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Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

HERE IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO PRECLUDE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS ABOUT HER DRUG USE AND PSYCHIATRIC CONDITION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the judge should not have precluded cross-examination of the complaining witness about drug use and psychiatric condition:

​In general, evidence of a witness’s substance abuse “is admissible to impeach [the] witness’ credibility if tending to show that [the witness] was under the influence of drugs while testifying, or at the time of the events to which [the witness] testified, or that [the witness’s] powers of perception or recollection, were actually impaired by the habit” … . Under the circumstances of this case, where the People disclosed that the complaining witness was in drug treatment at the time of her testimony and may have been using drugs when she first made allegations against the defendant, the County Court should not have precluded cross-examination as to the complaining witness’s drug use … .

Further, “[w]here a primary prosecution witness is shown to suffer from a psychiatric condition, the defense is entitled to show that the witness’s capacity to perceive and recall events was impaired by that condition” … . Here, the County Court should not have, in effect, granted the People’s application to preclude cross-examination of the complaining witness with respect to her mental health diagnosis, particularly since the People’s case primarily rested upon the complaining witness’s testimony … .People v Romero-Lopez, 2026 NY Slip Op 06331, Second Dept 10-28-26

​Practice Point: If there is evidence the complaining witness was using drugs at the time the allegations were made, it is reversible error to preclude cross-examination about drug use.

Practice Point: If the People disclose the complaining witness has a psychiatric condition, it is reversible error to preclude cross-examination about the condition.

 

October 28, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-28 14:40:032026-11-05 14:58:11HERE IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO PRECLUDE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS ABOUT HER DRUG USE AND PSYCHIATRIC CONDITION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Attorneys, Constitutional Law, Judges, Mental Hygiene Law

THE DEVELOPMENTALLY-DISABLED PETITIONER HAD THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HER OWN CHOOSING IN THIS PROCEEDING TO DISSOLVE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF HER PERSON (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, considering matters of first impression, determined the developmentally-disabled petitioner had the right to counsel of her own choosing in a proceeding to dissolve the guardianship of her person:

The right of an individual to select counsel “implicates both the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and will not yield unless confronted with some overriding competing public interest” … .

Contrary to the determination of the Surrogate’s Court, the record demonstrates that, under the circumstances present here, the petitioner freely and independently retained counsel of her own choosing. At the hearing, the petitioner articulated her purpose in retaining counsel and demonstrated an understanding of the nature and consequences of having counsel. The record shows, inter alia, that the petitioner had contacted more than one legal organization and spoke personally to the attorney whom she retained, and continued to communicate and work with that attorney. During the court’s inquiry, the petitioner was able to articulate a clear understanding of the purpose and goals of the proceeding and why counsel was sought to be retained. Matter of Jessica L.M. (Deborah M.), 2026 NY Slip Op 06306, Second Dept 10-28-26

Practice Point: Here the developmentally-disabled petitioner had the right to counsel of her own choosing in this dissolution-of-guardianship proceeding.

 

October 28, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-28 14:24:022026-11-05 14:39:24THE DEVELOPMENTALLY-DISABLED PETITIONER HAD THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HER OWN CHOOSING IN THIS PROCEEDING TO DISSOLVE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF HER PERSON (SECOND DEPT).
Appeals, Attorneys, Criminal Law

DEFENDANT FILED A SUBSTANTIAL MOTION TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO BE PRESENT AT THE PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW; THE ISSUE IS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION; HERE THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to have defense counsel present at the presentence interview should have been granted. The issue was not preserved but was considered under the court’s interest of justice jurisdiction. Because there is no statute on point, whether to allow defense counsel at the presentence interview is a matter of discretion:

… [T]he absence of a provision indicating whether counsel is permitted to attend the presentence interview leaves the issue to the court’s discretion, reviewable for abuse or improvident exercise thereof … .

Here, in advance of the presentence interview, defendant filed a substantial application requesting that counsel be permitted to attend. Because the extent of defendant’s sentence was subject to the court’s decision following his trial conviction and his application noted, among other things, the applicability of SORA at the conclusion of his incarceratory term, Supreme Court’s denial of defense counsel’s attendance at the presentence interview was an improvident exercise of discretion. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence should be vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing after a presentence interview at which defense counsel may appear. People v Lee, 2026 NY Slip Op 06259, First Dept 10-27-26

Practice Point: Here defendant’s “substantial” motion seeking permission to have defense counsel at the presentence interview should have been granted. Matter remitted.

 

October 27, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-27 09:44:052026-11-05 09:46:03DEFENDANT FILED A SUBSTANTIAL MOTION TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO BE PRESENT AT THE PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW; THE ISSUE IS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION; HERE THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Fiduciary Duty, Trusts and Estates

THE PETITION RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S DAUGHTER AND THE FAMILY ATTORNEY CAUSED THE APPELLANT TO MISS THE DEADLINES FOR FILING A SPOUSAL ELECTION; ALTHOUGH THE STATUTORY DEADLINES CANNOT BE EXTENDED, THE MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION HERE ASKS WHETHER APPELLANT’S DAUGHTER IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING THE DEADLINES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Shulman, in a matter of first impression, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined the facts alleged, if proven, could support the application equitable estoppel to preclude respondent-daughter from invoking statutory deadlines preventing her mother (the appellant) from filing a spousal election. The petition raised the question whether respondent daughter and the family attorney caused appellant to miss the deadlines:

Appellant is the 88-year-old surviving spouse of the decedent, her husband of 64 years. Over the course of their marriage, they acquired, rehabilitated, and operated 14 East Village buildings forming the core of a family real estate enterprise ultimately valued at more than $45 million. Appellant handled day-to-day management while the decedent handled the financials. Their two children include respondent and a son, Carlo. * * *

Following the decedent’s death, appellant experienced significant medical challenges and cognitive vulnerability leading to hospitalization and rehabilitation. During this period, the family’s long-time attorney, nonparty Gregg Weiss, prepared a broad, highly customized power of attorney naming respondent as attorney-in-fact. This document granted wide authority, with powers far beyond those typically granted in the statutory form, including the power to engage in trust related transactions. It was brought to appellant in the rehabilitation facility, where she signed it without any discussion or explanation of its consequences. * * *

Despite representing appellant and decedent’s estate at the time, Weiss never provided appellant with any drafts beforehand, nor is there any indication Weiss reviewed drafts with her or discussed their legal significance. These are just some of the facts the petition alleges that were the product of fiduciary nondisclosure and conflict. Critically, a video recording in the record shows respondent presenting the documents to appellant, who mutely signs them while visibly medicated on Lorazepam and impaired, without reading or understanding their terms. Matter of Giurdanella, 2026 NY Slip Op 06234, First Dept 10-22-26

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 22:03:452026-10-27 22:33:36THE PETITION RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE APPELLANT’S DAUGHTER AND THE FAMILY ATTORNEY CAUSED THE APPELLANT TO MISS THE DEADLINES FOR FILING A SPOUSAL ELECTION; ALTHOUGH THE STATUTORY DEADLINES CANNOT BE EXTENDED, THE MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION HERE ASKS WHETHER APPELLANT’S DAUGHTER IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING THE DEADLINES (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Judges

THE JUDGE RESPONDED TO A NOTE FROM ONE OF THE JURORS WHO EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH ANOTHER JUROR; THE JUDGE SPOKE TO HER ALONE AND APPARENTLY REVIEWED THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD GIVEN THE JURY ABOUT MEANINGFUL AND GOOD FAITH DELIBERATIONS; THAT WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, on writ of error coram nobis alleging ineffective appellate counsel, determined the trial judge committed a mode of proceedings error by instructing a single juror in the absence of the remaining jurors:​

On the fifth day of deliberations, the trial judge placed on the record that he had received a note from one of the jurors asking to speak with him and that, “with the consent of the attorneys,” he engaged in an off-the-record discussion with the juror in his chambers. Although the discussion was not transcribed, the trial judge explained that the juror had vented her frustration about the manner in which another juror was deliberating with her, revealing that “she was taking her role as a juror seriously” and that she was “being confronted” by another juror “when she voiced an opinion on issues” and “ask[ed] specific questions.” In response, the trial judge informed the juror that she “ha[d] a right to ask questions, and [the other jurors] ha[d] an obligation to deliberate with her and to respond to her in a civil manner.” The trial judge further revealed that, during the discussion with this juror, he “substantially reviewed with her the instructions that [he had given] to all the jurors regarding the requirement of meaningful and in-good-faith deliberations.” After the trial judge placed such exchange on the record, defendant’s counsel revealed that he was contemplating requesting that the court charge the entire jury on civility. However, he ultimately declined to do so.

… [W]e disagree with the People’s assertion that County Court’s off-the-record discussion with the juror was ministerial in nature. Although the juror’s note was ambiguous and the discussion in chambers was not transcribed — making it impossible to know the precise nature of the conversation — County Court revealed that it had “substantially reviewed” with the juror the instructions it had previously provided to the entire jury panel regarding meaningful and good faith deliberations. As noted by the Court of Appeals, ” ‘there are few moments in a criminal trial more critical to its outcome than when the court responds to a deliberating jury’s request for clarification of the law or further guidance on the process of deliberations'” … . Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that the court’s conversation with the juror — which included providing a substantive instruction on the jurors’ obligations during the deliberative process — was not ministerial in nature, violated defendant’s right to be present at all material stages of the trial and constituted a mode of proceedings error … . People v Anderson, 2026 NY Slip Op 06169, Third Dept 1-22-26

Practice Point: Here the judge’s meeting with a juror alone and reviewing some of the jury instructions outside the presence of the other jurors was deemed a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal.​

 

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 16:40:462026-10-30 17:54:23THE JUDGE RESPONDED TO A NOTE FROM ONE OF THE JURORS WHO EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH ANOTHER JUROR; THE JUDGE SPOKE TO HER ALONE AND APPARENTLY REVIEWED THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD GIVEN THE JURY ABOUT MEANINGFUL AND GOOD FAITH DELIBERATIONS; THAT WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (THIRD DEPT).
Attorneys, Contract Law, Debtor-Creditor

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE ORIGINAL SUIT ON THE NOTE, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO “FEES ON FEES” INCURRED DEFENDING DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff (Davidoff) was not entitled to an award of “fees on fees.” Defendants (the Hershfields) had appealed a judgment on a note which included an award of attorney’s fees to Davidoff. Davidoff then sued the Hershfields for the attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal, so-called “fees on fees.” The Second Department held that the language of the note did not support a “fees on fees” award:​

Davidoff commenced the instant action against the Hershfields, alleging that under the terms of the note, he was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with the prior appeal and in bringing this action. …

… Supreme Court granted Davidoff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability … . The court determined that Davidoff was entitled to recover his attorneys’ fees in connection with the prior appeal and the instant action under the clear terms of the note. …

… Supreme Court should have denied Davidoff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and should have granted the Hershfields’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. “The construction and interpretation of an unambiguous written contract is an issue of law within the province of the court, as is the inquiry of whether the writing is ambiguous in the first instance. If the language is free from ambiguity, its meaning may be determined as a matter of law on the basis of the writing alone without resort to extrinsic evidence” … . “[A]n award of attorneys’ fees for the costs incurred in prosecuting a claim for an award of attorneys’ fees, so called ‘fees on fees,’ must be based upon a specific contractual provision or statute” … . “Consequently, where a party is under no legal duty to indemnify, a contract assuming that obligation must be strictly construed to avoid reading into it a duty which the parties did not intend to be assumed” … .

… Davidoff failed to establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability for breach of contract. The note did not contain clear language expressly providing for the prevailing party to recover fees on fees or any reference to fees incurred to recover attorneys’ fees … . “Given the absence of unmistakably clear intent regarding the recovery of fees on fees, a right to recover those fees should not be implied” … . Davidoff v Hershfield, 2026 NY Slip Op 05931, Second Dept 10-14-26

Practice Point: To recover “fees on fees” the relevant contract must explicitly refer to fees incurred to recover attorney’s fees.

 

October 14, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-14 16:04:052026-10-24 08:53:16ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE ORIGINAL SUIT ON THE NOTE, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO “FEES ON FEES” INCURRED DEFENDING DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Family Law

THE PEOPLE’S AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD’S CASE TO FAMILY COURT WAS NOT BASED ON THE PROSECUTOR’S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FAILED TO ALLEGE DEFENDANT’S SPECIFIC CONDUCT; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the People’s motion to prevent removal of the 17-year-old defendant’s case to Family Court should have been denied:

The court was … required to order removal of the action to Family Court unless the People successfully moved to prevent removal by establishing “that extraordinary circumstances exist that should prevent the transfer” … . Such a motion must “contain allegations of sworn fact based upon personal knowledge of the affiant, and shall indicate if the district attorney is requesting a hearing” … . Whether extraordinary circumstances exist to preclude removal to Family Court is a discretionary determination to be made by a court after consideration of “the totality of the facts and circumstances” … . A court exercising that discretion, however, should give consideration to the legislative intent that retention should be the exception and not the rule, i.e., that only “extremely rare and exceptional cases” involving “highly unusual and heinous facts” and “strong proof that the young person is not amenable [to] or would not benefit in any way from the heightened services in the family court” should be precluded from removal … .

Here, the People’s supporting affirmation relied heavily on the nature of the charges against defendant. … [E]ach count on which defendant was indicted also named 17 codefendants with no factual allegations that would permit parsing out defendant’s specific conduct in, for example, possessing either a controlled substance or a weapon. Although defendant was also alleged to have committed conspiracy in the second degree, he was not alleged to have committed any overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy. The prosecutor also failed to state that the few factual allegations that were included in the People’s supporting affirmation were based on the prosecutor’s “personal knowledge” …  and that conclusion is not a reasonable inference from the affirmation as a whole … . Instead, there is no indication from what specific sources any information was obtained, no supporting documentation was included with the motion, and no request for a hearing was made … . Although the People also argued that defendant’s previous arrests on similar charges weighed against removal, we note that “reoffense in and of itself” is not “extraordinary” (id. at 666 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The mere fact of a prior charge or charges does not provide evidence of defendant’s actual prior conduct, i.e., the specific “illegal or immoral acts,” if any, that might have led to those charges … , or whether defendant’s conduct constituted “escalating criminal behavior” … . The People’s motion therefore failed to contain sufficient “allegations of sworn fact based upon personal knowledge of [an] affiant” … on which the court could have relied in considering defendant’s actual role in the charged offenses in relation to his numerous codefendants, many of whom were adults … . People v Quashawn C., 2026 NY Slip Op 05892, Fourth Dept 10-9-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a detailed discussion of what a prosecutor must demonstrate to prevent removal of a 17-year-old defendant’s case to Family Court.

 

October 9, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-09 22:33:082026-10-19 23:08:25THE PEOPLE’S AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD’S CASE TO FAMILY COURT WAS NOT BASED ON THE PROSECUTOR’S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FAILED TO ALLEGE DEFENDANT’S SPECIFIC CONDUCT; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence

PRESENTING A VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD VICTIM TO THE GRAND JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF A COURT ORDER VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND IMPAIRED THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS; INDICTMENT DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, dismissing the indictment without prejudice, determined presenting a videotaped interview of the 17-year-old victim without a court order violated the Criminal Procedure Law and impaired the integrity of the proceedings:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted rape in the first degree … . Defendant contends that County Court erred in denying that part of his omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the grand jury proceeding failed “to conform to the requirements of [CPL] article [190] to such degree that the integrity thereof [was] impaired and prejudice to the defendant” resulted (CPL 210.35 [5]). We agree. The People correctly concede on appeal that the prosecutor improperly presented to the grand jury a videotaped interview of the approximately 17-year-old victim conducted by a social services caseworker in lieu of her live testimony without adhering to any of the requirements of CPL 190.32, including the obligation to seek a court order authorizing the videotaping of an examination of the victim as a “special witness” … . We agree with the parties that, under these circumstances, this error rendered the proceeding so irregular “that the integrity thereof [was] impaired and prejudice to . . . defendant may [have] result[ed]” (CPL 210.35 [5]; see CPL 210.20 [1] [c] …). People v Thompson, 2026 NY Slip Op 05874, Fourth Dept 10-9-26

Practice Point: Presenting a videotaped interview of a crime victim to a grand jury without a court order may impair the integrity of the proceedings requiring dismissal of the indictment.

 

October 9, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-09 22:06:582026-10-19 22:30:21PRESENTING A VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD VICTIM TO THE GRAND JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF A COURT ORDER VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND IMPAIRED THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS; INDICTMENT DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Civil Rights Law, Defamation

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY’S DEFAMATION SUIT AGAINST A FORMER CLIENT WHO POSTED A NEGATIVE REVIEW WAS A “STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPP);” PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE SUIT HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW; THE POST WAS NONACTIONABLE OPINION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determines plaintiff-attorney’s defamation action against a former client who posted a negative review on the attorney’s website was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). Plaintiff did not demonstrate the defamation action had a substantial basis in law because the posted review was nonactionable opinion:

… [T]he defendant satisfied her initial burden of establishing that this is an action involving public petition and participation, since it involves a claim based upon a communication in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest [see Civil Rights Law 76-a]. * * *

The elements of a cause of action alleging defamation are (1) a false statement that tends to expose a person to public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, (2) published without privilege or authorization to a third party, (3) amounting to fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and (4) either causing special harm or constituting defamation per se … . “Since falsity is a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only facts are capable of being proven false, it follows that only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action” … . Thus, an expression of pure opinion is not actionable, no matter how vituperative or unreasonable it may be … . Shapiro v Kushnick-Carr, 2026 NY Slip Op 05822, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Here an attorney’s defamation action against a former client who posted a negative review was deemed a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) which was dismissed because it did not have a “substantial basis in law” (the post was nonactionable opinion).

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 11:29:162026-10-18 11:52:35PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY’S DEFAMATION SUIT AGAINST A FORMER CLIENT WHO POSTED A NEGATIVE REVIEW WAS A “STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPP);” PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE SUIT HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW; THE POST WAS NONACTIONABLE OPINION (SECOND DEPT).
Attorneys, Contract Law

THIS OPINION DEMONSTRATES HOW COURTS DEAL WITH INTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF A CONTRACT WHERE DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS OF A KEY WORD, HERE THE WORD “COMMIT,” SUPPORT THE OPPOSING POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, over a detailed dissent, affirmed the lower court’s interpretation of the contract language and the related denial of plaintiff’s demand for prevailing-party attorney’s fees. The opinion turned on the definition of “commit” and is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The opinion should be consulted for insight into the interpretation of contract language where dictionary definitions support the opposing positions of the parties. Aurelius Capital Master Ltd. v Hertz Intl. Ltd., 2026 NY Slip Op 05369, First Dept 9-22-26

 

September 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-22 10:37:222026-09-27 13:23:42THIS OPINION DEMONSTRATES HOW COURTS DEAL WITH INTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF A CONTRACT WHERE DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS OF A KEY WORD, HERE THE WORD “COMMIT,” SUPPORT THE OPPOSING POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES (FIRST DEPT).
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