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Attorneys, Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)

HERE, IN THIS FOIL PROCEEDING, THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS WERE ULTIMATELY PROVIDED AFTER AN INITIAL REFUSAL RENDERING THE ACTION MOOT; THE PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES, HOWEVER, WAS NOT PRECLUDED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the award of attorney’s for a FOIL request is not precluded when the underlying action is rendered moot because the requested documents were ultimately provided (after an initial refusal):

The fact that the proceeding has been rendered moot by the disclosure of the documents does not … preclude petitioner’s request for an award of fees … .The Public Officers Law permits an award of “reasonable [counsel] fees and other litigation costs” where the petitioner “has substantially prevailed” in a FOIL proceeding and “when the agency failed to respond to a request . . . within the statutory time frame” … . Under the circumstances, as petitioner included in his petition a request for fees associated with the FOIL application, the matter must be remitted to Supreme Court for a determination of an award of costs and fees pursuant to Public Officers Law § 89 (4) (c) (i). Matter of Lewis v James, 2022 NY Slip Op 04066, Third Dept 6-23-22

Practice Point: If a FOIL request, after an initial refusal to provide the requested documents, is rendered moot by the respondent’s ultimately providing the documents, an award of attorney’s fees to the petitioner is not precluded.

 

June 23, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-23 11:35:202022-06-26 11:56:29HERE, IN THIS FOIL PROCEEDING, THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS WERE ULTIMATELY PROVIDED AFTER AN INITIAL REFUSAL RENDERING THE ACTION MOOT; THE PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES, HOWEVER, WAS NOT PRECLUDED (THIRD DEPT).
Attorneys, Civil Procedure

PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY WAS NOT AWARE OF COVID-RELATED PROCEDURAL CHANGES FOR CONDUCTING COMPLIANCE CONFERENCES; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the COVID-related law office failure was an adequate excuse and plaintiff’s motion to vacate the dismissal of the action should have been granted:

Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the dismissal, as plaintiffs showed both a reasonable excuse for their default and a meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 2005 …). Under the circumstances, law office failure constitutes a reasonable excuse for the default, since plaintiffs’ counsel was unaware that procedures for conducting compliance conferences had changed during the COVID-19 pandemic and, as a result, inadvertently failed to submit stipulations before a scheduled conference … .. Furthermore, plaintiffs demonstrated a meritorious cause of action by submitting the complaint, a bill of particulars, and the injured plaintiff’s deposition testimony … . Defendants also were not prejudiced by plaintiffs’ failure to appear, and indeed, did not oppose the motion to vacate … . Willner v S Norsel Realties LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 04111, First Dept 6-23-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff’s attorney was not aware of procedural changes related to COVID and the action was dismissed because counsel did not submit stipulations before the scheduled compliance conference. This “law office failure” was a “reasonable excuse.” Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the dismissal of the action should have been granted.

 

June 23, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-23 11:04:502022-06-25 11:19:22PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY WAS NOT AWARE OF COVID-RELATED PROCEDURAL CHANGES FOR CONDUCTING COMPLIANCE CONFERENCES; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
Arbitration, Attorneys, Contract Law, Insurance Law

IN THIS VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF ENTERED AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WHICH INDICATED THE AWARD WOULD BE BETWEEN $0 AND $50,000, BUT THE POLICY LIMITS WERE $100,000/300,000; THE UNILATERAL MISTAKE BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY RE: THE POLICY LIMITS WAS NOT INDUCED BY DEFENDANT OR DEFENDANT’S CARRIER, THEREFORE RESCISSION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in this vehicle-accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff wanted the agreement to arbitrate rescinded because it did not reflect the actual policy limits. But the unilateral mistake by plaintiff’s attorney was not induced by the defendant because defendant’s insurance carrier had twice notified plaintiff’s attorney of the policy limits. The agreement to arbitrate set the award at between $0 and $50,000, but the policy limits were $100,000/300,000:

“Generally, a party’s unilateral mistake is a ground for rescission of a contract only where it was induced by fraud or other wrongful conduct by the other party” … . Moreover, “the equitable remedy of rescission is not available to relieve an allegedly mistaken party of the consequences of their failure to exercise ordinary care” … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, he failed to establish that the arbitration agreement was subject to the equitable remedy of rescission on the ground of unilateral mistake by his attorney regarding the policy limits … . The purported mistake in the high-low agreement at issue arose not from any fraudulent inducement by the defendant, but from the failure of the plaintiff’s attorney to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances … . Maynard v Smith, 2022 NY Slip Op 04017, Second Dept 6-22-22

Practice Point: A unilateral mistake by one party which was not induced by the other party is not a ground for rescission of a contract.

 

June 22, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-22 14:40:452022-06-25 15:02:16IN THIS VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF ENTERED AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WHICH INDICATED THE AWARD WOULD BE BETWEEN $0 AND $50,000, BUT THE POLICY LIMITS WERE $100,000/300,000; THE UNILATERAL MISTAKE BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY RE: THE POLICY LIMITS WAS NOT INDUCED BY DEFENDANT OR DEFENDANT’S CARRIER, THEREFORE RESCISSION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY (SECOND DEPT).
Attorneys, Contract Law, Conversion, Landlord-Tenant

ALTHOUGH THE PLAINTIFFS’ $96,000, CONSTITUTING TWO MONTHS’ RENT AND A SECURITY DEPOSIT, WAS TRANSFERRED TO DEFENDANT FROM AN ATTORNEY’S IOLA ACCOUNT, THE $96,000 CONSTITUTED AN “IDENTIFIABLE FUND” WHICH DEFENDANT “CONVERTED” WHEN IT WAS NOT RETURNED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rodriguez, over a two-justice dissent, determined the $96,000 transferred from an attorney’s IOLA account to defendant landlord was an “identifiable fund” which was a proper subject of this conversion action. The fund was for two months rent and a security deposit on a lease. But the lease was never signed. By keeping the $96,000 defendant had converted the “identified fund.” One of the points in the opinion was that the transfer of funds to an attorney’s IOLA account does not necessarily render the funds incapable of being “identified:”

… [W]e now clarify that our prior decision in SH575 Holdings [195 AD3d 429], which found that funds were not specifically identifiable by virtue of being transferred into the IOLA account of an attorney involved in a Ponzi scheme, should not be read to preclude a cause of action for conversion when funds at issue have been commingled to any extent. Here, notwithstanding the funds’ transmission through plaintiffs’ attorney’s IOLA account, the funds’ temporary presence in that account did not constitute commingling under any measure pertinent to this cause of action. While the funds were in plaintiffs’ attorneys’ IOLA account, they remained plaintiffs’ funds. Consequently, this conclusion is not at odds with this Court’s holding in SH575 Holdings. Family Health Mgt., LLC v Rohan Devs., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03796, First Dept 6-9-22

Practice Point: Here the plaintiffs’ security deposit and two-months rent amounting to $96,000 were transferred to defendant landlord from an attorney’s IOLA account. However the lease was never signed and defendant did not return the money. Despite the fact that the money was deposited in the IOLA account, it remained an “identifiable fund” and was therefore a proper subject for this conversion action.

 

June 9, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-09 08:58:342022-06-11 09:30:02ALTHOUGH THE PLAINTIFFS’ $96,000, CONSTITUTING TWO MONTHS’ RENT AND A SECURITY DEPOSIT, WAS TRANSFERRED TO DEFENDANT FROM AN ATTORNEY’S IOLA ACCOUNT, THE $96,000 CONSTITUTED AN “IDENTIFIABLE FUND” WHICH DEFENDANT “CONVERTED” WHEN IT WAS NOT RETURNED (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Contract Law, Family Law

THE WIFE RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT (1) THE FAIRNESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, (2) WHETHER HER ATTORNEY, CHOSEN FOR HER, ENGAGED IN MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS, (3) WHETHER SHE RATIFIED THE AGREEMENT, AND (4) WHETHER SHE WAS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the wife raised questions of fact about the fairness of the prenuptial agreement negotiations and whether she ratified the agreement. The wife alleged her husband chose the attorney who represented her merely to ensure she understood the agreement and not to negotiate its terms. In addition, Supreme Court should not have denied the wife’s motion for temporary maintenance:

On the last day of negotiations between counsel, the wife averred that she was preparing to travel to Florida with the parties’ children. While the communications submitted by the husband in support of his motion indicate that counsel for the parties continued discussing potential changes to the agreement, there is conflicting evidence establishing the extent that the wife was meaningfully involved in those discussions. The wife further averred that the first opportunity she had to review the agreement was in Florida, at which point it was already in its final form. We find that the foregoing facts, if established, raise issues concerning whether the wife was meaningfully represented during the abbreviated negotiations, and also raise an inference that the husband did not intend on engaging in a good faith negotiation of the agreement from the outset, which, if true, would be sufficient to establish overreaching on his part … . …

We further … the husband’s contention that the wife ratified the agreement and is therefore foreclosed from challenging its validity. … [I]t is clear that the wife did not begin receiving benefits under the agreement until the husband commenced this divorce action, and she took sufficiently prompt action to challenge the validity of the agreement in the context of this litigation … . …

… Supreme Court improperly denied the wife’s cross motion for temporary maintenance. To this end, the wife argues that the maintenance provision of the agreement must be invalidated for failing to comply with the requirements of Domestic Relations Law former § 236 (B) (5-a) (f). We agree. Spiegel v Spiegel, 2022 NY Slip Op 03778, Third Dept 6-9-22

Practice Point: Here in this divorce action there were questions of fact whether the wife was meaningfully represented in the prenuptial-agreement negotiations and whether she ratified the agreement. In addition, pursuant to the Domestic Relation Law, Supreme Court should have awarded temporary maintenance.

 

June 9, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-09 08:39:202022-06-12 09:18:30THE WIFE RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT (1) THE FAIRNESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, (2) WHETHER HER ATTORNEY, CHOSEN FOR HER, ENGAGED IN MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS, (3) WHETHER SHE RATIFIED THE AGREEMENT, AND (4) WHETHER SHE WAS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE (THIRD DEPT).
Attorneys, Family Law

NO REASON MOTHER’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE PRESENT, EITHER IN PERSON OR ELECTRONICALLY, DURING A HOME VISIT BY THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined there was no reason mother’s attorney could not be present, either in person of electronically, during a home visit by the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS):

Where, as here, the Family Court issued an order temporarily releasing a child who is the subject of a neglect proceeding to a parent pending a final order of disposition (see Family Ct Act § 1027[d]), the order may include a direction for the parent to “cooperat[e] in making the child available for . . . visits by the child protective agency, including visits in the home” (id. § 1017[3]). However, there are no provisions of the Family Court Act—nor does ACS cite to any other authority—prohibiting a respondent in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10 from having counsel present during a home visit. Thus, the respondent is not automatically prohibited from having an attorney—or any other individual—present in her home during the home visit, either in person or electronically. Matter of Lexis B. (Natalia B.), 2022 NY Slip Op 03721, Second Dept 6-8-22

​Practice Point: The Administration for Children’s Services (ASC) did not cite any authority for its attempt to preclude mother’s attorney from being present, either in person or electronically, during ASC’s home visits.

 

June 8, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-08 13:52:002022-06-12 08:15:14NO REASON MOTHER’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE PRESENT, EITHER IN PERSON OR ELECTRONICALLY, DURING A HOME VISIT BY THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS) (SECOND DEPT).
Appeals, Attorneys, Family Law

ALTHOUGH FATHER FAILED TO APPEAR, HIS COUNSEL APPEARED AND FATHER WAS THEREFORE NOT IN DEFAULT; BECAUSE FATHER WAS NOT IN DEFAULT, APPEAL IS NOT PRECLUDED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating the portions of the order entered on default, determined father’s failure to appear was not a default because his counsel appeared. Because father was not in default, appeal is not precluded:

We agree with the father that Family Court erred in entering the order upon his default based on his failure to appear in court. The record establishes that the father “was represented by counsel, and we have previously determined that, [w]here a party fails to appear [in court on a scheduled date] but is represented by counsel, the order is not one entered upon the default of the aggrieved party and appeal is not precluded” … . Matter of Akol v Afet, 2022 NY Slip Op 03641, Fourth Dept 6-3-22

Practice Point: When counsel appears in Family Court, the party represented by counsel is not in default. An appeal is available to a party not in default.

 

June 3, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-03 11:22:552022-06-05 11:34:17ALTHOUGH FATHER FAILED TO APPEAR, HIS COUNSEL APPEARED AND FATHER WAS THEREFORE NOT IN DEFAULT; BECAUSE FATHER WAS NOT IN DEFAULT, APPEAL IS NOT PRECLUDED (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO INTERVIEW A POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY WITNESS; MOTION TO VACATE THE MURDER CONVICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance grounds should have been granted. Defense counsel did not interview a witness who, based on the witness’s testimony at the hearing on the motion to vacate, would have testified defendant was not at the scene of the shooting:

… [W]e conclude that defendant met his burden of establishing that defense counsel’s failure to interview the potentially exculpatory witness constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, inasmuch as the record before us reflects “the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for defense counsel’s allegedly deficient conduct” … . The failure by defendant’s trial counsel to interview the witness cannot be characterized as a legitimate strategic decision because, “without collecting that information, [defense] counsel could not make an informed decision as to whether the witness[‘s] evidence might be helpful at trial” … . To the extent that the defense team deemed the witness not credible due to his criminal record or history, that alone “does not excuse trial counsel’s failure to investigate since a witness’s unsavory background[ ] does not render his or her testimony incredible as a matter of law” … . Further, we conclude that, “even if the witness[‘s] criminal record[] provided a strategic basis for choosing not to present [his] testimony, it does not provide an excuse for [defense] counsel’s failure to investigate [him] as [a] possible witness[ ]” … . Moreover, the witness’s testimony at the CPL article 440 hearing was wholly consistent with the theory pursued by trial counsel, namely that defendant was not present at the shooting and that the crime was instead committed by an individual seeking to rob the victims’ residence, and the proposed witness would have provided the only eyewitness testimony at trial as to the shooting. People v Williams, 2022 NY Slip Op 03625, Fourth Dept 6-3-22

Practice Point: Here defense counsel was made aware of a potentially exculpatory witness and did not interview him. The fact that defense counsel felt the witness was not credible did not excuse the failure to investigate. Defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance grounds was granted by the appellate court.

 

June 3, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-03 10:56:572022-06-05 11:21:57DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO INTERVIEW A POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY WITNESS; MOTION TO VACATE THE MURDER CONVICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law

DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO ATTEMPTED GANG ASSAULT, WHICH IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY AT TRIAL; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON WHETHER HIS PLEA WAS RENDERED INVOLUNTARY BY COUNSEL’S INACCURATE ADVICE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVICTION; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined there should be a hearing on whether defendant’s plea to attempted gang assault was involuntary. Defendant contended the plea was based on inaccurate advice from counsel. “Attempted gang assault” is a legal impossibility for trial purposes:

… [W]e agree with defendant that “attempted gang assault in the second degree is a legal impossibility for trial purposes. . . , as ‘there can be no attempt to commit a crime which makes the causing of a certain result criminal even though wholly unintended’ ” … . Based on that law and our review of the record, we further agree with defendant that the advice of defense counsel regarding the possibility of a conviction at trial of attempted gang assault in the second degree was erroneous.

Nevertheless, “[i]t is well settled that permission to withdraw a guilty plea rests largely within the court’s discretion” … . “Whether a plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary is dependent upon a number of factors ‘including the nature and terms of the agreement, the reasonableness of the bargain, and the age and experience of the accused’ . . . That the defendant allegedly received inaccurate information regarding [the possibility of a conviction at trial and the resulting impact upon] his possible sentence exposure is another factor which must be considered by the court, but it is not, in and of itself, dispositive” … . “Where . . . the record raises a legitimate question as to the voluntariness of the plea, an evidentiary hearing is required” … . People v Davis, 2022 NY Slip Op 03610, Fourth Dept 6-3-22

Practice Point: “Attempted gang assault” is a legal impossibility at trial. Here defendant was entitled to a hearing on whether his plea to attempted gang assault was involuntary because of counsel’s inaccurate advice about the possibility of conviction at trial.

 

June 3, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-03 10:36:432022-06-05 10:56:52DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO ATTEMPTED GANG ASSAULT, WHICH IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY AT TRIAL; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON WHETHER HIS PLEA WAS RENDERED INVOLUNTARY BY COUNSEL’S INACCURATE ADVICE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVICTION; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Court of Claims, Evidence, Negligence

CLAIMANT’S ATTORNEY WAS NOT AWARE OF THE THIRD DEPARTMENT’S UNIQUE REQUIREMENT OF FULL EXPERT-WITNESS DISCLOSURE FOR A TREATING PHYSICIAN; THAT WAS AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR AN UNTIMELY DISCLOSURE (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined claimant’s treating physician (Hopson) in this personal injury case should have been allowed to testify as an expert, despite the failure to comply with full expert disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3101. The Third Department is the only department which requires such full expert disclosure by a treating physician and claimant’s attorney had not practiced in the Third Department:

There is no dispute that claimant failed to comply with the expert disclosure requirements of CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) in identifying Hopson as a witness. Nevertheless, we disagree with the Court of Claims’ finding that claimant’s excuse was unreasonable. The situation here mirrors that in Schmitt v Oneonta City Sch. Dist. (151 AD3d 1254), where we accepted the explanation of the plaintiffs’ attorney that he was “unaware of this Court’s interpretation of CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) and the corresponding need to file an expert disclosure for a treating physician, and the record [was] otherwise devoid of any indication that counsel’s failure to file such disclosure was willful” … . The same holds true here, as claimant’s attorney revealed that she practices law in a different judicial department and candidly conceded that she was unaware of this Court’s interpretation that the statute requires expert disclosure for treating physicians. There is nothing in the record calling into question the veracity of counsel’s representations and no basis to conclude that the noncompliance with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) was willful. As such, the court erred in precluding Hopson’s testimony as an expert witness…. . Freeman v State of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 03559, Third Dept 6-2-22

Practice Point: Only the Third Department requires full expert-witness disclosure for a treating physician.

 

June 2, 2022/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-06-02 16:25:452022-06-04 08:08:43CLAIMANT’S ATTORNEY WAS NOT AWARE OF THE THIRD DEPARTMENT’S UNIQUE REQUIREMENT OF FULL EXPERT-WITNESS DISCLOSURE FOR A TREATING PHYSICIAN; THAT WAS AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR AN UNTIMELY DISCLOSURE (THIRD DEPT). ​
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