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Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER WHO COLLIDED WITH HER CAR WAS ENGAGED IN AN EMERGENCY OPERATION AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; THEREFORE THE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact whether defendant police officer, Breen, was in fact involved in an emergency operation at the time she collided with the car in which plaintiff was a passenger. Therefore there was a question of fact whether the ordinary negligence principles, as opposed the reckless disregard standard, applied:

“[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b). Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence” … .

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that a negligence standard of care was inapplicable to Breen’s conduct, through the submission of evidence establishing that Breen was responding to another officer in need of assistance when she entered the intersection against a red traffic light and collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle … . In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether Breen was in fact responding to the other officer’s call at the time of the accident and, therefore, whether the negligence standard should apply … . Modica v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 02287, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-14 19:47:042021-04-17 20:03:22PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER WHO COLLIDED WITH HER CAR WAS ENGAGED IN AN EMERGENCY OPERATION AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; THEREFORE THE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Immunity, Municipal Law, Negligence

THE POLICE OFFICERS’ DECIDING NOT TO ARREST PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S SON AFTER AN ALTERCATION BETWEEN HER AND HER SON WAS AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY; THEREFORE THE CITY WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE SUBSEQUENT ATTACK BY HER SON RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this third-party assault case, determined the city could not be held liable for the injury and death of plaintiff’s decedent at the hands of her son. The police had been called to plaintiff’s decedent’s home because of an altercation between her and her son, Matthew. The police did not arrest her son. The next day her son attacked her with a baseball bat and she died from her injuries. The Second Department held that the decision not to arrest the son was an exercise of discretion which is protected by the doctrine of governmental immunity:

The governmental function immunity defense cannot attach unless the municipal defendant establishes that the discretion possessed by its employees was in fact exercised in relation to the conduct on which liability is predicated … . The immunity afforded a municipality presupposes an exercise of discretion in compliance with its own procedures … . The basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery for injury becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion … . Immunity is not available unless the municipality establishes that the action taken actually resulted from discretionary decision-making, meaning the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results … .

Here, the defendants established … that the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law … by its submissions, which demonstrated that the police officers’ actions were discretionary, and they did not fail to follow the police department’s rules and policies in deciding not to arrest Matthew … . The evidence demonstrated that the officers determined that Matthew had committed a violation during the altercation with his mother. Since the officers determined that no crime had been committed, pursuant to CPL 140.10(4)(c) and the patrol guide mandates, the officers were not compelled to arrest Matthew. The evidence further demonstrated that the officers’ decision involved reasoned judgment and an exercise of discretion in compliance with departmental procedures. Devlin v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 02275, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-14 17:30:352021-04-17 18:38:14THE POLICE OFFICERS’ DECIDING NOT TO ARREST PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S SON AFTER AN ALTERCATION BETWEEN HER AND HER SON WAS AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY; THEREFORE THE CITY WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE SUBSEQUENT ATTACK BY HER SON RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT (SECOND DEPT).
Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Negligence

REJECTING THE 2ND DEPARTMENT’S CRITICISM OF THE 1ST DEPARTMENT’S THIRD-PARTY-ASSAULT JURISPRUDENCE, THE 1ST DEPARTMENT HELD THE BROKEN DOOR THROUGH WHICH THE ASSAILANTS GAINED ACCESS TO THE BUILDING WHERE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS SHOT AND KILLED WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SHOOTING BECAUSE THE ASSAILANTS WOULD HAVE FOUND A WAY TO ENTER THE BUILDING EVEN IF THE DOOR LOCK WERE WORKING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the landlord, New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), was not liable for the shooting death of plaintiff’s decedent, Murphy, despite conclusive video evidence the locking mechanism on the door the assailants used to enter plaintiff’s decedent’s building was broken. Disagreeing with the Second Department’s characterization of the First Department’s jurisprudence in similar third-party assault cases, the First Department held that the assailants were intent on shooting plaintiff’s decedent and would have gained entrance to the building even if the locking mechanism worked. Therefore the assailants’ actions constituted the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s decedent’s death:

We disagree with the [Second Department’s] implication that under this Court’s jurisprudence the fact that a victim was targeted obviates the need for any inquiry into the security measures in place at the subject premises. Indeed, we are aware of no case in the First Department that suggests that a landowner would avoid liability even if minimal precautions would have actually prevented a determined assailant from gaining access. In reality, however, that is hardly ever the case. In Buckeridge v Broadie (5 AD3d 298, 300), … the assailants were “sophisticated” and disguised themselves to gain entry. In Cerda v 2962 Decatur Ave. Owners Corp. (306 AD2d 169, 170 [1st Dept 2003]) … the plaintiff was assaulted by a “team of assassins.” … [C]ases confirm that this Court has not abandoned the notion that more than the simple fact that a victim was targeted is necessary to shield a property owner from liability. … [T]he cases confirm that, given the minimal steps a landowner is required to take to secure premises, it has no duty to outwit or outthink those who are determined to overcome those steps.

The record establishes that Murphy’s killers were intent on gaining access to the building. … [C]onsidering that at least one other person, by all appearances oblivious to the brouhaha … , entered the building at the same time, it does not take a leap of the imagination to surmise that [the assailants] would have gained access to the building by following another person in or forcing such a person to let them in. This negates the unlocked door as a proximate cause of the harm that befell Murphy, and makes her assailants’ murderous intent the only proximate cause. Estate of Murphy v New York City Hous. Auth., 2021 NY Slip Op 02246, First Dept 4-13-21

 

April 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-13 10:52:322021-04-17 11:27:07REJECTING THE 2ND DEPARTMENT’S CRITICISM OF THE 1ST DEPARTMENT’S THIRD-PARTY-ASSAULT JURISPRUDENCE, THE 1ST DEPARTMENT HELD THE BROKEN DOOR THROUGH WHICH THE ASSAILANTS GAINED ACCESS TO THE BUILDING WHERE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS SHOT AND KILLED WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SHOOTING BECAUSE THE ASSAILANTS WOULD HAVE FOUND A WAY TO ENTER THE BUILDING EVEN IF THE DOOR LOCK WERE WORKING (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Municipal Law, Negligence

AFTER THE CITY MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE ON THE GROUND IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE ICY CONDITION, THE PLAINTIFFS, YEARS AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED, MOVED FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE NOTICE OF CLAIM TO ALLEGE THE CITY CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE NOTICE OF CLAIM AND THE CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs in this slip and fall case should not have been allowed to amend the notice of claim to add the allegation that the city created the icy condition in the parking garage. The city had moved for summary judgment because it did not have written notice of the condition. The plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend the notice of claim, years after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The city was entitled to summary judgment:

“‘A plaintiff seeking to recover in tort against a municipality must serve a notice of claim to enable authorities to investigate, collect evidence and evaluate the merits of the claim'” … . “‘A notice of claim must set forth, inter alia, the nature of the claim, and the time, place, and manner in which the claim arose'” … . “Under General Municipal Law § 50-e(6), ‘[a] notice of claim may be amended only to correct good faith and nonprejudicial technical mistakes, omissions, or defects, not to substantively change the nature of the claim or the theory of liability'” … . Here, contrary to the court’s determination, the proposed amendment to the notice of claim was not to correct a technical mistake, defect, or omission within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e(6), but rather, improperly sought “to assert a new theory of affirmative negligence several years after the . . . applicable limitations period” … . Congero v City of Glen Cove, 2021 NY Slip Op 02131, Second Dept 4-7-21

 

April 7, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-07 12:06:262021-04-10 12:29:03AFTER THE CITY MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE ON THE GROUND IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE ICY CONDITION, THE PLAINTIFFS, YEARS AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED, MOVED FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE NOTICE OF CLAIM TO ALLEGE THE CITY CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION; THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE NOTICE OF CLAIM AND THE CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Municipal Law

WARREN COUNTY DID NOT HAVE “PARTICULAR EFFECT” JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL OFFENSES ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN SARATOGA COUNTY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Article 78 prohibition petition was the appropriate vehicle for raising the issue whether Warren County had jurisdiction over offenses alleged to have been committed in Saratoga County. The Third Department held the charges could not be brought in Warren County under the so-called “particular effect” rationale (i.e., the argument that the offenses had a “particular effect” on Warren County). The petitioner, who resided in Warren County, was charged with grand larceny and other offenses alleged to have been committed when petitioner was treasurer of Lake George EMS involving bank accounts in Saratoga County:

Respondent failed to demonstrate that the evidence before the grand jury established that Warren County has particular effect jurisdiction over the instant crimes. Respondent submitted his paraphrased testimony of one witness, whose familiarity with Lake George EMS and/or source of information was not disclosed. According to respondent, the witness testified that petitioner stole money from Lake George EMS at a time when he knew the organization was having difficulty meeting payroll. Based on this testimony, respondent argued that petitioner’s conduct “was likely to create a situation where emergency medical services would be restricted or discontinued by the Lake George [EMS] thus having a materially harmful impact upon the community welfare.” In our view, such testimony fails to demonstrate a concrete and identifiable injury to the Warren County community. Matter of Gentner v Hall, 2021 NY Slip Op 02028, Third Dept 4-1-21

 

April 1, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-01 11:06:142021-04-03 15:24:21WARREN COUNTY DID NOT HAVE “PARTICULAR EFFECT” JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL OFFENSES ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN SARATOGA COUNTY (THIRD DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Municipal Law, Negligence

THE COURT LACKED AUTHORITY TO DEEM A NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY FILED MORE THAN ONE YEAR AND 90 DAYS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION (SLIP AND FALL) ACCRUED, EVEN THOUGH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WAS SERVED WITHIN THAT TIME PERIOD; A NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED MORE THAN 90 DAYS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT IS A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the notice of claim served more than 90 after the slip and fall without leave of court was a nullity. The court further determined that the request for an order deeming the notice of claim timely served made more than one year and 90 days after the slip and fall could not be authorized by the court, even where the summons and complaint was served within that time period:

It is well settled that an “application for the extension [of time within which to serve a notice of claim] may be made before or after the commencement of the action but not more than one year and 90 days after the cause of action accrued, unless the statute has been tolled” .. . Where that time expires before the application for an extension is made, “the court lack[s] the power to authorize late filing of the notice [of claim]” … .

Here, we conclude that “[p]laintiff’s service of the summons and complaint within the limitations period does not excuse the failure to serve a notice of claim within that period,” and we further conclude that “plaintiff’s earlier service of a notice of claim is a nullity inasmuch as the notice of claim was served more than 90 days after the accident but before leave to serve a late notice of claim was granted” … . Thus, because plaintiff’s cross motion seeking an order deeming her notice of claim to be timely filed “was made after the expiration of the maximum period permitted” for seeking such relief, i.e., one year and 90 days, Supreme Court should have denied plaintiff’s cross motion, granted defendant’s motion, and dismissed the complaint … . Bennett v City of Buffalo Parks & Recreation, 2021 NY Slip Op 01920, Fourth Dept 3-26-21

 

March 26, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-03-26 12:17:262021-03-27 12:54:06THE COURT LACKED AUTHORITY TO DEEM A NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY FILED MORE THAN ONE YEAR AND 90 DAYS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION (SLIP AND FALL) ACCRUED, EVEN THOUGH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WAS SERVED WITHIN THAT TIME PERIOD; A NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED MORE THAN 90 DAYS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT IS A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT).
Administrative Law, Contract Law, Medicaid, Municipal Law, Social Services Law

FUNDS FOR PERSONAL CARE SERVICES ARE MEDICAID FUNDS SUBJECT TO THE AUDIT AND RECOUPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION; APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED (CT APP)..

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined funds paid for personal care were Medicaid funds which were subject to the audit and recoupment authority of the City of New York Human Resources Administration (HRA). The facts are explained in the Appellate Division decision:

For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion below (Matter of People Care Inc. v City of New York, 175 AD3d 134, 147-152 [1st Dept 2020] [Richter, J.P., dissenting]), we conclude that the funds for personal care services paid to petitioner People Care, Inc. under the Health Care Reform Act (Public Health Law §§ 2807-v [1] [bb] [i], [iii]) are Medicaid funds subject to the audit and recoupment authority of the City of New York Human Resources Administration (HRA) in accordance with the parties’ 2001 contract. Matter of People Care Inc. v City of N.Y. Human Resources Admin., 2021 NY Slip Op 01834, CtApp 3-25-21

 

March 25, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-03-25 21:12:432021-03-26 16:21:50FUNDS FOR PERSONAL CARE SERVICES ARE MEDICAID FUNDS SUBJECT TO THE AUDIT AND RECOUPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION; APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED (CT APP)..
Administrative Law, Employment Law, Municipal Law

THE NYPD OFFICER WHO EMPLOYED A PROHIBITED CHOKEHOLD ON ERIC GARNER, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO ERIC’S DEATH, WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FROM THE NYPD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the police officer who employed a prohibited chokehold on Eric Garner, which contributed to Eric’s death, was properly dismissed from employment by the New York Police Department (NYPD):

Substantial evidence supports respondents’ conclusion that petitioner recklessly caused injury to Eric Garner by maintaining a prohibited chokehold for 9 to 10 seconds after exigent circumstances were no longer present, thereby disregarding the risk of injury (Penal Law §§ 15.05[3]; 120.00[2] …).

We do not find the penalty “so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness” … . Conduct far less serious than petitioner’s has been found by the Court of Appeals to have a “destructive impact . . . on the confidence which it is so important for the public to have in its police officers” … . Matter of Pantaleo v O’Neill, 2021 NY Slip Op 01857, First Dept 3-25-21

 

March 25, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-03-25 18:03:072021-03-27 10:25:52THE NYPD OFFICER WHO EMPLOYED A PROHIBITED CHOKEHOLD ON ERIC GARNER, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO ERIC’S DEATH, WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FROM THE NYPD (FIRST DEPT).
Municipal Law

PLAINTIFF LANDLORD, PURSUANT TO THE VILLAGE WATER DEPARTMENT’S RULES, CAN NOT BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE TENANT’S UNPAID WATER BILLS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff landlord was not personally responsible for the tenant’s unpaid water bills. The village water department’s rules provided only a lien on the property and cutting off water as remedies:

The Water Department Rules and Regulations of the Village of Herkimer, on which the Village relies, do not authorize a claim against plaintiff for personal liability upon nonpayment of water rents. To the extent the Rules and Regulations determine the Village’s remedies for unpaid water bills, they refer to “a lien on the premises where the water is used” (Rule No. 8; see also Village Law § 11-1118 [providing that unpaid water rents constitute a lien on real property]) and to shutting off water supply, upon notice (see Rule No. 9; see also Village Law § 11-1116 [providing that a village may enforce observance of its water use rules and regulations by cutting off water supply]). Herkimer County Indus. Dev. Agency v Village of Herkimer, 2021 NY Slip Op 01835, CtApp 3-25-21

 

March 25, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-03-25 12:46:152021-03-26 14:38:16PLAINTIFF LANDLORD, PURSUANT TO THE VILLAGE WATER DEPARTMENT’S RULES, CAN NOT BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE TENANT’S UNPAID WATER BILLS (CT APP).
Appeals, Civil Procedure, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THERE IS NO NEED TO FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AFTER SERVICE OF A WARRANT AND NOTICE OF EVICTION; THE MATTER WAS CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the failure file an affidavit of service after serving the warrant and notice of eviction did not affect the validity of the service of the warrant of eviction which triggers the 14-day waiting period before execution of the warrant. The court noted that the matter was moot because the petitioner was subsequently evicted based on a different warrant, but the matter should be heard on appeal because the circumstance is likely to recur. The two dissenters argued the mootness of the matter precluded appeal:

… [T]he issuance of a warrant is the court’s last act in a summary proceeding, as denoted by the phrase, “Upon rendering a final judgment for [the owner], the court shall issue a warrant” (RPAPL 749 [1]). The execution of the warrant terminates the lease … . Likewise, the execution of the warrant terminates the summary proceeding and the jurisdiction of the court …  Because the court no longer has jurisdiction, the filing of the affidavit of service is superfluous. This stands in stark contrast to the purpose of the affidavit of service at the commencement of the summary proceeding, where it suffices as proof that the party was properly served pursuant to law, as proper service is required to bring a respondent within the jurisdiction of the court … .

… [W]e find that filing the affidavit of service at the conclusion of service of a warrant of eviction is not required, and the 14-day notice begins the day following the date of service, posting or mailing, whichever is later … . Matter of Dixon v County of Albany, 2021 NY Slip Op 01819, Third Dept 3-25-21

 

March 25, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-03-25 10:56:092021-03-27 11:26:03THERE IS NO NEED TO FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AFTER SERVICE OF A WARRANT AND NOTICE OF EVICTION; THE MATTER WAS CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (THIRD DEPT).
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Just Added: “Weekly Newsletter April 5 – 9, 2021–A Compilation of the Decision-Summaries Posted in “Latest Posts” on Monday April 12–Organized by Legal Category with a Table of Contents

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