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You are here: Home1 / Evidence
Criminal Law, Evidence

HERE THE “MERGER DOCTRINE” APPLIED TO THE KIDNAPPING AND ASSAULT CHARGES, THE KIDNAPPING CONVICTION WAS REVERSED AND THE COUNT DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court in this assault/kidnapping case, determined the merger doctrine should have been applied and reversed the kidnapping conviction:

… [A] kidnapping is generally deemed to merge with another offense where there is minimal asportation immediately preceding the other crime or where the restraint and underlying crime are essentially simultaneous” … . Notwithstanding the foregoing, “the merger doctrine does not apply ‘where the manner of detention is egregious’ ” … .

Here, the proof at trial demonstrated that the victim was lured to the residence on the promise of sex and drugs and, immediately upon entering, he was assaulted while also being prevented from leaving for 15 to 20 minutes. Thus, the kidnapping and the assault occurred simultaneously, as part of a single, uninterrupted and relatively brief episode … . * * *  … [T]he manner of detention was not so egregious that the kidnapping conviction should be sustained … . People v Hart, 2026 NY Slip Op 06360, Third Dept 10-29-26

Practice Point: Under the merger doctrine, where the actions of the defendant are not “egregious” and the victim is restrained for a brief period of time while other offenses are committed, a kidnapping charge will be deemed “merged” with the other offenses and the kidnapping count will be dismissed.

 

October 29, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-29 13:38:302026-11-06 20:00:51HERE THE “MERGER DOCTRINE” APPLIED TO THE KIDNAPPING AND ASSAULT CHARGES, THE KIDNAPPING CONVICTION WAS REVERSED AND THE COUNT DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).
Evidence, Labor Law-Construction Law

PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE STAIRCASE WHERE HE SLIPPED ON ICE WAS THE ONLY MEANS OF ACCESS TO THE WORK SITE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s summary judgment motion for the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action should not have been granted. Plaintiff slipped on ice on a permanent staircase. A permanent staircase qualifies as a “safety device” only when it is the only means of access to the worksite. Plaintiff failed to prove the “only means of access” element:

Plaintiff failed to establish that the staircase was the sole means of access because he testified that he could have gone up one flight of stairs and then taken the hoist down, which was how he returned to the worksite after his accident. Even if plaintiff established prima facie that the staircase was the sole means of access, defendants raised an issue of fact through the site safety manager’s affidavit, which stated there were additional staircases that plaintiff could have used as well as other hoists in operation at the site at the time of the accident. Ramos v Lendlease (US) Constr. LMB Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 06394, First Dept 10-29-26

Practice Point: A permanent staircase is a “safety device” within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1) if it is the only means of access to the work site.​

​

October 29, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-29 09:46:142026-11-05 14:07:39PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE STAIRCASE WHERE HE SLIPPED ON ICE WAS THE ONLY MEANS OF ACCESS TO THE WORK SITE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

HERE IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO PRECLUDE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS ABOUT HER DRUG USE AND PSYCHIATRIC CONDITION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the judge should not have precluded cross-examination of the complaining witness about drug use and psychiatric condition:

​In general, evidence of a witness’s substance abuse “is admissible to impeach [the] witness’ credibility if tending to show that [the witness] was under the influence of drugs while testifying, or at the time of the events to which [the witness] testified, or that [the witness’s] powers of perception or recollection, were actually impaired by the habit” … . Under the circumstances of this case, where the People disclosed that the complaining witness was in drug treatment at the time of her testimony and may have been using drugs when she first made allegations against the defendant, the County Court should not have precluded cross-examination as to the complaining witness’s drug use … .

Further, “[w]here a primary prosecution witness is shown to suffer from a psychiatric condition, the defense is entitled to show that the witness’s capacity to perceive and recall events was impaired by that condition” … . Here, the County Court should not have, in effect, granted the People’s application to preclude cross-examination of the complaining witness with respect to her mental health diagnosis, particularly since the People’s case primarily rested upon the complaining witness’s testimony … .People v Romero-Lopez, 2026 NY Slip Op 06331, Second Dept 10-28-26

​Practice Point: If there is evidence the complaining witness was using drugs at the time the allegations were made, it is reversible error to preclude cross-examination about drug use.

Practice Point: If the People disclose the complaining witness has a psychiatric condition, it is reversible error to preclude cross-examination about the condition.

 

October 28, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-28 14:40:032026-11-05 14:58:11HERE IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO PRECLUDE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS ABOUT HER DRUG USE AND PSYCHIATRIC CONDITION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

WHERE AN ENDANGERING-THE-WELFARE-OF-A-CHILD CHARGE IS BASED UPON THE USE OF FORCE, THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IS AVAILABLE IF SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, with a concurring opinion, determined the defendant was entitled to the justification jury instruction in this endangering-the -welfare-of-a-child prosecution:

The relevant statutory text and our precedent confirm that a justification instruction pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 may be available for a charge of endangering the welfare of a child that is premised on the use of force. We also conclude that there is a reasonable view of the evidence here in support of the defense, and the refusal to charge the justification defense was not harmless. * * *

… [T]he defendant shared a home with his girlfriend, J.L., and her fifteen-year-old son, R.T. During a night out, the defendant and J.L. argued and returned home. Each went back out to a bar, and they eventually returned home again, still quarreling. A physical altercation between the defendant and R.T. ensued, leaving R.T. on the floor, seemingly unconscious. * * *

Article 35 instructs that, “[i]n any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 35.05 through 35.30, is a defense” … . And the self-defense justification defense, set forth in section 35.15, includes no limiting or qualifying language regarding the availability of the defense. We thus see no basis in Article 35’s broad language for denying a section 35.15 justification defense in a prosecution involving a charge of endangering the welfare of a child. * * *

When a prosecution for endangering the welfare of a child is based on the use of force, a charge of justification pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 is available if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support it. To the extent that [Varela (164 AD2d 924), and Williams (102 AD3d 566)] are inconsistent with that holding, they should not be followed. People v Mears, 2026 NY Slip Op 06237, CtApp 10-27-26

 

October 27, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-27 21:50:252026-11-06 23:04:29WHERE AN ENDANGERING-THE-WELFARE-OF-A-CHILD CHARGE IS BASED UPON THE USE OF FORCE, THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE IS AVAILABLE IF SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Foreclosure

THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO FORECLOSE; THE PROOF OF POSSESSION OF THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS AT THE TIME THE ACTION WAS BROUGHT WAS DEFICIENT; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure proceeding was not entitled to summary judgment because it did not establish standing to foreclose:

Although plaintiff attached a copy of the underlying note to the complaint and affirmed therein that it was in possession of the note prior to commencement of the action, the copy of the note attached to the complaint was not endorsed in blank, specially endorsed to plaintiff or accompanied by an allonge containing the required endorsements … . “[W]here there is no allonge or note that is either endorsed in blank or specially endorsed to the plaintiff, mere physical possession of a note at the commencement of a foreclosure action is insufficient to confer standing or to make a plaintiff the lawful holder of a negotiable instrument for the purposes of enforcing the note” … .

Plaintiff’s evidence in support of its summary judgment motion also did not establish its standing to foreclose the mortgage. In that regard, plaintiff submitted with its motion papers, among other things, a copy of the underlying note and two undated allonges, one of which contained a special endorsement that made the note payable to the order of plaintiff. However, mere possession of such allonges was insufficient to establish standing without evidence that they were “so firmly affixed” to the note “as to become a part thereof” at the time the action was commenced (UCC § 3-202 [2] … ). U.S. Bank N.A. v Sukljian, 2026 NY Slip Op 06191, Third Dept 10-22-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a detailed description of the documents the bank must possess to have standing to bring a foreclosure action.

 

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 09:05:532026-10-31 10:33:04THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO FORECLOSE; THE PROOF OF POSSESSION OF THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS AT THE TIME THE ACTION WAS BROUGHT WAS DEFICIENT; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH CRIMINAL TRESPASS FOR ENTERING A WORKSHOP OWNED BY DECEDENT; DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO TESTIFY THE DECEDENT HAD GIVEN HIM PERMISSION TO ENTER THE WORKSHOP; THE TESTIMONY WAS PRECLUDED AS HEARSAY; BUT THE HEARSAY WAS ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT’S STATE OF MIND WHEN ENTERING THE WORKSHOP; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the criminal trespass conviction and ordering a new trial on that charge, determined the judge should not have precluded the defendant from testifying that the decedent had granted defendant permission to enter decedent’s workshop. The testimony but precluded as inadmissible hearsay. But the testimony was offered to demonstrate defendant’s state of mind, a nonhearsay purpose:

… [A] new trial is required in connection with this charge due to County Court’s erroneous preclusion of evidence. Prior to trial, the People sought to preclude defendant from testifying that he had been granted permission by decedent to enter his workshop. Defendant opposed, and the court granted the motion on the ground that such evidence would constitute inadmissible hearsay. However, this proof would have been relevant and admissible for a nonhearsay purpose, i.e., to establish defendant’s state of mind when he entered the workshop … . Recognizing that the question of whether defendant believed he had decedent’s permission to enter bore directly upon whether he did so knowingly and unlawfully that is, without license or privilege (see Penal Law §§ 140.00 [5]; 140.10 [a]) as required to establish this crime, the court’s ruling effectively prevented him from exercising his constitutional right to present a defense, and this error cannot be said to be harmless … . People v Bombard, 2026 NY Slip Op 06175, Second Dept 10-22-26

Practice Point: Hearsay can be admissible to demonstrate a person’s state of mind. Here evidence the decedent gave the defendant permission to enter decedent’s workshop constituted a defense to the criminal trespass charge. To exclude the testimony deprived defendant of his constitutional right to put on a defense.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 17:54:332026-10-30 18:21:34DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH CRIMINAL TRESPASS FOR ENTERING A WORKSHOP OWNED BY DECEDENT; DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO TESTIFY THE DECEDENT HAD GIVEN HIM PERMISSION TO ENTER THE WORKSHOP; THE TESTIMONY WAS PRECLUDED AS HEARSAY; BUT THE HEARSAY WAS ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT’S STATE OF MIND WHEN ENTERING THE WORKSHOP; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS ALREADY IN THE INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID THE COLLISION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN THE LIABLITY PORTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial in this intersection traffic-accident case, determined defendants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case. The Second Department held that a jury could find that, although defendant (Capobianco) had the right of way, plaintiff was already in the intersection and Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision. In addition, the Second Department found that Supreme Court should not have excluded evidence of the damage to the vehicles because the damage was relevant to liability for failure to see what should have been seen:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), a driver entering an intersection controlled by a stop sign must yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle that is already in the intersection or that is approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard … , and a driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic law requiring them to yield … . A driver also has a common-law duty to see that which should have been seen through the proper use of the driver’s senses … . Thus, while a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision … , he or she still has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle already in the intersection … .

Here, affording the plaintiff every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is a rational process by which the jury could have found that even if Capobianco had the right-of-way, the plaintiff’s vehicle was already in the intersection, and that Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.

In addition, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding photographs depicting the nature and extent of damage to the parties’ vehicles after the accident. Even where a trial is bifurcated, some evidence of damages may nevertheless be admitted, in the trial court’s discretion, to establish liability at the liability phase of the trial, so long as such evidence is probative of liability and accompanied by an appropriate limiting instruction … . Pruessen v Richard Capobianco, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 06155, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: A driver who had the right of way may still be liable in an intersection traffic accident if the other driver was already in the intersection and the driver who had the right of way did not exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision.

Practice Point: In a bifurcated traffic-accident trial, evidence of the nature of the damage to the vehicles may have relevance to liability and, if so, should be admitted.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 13:00:062026-10-30 16:15:12EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS ALREADY IN THE INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID THE COLLISION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN THE LIABLITY PORTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO GIVE HIS OPINION ABOUT WHAT WAS DEPICTED IN SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, determined a police officer should not have been allowed to offer an opinion about what was depicted in surveillance videos:

Supreme Court should have precluded the testimony of a police detective regarding his opinion as to what was depicted on various surveillance videos. “It is, of course, the role of the jury to determine the facts of the case tried before it” … . “Generally, lay witnesses must testify only to the facts and not to their opinions and conclusions drawn from the facts, as it is the jury’s province to draw the appropriate inferences arising from the facts” … . Here, considerable portions of the detective’s testimony improperly usurped the jury’s function by interpreting the evidence and was improperly admitted into evidence as relevant to the detective’s investigation … . Rather than aiding the jury in understanding the investigation, the detective improperly narrated the video, and the detective’s interpretation of the video improperly “instruct[ed] the jury on the existence of the facts needed to satisfy the elements of the charged offense” … . The error cannot be deemed harmless since the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the error, was not overwhelming, and it cannot be said that there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error … . People v Vincent, 2026 NY Slip Op 06149, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: Here, allowing a police officer to give his opinion about what was depicted in surveillance videos usurped the jury’s function.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 12:45:312026-10-30 12:59:58A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO GIVE HIS OPINION ABOUT WHAT WAS DEPICTED IN SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

IN THIS STREET STOP, THE POLICE WERE JUSTIFIED IN FRISKING THE DEFENDANT BUT WERE NOT JUSTIFIED IN REACHING INSIDE A POCKET TO RETRIEVE THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S DRIVER’S LICENSE; BECAUSE THE DRIVER’S LICENSE CORROBORATED OTHER EVIDENCE, MAKING CONVICTION MORE LIKELY, A NEW TRIAL WAS ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing several convictions and ordering a new trial on the relevant counts, determined the police were justified in frisking the defendant not in removing the robbery victim’s driver’s license from defendant’s pocket. The driver’s license corroborated other evidence making the robbery and possession of stolen property convictions more likely:

… Supreme Court properly determined that since the defendant fit the description heard over the radio and he was in close spatial and temporal proximity to the scene of the robbery, the police officers reasonably suspected that the defendant was the perpetrator of the robbery. Furthermore, the police officers were justified in performing a protective frisk since they had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous since he had a box cutter in his hand, and the police officers had concerns for safety, entitling them to conduct a protective frisk … . However, here, there was no justification for searching the defendant’s pants pocket, reaching into it, and removing the driver license … , as there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing that, during his frisk of the defendant, Officer Mancuso felt anything in the defendant’s pocket that seemed to be a weapon or that could have posed a further danger to the police officers at the scene. In the course of conducting a protective pat-down based upon reasonable suspicion, “[o]nce an officer has concluded that no weapon is present, the search is over and there is no authority for further intrusion” … . Thus, there was no lawful basis for removing the driver license from the defendant’s pocket … . Accordingly, the People failed to satisfy their burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance, and thus, the driver license should have been suppressed. People v Sanchez, 2026 NY Slip Op 06146, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: Here the police were justified in frisking the defendant for weapons. But, because the frisk did not indicate the presence of a weapon, the police were not justified in reaching inside defendant’s pocket and seizing the robbery victim’s driver’s license.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 12:21:062026-10-30 12:45:23IN THIS STREET STOP, THE POLICE WERE JUSTIFIED IN FRISKING THE DEFENDANT BUT WERE NOT JUSTIFIED IN REACHING INSIDE A POCKET TO RETRIEVE THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S DRIVER’S LICENSE; BECAUSE THE DRIVER’S LICENSE CORROBORATED OTHER EVIDENCE, MAKING CONVICTION MORE LIKELY, A NEW TRIAL WAS ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

THE PROOF OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE STRANGULATION AND ASSAULT CONVICTIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department reversed strangulation and assault convictions because the proof of physical injury was insufficient:

The injuries to the victim’s neck, described as “redness,” “small black and blue marks,” and “little scratches” are insufficient to establish physical injury … . * * *

The object was described by the victim as “something that was like metal,” which caused tiny red marks on the victim’s stomach. This evidence was insufficient to prove that the object was a dangerous instrument … capable of causing serious physical injury … . People v Guzman, 2026 NY Slip Op 05972, Second Dept 10-14-26

Practice Point: Strangulation and assault require proof of physical injury. The minor injuries proven in this case did not support the convictions.

 

October 14, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-14 22:06:402026-10-23 22:19:02THE PROOF OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE STRANGULATION AND ASSAULT CONVICTIONS (SECOND DEPT).
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