who is injured by the dangerous condition. The theory is similar to the “launch an instrument of harm” theory of contractor liability under the Espinal case.

 

May 4, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-05-04 09:31:062022-05-10 09:32:53A CONTRACTOR WHICH CREATES A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON A PUBLIC SIDEWALK MAY BE LIABLE FOR A SLIP AND FALL BY A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT).
Administrative Law, Municipal Law

THE CITY COMMISSIONER ORDERED THE DEMOLITION OF A GRAIN ELEVATOR, A CITY LANDMARK, WHICH HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY WIND; SUPREME COURT PROPERLY ORDERED A HEARING ON WHETHER THE COMMISSIONER HAD A RATIONAL BASIS FOR ORDERING DEMOLITION BUT IMPROPERLY PROHIBITED THE PETITIONER FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE THAT DEMOLITION WAS NOT NECESSARY; NEW HEARING ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering another hearing, determined that the petitioner was entitled to present evidence at the hearing about the Buffalo Commissioner of the City’s Department of Permit and Inspections Services’ (Commissioner’s) ruling that a grain elevator, a City landmark, which was damaged by wind, must be demolished. Supreme Court had confined the hearing to whether the Commissioner had a rational basis for ordering demolition and did not allow the petitioner to submit evidence. Petitioner had submitted with the petition “an unsworn and unsigned expert affidavit from a licensed architect who opined that the Grain Elevator could be adequately repaired and did not need to be demolished:”

We agree with petitioner … that, while petitioner is not entitled to a de novo hearing on the Commissioner’s determination … , the court erred in refusing to consider petitioner’s proposed evidence inasmuch as it should have afforded petitioner the opportunity to submit ” ‘any competent and relevant proof . . . bearing on the triable issue here presented and showing that any of the underlying material on which the [Commissioner] based [his] determination has no basis in fact’ . . . , or that the determination was irrational or arbitrary”  … . Matter of Campaign for Buffalo History, Architecture & Culture, Inc. v City of Buffalo, 2022 NY Slip Op 02927, Fourth Dept 4-29-22

Practice Point: The City Commission ordered the demolition of a city landmark which had been damaged by wind. Petitioner opposed demolition. At the hearing to determine whether there was a rational basis for the Commissioner’s decision, the petitioner was entitled to present evidence demolition was not required. Because Supreme Court did not allow petitioner to present evidence, a new hearing was necessary.

 

April 29, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-04-29 09:20:082022-05-09 09:11:25THE CITY COMMISSIONER ORDERED THE DEMOLITION OF A GRAIN ELEVATOR, A CITY LANDMARK, WHICH HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY WIND; SUPREME COURT PROPERLY ORDERED A HEARING ON WHETHER THE COMMISSIONER HAD A RATIONAL BASIS FOR ORDERING DEMOLITION BUT IMPROPERLY PROHIBITED THE PETITIONER FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE THAT DEMOLITION WAS NOT NECESSARY; NEW HEARING ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).
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