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Evidence, Foreclosure

PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE REQUIRED BUSINESS RECORDS WERE NOT SUBMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank failed to demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action with admissible evidence:

Although the plaintiff can establish standing by attaching the blank-endorsed note to the complaint when commencing the action … here, the record demonstrates that the plaintiff only attached the mortgage to the complaint. Moreover, although Wallace [representing the plaintiff bank’s loan servicer] stated in her affidavit, based on her review of certain business records, that the plaintiff or its agent had possession of the note prior to commencement, the affidavit was insufficient to establish standing because the records themselves were not submitted by the plaintiff … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Szal, 2021 NY Slip Op 02274, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-14 17:18:542021-04-17 17:30:26PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE REQUIRED BUSINESS RECORDS WERE NOT SUBMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Foreclosure

A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT LAID; THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank did not law a proper foundation for the business records required to demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted … the affidavit of Kathleen Manly, an assistant vice present of Residential Credit Solutions, Inc. … , the plaintiff’s loan servicer. While Manly averred … that she was familiar with Residential’s records and record-keeping practices, and that she had reviewed the records of the prior loan servicer, Bank of America, N.A. … , she did not state that she was familiar with the records or record-keeping practices of Bank of America or that Bank of America’s records were incorporated into Residential’s records and routinely relied upon by Residential in its own business. Thus, she failed to lay a foundation for the admissibility of the records she relied upon to support her claim that the plaintiff possessed the original note prior to the commencement of this action … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Penso, 2021 NY Slip Op 02268, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
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Evidence, Foreclosure

THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED UPON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY SUPREME COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s report in this foreclosure action should not have been confirmed because the report was based upon inadmissible hearsay:

“The report of a referee should be confirmed whenever the findings are substantially supported by the record, and the referee has clearly defined the issues and resolved matters of credibility” … . Here, the affidavit of an employee of the plaintiff’s loan servicer, submitted for the purpose of establishing the amount due and owing under the subject mortgage loan, constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value because the affiant did not produce any of the business records she purportedly relied upon in making her calculations … . Under the circumstances, the referee’s findings with respect to the total amount due upon the mortgage were not substantially supported by the record … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Davis, 2021 NY Slip Op 02267, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
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Civil Procedure, Evidence

THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE AND THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF FROM PROVING HIS CASE, WHICH WAS BASED UPON A CONTRACT AND DECEDENT’S STATEMENTS ABOUT THE CONTRACT; ALTHOUGH THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE USUALLY WILL NOT PRECLUDE EVIDENCE AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE, HERE IT IS CLEAR PLAINTIFF WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVE HIS CASE AT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this action based upon a contract between plaintiff and decedent was properly granted. The alleged copy of the contract was inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule, and any testimony about what the decedent said about the contract was prohibited by the Dead Man’s statute:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to adequately explain the unavailability of the original executed joint development agreement … . Moreover, even if the plaintiff met his threshold burden of explaining the unavailability of the original joint development agreement, he failed to establish that the copy was a reliable and accurate portrayal of the original … . The plaintiff’s proffered testimony that the copy was an exact copy of the original joint development agreement could not be offered at trial, as it was precluded by the application of the Dead Man’s Statute (see CPLR 4519 …). …

“New York’s Dead Man’s Statute by its terms makes testimony by an interested witness ‘concerning a personal transaction or communication between the witness and the deceased’ excludable only ‘[u]pon the trial of an action or the hearing upon the merits of a special proceeding'” … .Generally, “[e]vidence, otherwise relevant and competent upon a trial or hearing, but subject to exclusion on objection under the Dead Man’s Statute, should not predetermine the result on summary judgment in anticipation of the objection”… . Thus, evidence excludable at trial under CPLR 4519 may be considered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment … . However, a trial is unnecessary if it is certain that there would be no waiver of the statute and that all of the proof would be excludable … . Where, as here, the sole evidence proffered by the opposing party is barred by the Dead Man’s Statute, an award of summary judgment is appropriate … . Stathis v Estate of Donald Karas, 2021 NY Slip Op 02330, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-14 14:43:342021-04-17 15:03:03THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE AND THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE PRECLUDED PLAINTIFF FROM PROVING HIS CASE, WHICH WAS BASED UPON A CONTRACT AND DECEDENT’S STATEMENTS ABOUT THE CONTRACT; ALTHOUGH THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE USUALLY WILL NOT PRECLUDE EVIDENCE AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE, HERE IT IS CLEAR PLAINTIFF WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVE HIS CASE AT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

THE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS AN ACCOMPLICE IN A DRUG SALE AND WAS PART OF A CONSPIRACY TO SELL DRUGS WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; MERE PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND THERE WAS NO PROOF OF AN OVERT ACT RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s convictions of criminal sale of a controlled substance, on an accomplice theory, and conspiracy, based on mere presence. Defendant was in the car with Alvarado, who sold heroin to an undercover officer who briefly got into the car, purchased the drugs, and left. The evidence defendant acted as an accomplice and was part of a conspiracy was deemed legally insufficient and against the weight of the evidence:

… [T]he evidence reflects that the defendant met Alvarado on April 25, 2015, to accompany Alvarado to the driving school before Alvarado and the undercover officer arranged the meeting, and that Alvarado told the undercover officer prior to the meeting that he had to “do this thing for my license.” Thus, the defendant’s mere presence during the sale, with knowledge of what was transpiring at that time, was insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree … . …

… [T]he evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the defendant entered into an agreement with Alvarado to sell heroin on April 25, 2015, since there was no evidence that the defendant participated in arranging the heroin sale or even had any discussion with Alvarado about selling heroin on that date … . Further, the People failed to present any evidence of an “overt act” connected to any statements made during the wiretapped calls between the defendant and Alvarado. Accordingly, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of conspiracy in the fourth degree beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Moreno, 2021 NY Slip Op 02316, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-14 13:59:182021-04-17 14:21:23THE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS AN ACCOMPLICE IN A DRUG SALE AND WAS PART OF A CONSPIRACY TO SELL DRUGS WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; MERE PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND THERE WAS NO PROOF OF AN OVERT ACT RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

THE ANONYMOUS TIP THAT A MAN WITH A GUN WAS LEAVING A CLUB DID NOT PROVIDE THE POLICE WITH SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR STOPPING AND DETAINING THE DEFENDANT WHO SUBSEQUENTLY RAN, PULLED OUT A HANDGUN AND WAS SHOT BY THE POLICE; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE HANDGUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the denial of defendant’s suppression motion, determined the police, action on an anonymous tip, did not have sufficient information to stop and detain the defendant. The defendant ran, pulled out a handgun, and was shot by the police. The defendant moved to suppress the handgun. The Second Department noted that the theories supporting the initial stop of the defendant where not raised or ruled upon below and therefore could not be considered on appeal:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in finding, in effect, that the police had lawfully stopped the defendant before the defendant fled from the police and removed a gun from his waist. The hearing testimony indicated that the law enforcement officials who were in the sergeant’s vehicle had received a tip that two individuals, one of whom had a gun, were leaving the club. There was no evidence presented at the hearing as to the identity of the individual who provided the tip, no evidence that the informant explained to the police how he or she knew about the gun, no evidence that the informant supplied any basis to believe that he or she had inside information about the defendant, and no evidence that the informant had “‘knowledge of concealed criminal activity'” … . Therefore, the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and his companion based solely on the tip. People v Benbow, 2021 NY Slip Op 02304, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-14 12:51:422021-04-17 13:13:56THE ANONYMOUS TIP THAT A MAN WITH A GUN WAS LEAVING A CLUB DID NOT PROVIDE THE POLICE WITH SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR STOPPING AND DETAINING THE DEFENDANT WHO SUBSEQUENTLY RAN, PULLED OUT A HANDGUN AND WAS SHOT BY THE POLICE; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE HANDGUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Debtor-Creditor, Evidence, Insurance Law

THE MEDICAL CENTER WAS ENTITLED TO THE NO-FAULT INSURANCE BENEFITS ASSIGNED TO IT BY THE PEDESTRIAN INJURED BY PLAINTIFF’S TAXI; THE FACT THAT THE PEDESTRIAN HAD SETTLED HIS ACTION AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF TAXI COMPANY DID NOT HAVE ANY BEARING ON THE PLAINTIFF’S OBLIGATION TO PAY THE NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO THE MEDICAL CENTER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant medical center was entitled to the no-fault benefits assigned to it by the pedestrian injured by plaintiff’s taxi in this traffic accident case. The fact that the pedestrian had settled his action against the plaintiff taxi company had no bearing on the assignment of the no-fault benefits to the medical center:

“[A]n account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until the account debtor receives notification that the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee ” … . To establish that it did not receive notice of the assignment, the plaintiff relies solely on an affidavit of an employee of the plaintiff’s claims administrator, who asserted that the claims administrator never received the faxed notice on July 11, 2011. The employee’s assertion, however, was belied by overwhelming documentary evidence. Indeed, a denial of claim form dated July 20, 2011, which was prepared by the plaintiff’s claims administrator and attached to the employee’s affidavit, designated the defendant as the assignee. In addition, the defendant submitted an arbitration decision dated January 3, 2012, in which [the pedestrian’s] arbitration claim against the plaintiff for no-fault benefits was dismissed on the ground that he lacked standing because he assigned the claims for no-fault benefits. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it received notice of the assignment. Murzik Taxi, Inc. v Lutheran Med. Ctr., 2021 NY Slip Op 02302, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

April 14, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-14 12:29:082021-04-17 12:51:30THE MEDICAL CENTER WAS ENTITLED TO THE NO-FAULT INSURANCE BENEFITS ASSIGNED TO IT BY THE PEDESTRIAN INJURED BY PLAINTIFF’S TAXI; THE FACT THAT THE PEDESTRIAN HAD SETTLED HIS ACTION AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF TAXI COMPANY DID NOT HAVE ANY BEARING ON THE PLAINTIFF’S OBLIGATION TO PAY THE NO-FAULT BENEFITS TO THE MEDICAL CENTER (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Negligence

CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF THE AREA WERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY SLIPPED AND FELL PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was properly denied. The incident report indicated there was video surveillance of the area where plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell on blueberries on the supermarket (Bogopa’s) floor. An employee of defendant testified he did not know of any surveillance cameras in the supermarket:

The Bogopa defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint. In support of their motion, the Bogopa defendants submitted, among other things, a store incident report which checked a “yes” box when asked if the incident was captured on video, which should be preserved. * * *

The record presents contradictory statements from the Bogopa defendants regarding whether surveillance videos recording the time and location of plaintiff’s fall were available and should have been preserved pursuant to an express video-preservation directive in the incident report prepared by the Bogopa defendants following plaintiff’s accident. While the incident report mentions a surveillance recording, the Bogopa defendant’s employee testified that he did not “know of” any surveillance cameras in the supermarket.

The Bogopa defendants argue in their motion for summary judgment that there is no evidence that establishes the existence of surveillance cameras in the supermarket. We disagree. Where, as here, potential video evidence existed of the alleged hazardous location that may have been of assistance to plaintiff in establishing whether defendants created and/or had notice of an alleged slippery, blueberry-strewn floor hazard, the motion by the Bogopa defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them should be denied. Banks v Bogopa, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 02236, Frist Dept 4-13-21

 

April 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-13 11:44:502021-04-17 12:14:49CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF THE AREA WERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY SLIPPED AND FELL PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Evidence

A THEORY ASSERTED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, AFTER DISCOVERY HAD ENDED, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this breach of contract action should have been granted. Plaintiff raised a new theory in opposition to the motion, after discovery had ended:

Plaintiff Frank Darabont, represented by his agent, plaintiff Creative Arts Associates, entered into an agreement to develop and run the television series The Walking Dead in exchange for fixed payments for each episode of the series, as well as backend compensation contingent upon the show’s profitability, as calculated based on “Modified Adjusted Gross Receipts” (MAGR), with defendant AMC Network Entertainment LLC producing the series and exhibiting it on its own cable channel.

Plaintiffs’ claim that AMC breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by crafting the formula for MAGR arbitrarily, irrationally, or in bad faith was improperly asserted for the first time in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment … . … [T]here are no allegations in the complaint that AMC engaged in misconduct by formulating the MAGR definition in such a manner as to deprive plaintiffs of contractual benefits. … [I]t would be prejudicial to require AMC to defend against a theory of liability asserted only after discovery had concluded. Darabont v AMC Network Entertainment LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 02240, First Dept 4-13-21

 

April 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-13 11:27:172021-04-17 11:41:17A THEORY ASSERTED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, AFTER DISCOVERY HAD ENDED, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304. In support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Mahilet Ayalew, a vice president of loan documentation of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the plaintiff’s servicer. Ayalew stated in the affidavit that 90-day notices were sent to the defendant on February 1, 2013, by regular and certified mail “in full compliance” with RPAPL 1304. The plaintiff additionally submitted copies of 90-day notices and indicia of mailing by certified mail, but not first-class mail. Ayalew’s affidavit was insufficient to establish that the notices were actually mailed since Ayalew did not aver that she had personal knowledge of the mailing or that she was familiar with the servicer’s standard office mailing practices and procedures … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Cardona, 2021 NY Slip Op 02138, Second Dept 4-7-21

 

April 7, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-04-07 13:00:522021-04-10 13:11:22THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).
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