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Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE GROUND FOR SUPPRESSION OF A SHOTGUN AND SHOTGUN SHELL RELIED ON BY COUNTY COURT; ALTHOUGH THE PEOPLE RAISED OTHER GROUNDS FOR JUSTIFICATION OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, THOSE GROUNDS CANNOT BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL BECAUSE COUNTY COURT DID NOT RULE ON THEM; MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE PEOPLE’S OTHER ARGUMENTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the motion to suppress the shotgun and shotgun shell should have been granted on the ground raised on appeal. The People raised other grounds for suppression on appeal. The Third Department noted it cannot consider grounds for suppression on which the motion court did not rule on and remitted the matter for consideration of the other grounds for suppression raised by the People:

County Court found that the shotgun shell was discovered on defendant’s person during a limited protective pat-down search of defendant, which then provided law enforcement with probable cause to search the vehicle. However, this finding is not supported by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, which demonstrated that the search of the vehicle actually preceded the search of defendant’s person and discovery of the shotgun shell. Although the People raised other arguments that could potentially justify the search of the vehicle and defendant’s person, this Court is statutorily restricted from considering issues not ruled upon by the trial court … .  We are therefore constrained to reverse the denial of defendant’s suppression motion. Accordingly, we will hold the appeal in abeyance and remit the matter to County Court to review the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, consider any alternate bases to suppress the physical evidence and render a new determination on defendant’s motion … . People v Kabia, 2021 NY Slip Op 00209, Third Dept 1-14-21

 

January 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-13 17:15:192021-01-16 17:36:17THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE GROUND FOR SUPPRESSION OF A SHOTGUN AND SHOTGUN SHELL RELIED ON BY COUNTY COURT; ALTHOUGH THE PEOPLE RAISED OTHER GROUNDS FOR JUSTIFICATION OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, THOSE GROUNDS CANNOT BE ADDRESSED ON APPEAL BECAUSE COUNTY COURT DID NOT RULE ON THEM; MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE PEOPLE’S OTHER ARGUMENTS (THIRD DEPT).
Evidence, Foreclosure

THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED UPON INADMISSBILE HEARSAY AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s report should not have been confirmed because it was based on inadmissible hearsay:

… [T]he affidavit of an assistant vice president of Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, submitted for the purpose of establishing the amount due and owing under the subject mortgage loan, “constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value because the affiant did not produce any of the business records he purportedly relied upon in making his calculations” … . Thus, the referee’s findings with respect to the total amount due upon the mortgage were not substantially supported by the record … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion to confirm the referee’s report … . Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Isom, 2021 NY Slip Op 00203, Second Dept 1-13-21

 

January 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-13 17:04:172021-01-16 17:15:09THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED UPON INADMISSBILE HEARSAY AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

THE JURY WAS ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED TO CONSIDER A THEORY OF BURGLARY WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS NOT CHARGED; BURGLARY CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s burglary convictions, determined the jury should not have been instructed to consider a theory of burglary (intent to assault versus intent to damage property) with which defendant was not charged:

A defendant has a right to be tried only for the crimes charged in the indictment … . “Where the prosecution is limited by the indictment or bill of particulars to a certain theory or theories, the court must hold the prosecution to such narrower theory or theories” … . This rule applies in cases charging burglary, where it is not normally necessary for the People to demonstrate the exact crime which the defendant intended to commit while inside the building … .

Here, we agree with the defendant that the People limited their theory of burglary in their bill of particulars, which incorporated the allegations of the criminal complaint, to the intent to commit property damage and/or theft … . Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in permitting the prosecutor to argue, during summation, and in permitting the jury to consider, the uncharged theory that the defendant intended to assault the complainant … . People v Petersen, 2021 NY Slip Op 00193, Second Dept 1-13-21

 

January 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-13 17:01:312021-01-16 17:03:02THE JURY WAS ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED TO CONSIDER A THEORY OF BURGLARY WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS NOT CHARGED; BURGLARY CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence, Family Law

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THE APPELLANT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING MADE A TERRORISTIC THREAT IN VIOLATION OF PENAL LAW 490.20; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN INTENT TO INTIMIDATE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the evidence in this juvenile delinquency proceeding did not support finding the appellant student made a terroristic threat. The issue was not preserved but the appeal was considered in the interest of justice:

The student testified that one morning during class some of the students were joking and talking when the appellant and another student got into “a little argument,” and the appellant told that student that he “[was] going to be 14 years old, chopped up in somebody’s backyard, and he’s going to get a white person to shoot up the school.” * * *

“Penal Law article 490 was enacted shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001, to ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and punished in state courts with appropriate severity” … . “In construing the statute, courts must be cognizant that ‘the concept of terrorism has a unique meaning and its implications risk being trivialized if the terminology is applied loosely in situations that do not match our collective understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act'” … . As relevant here, Penal Law § 490.20 (1) provides that a person is guilty of making a terroristic threat when “with intent to intimidate . . . a civilian population . . . he or she threatens to commit or cause to be committed a specified offense and thereby causes a reasonable expectation or fear of the imminent commission of such offense.” We agree with the appellant that the presentment agency presented no evidence of an intent by the appellant to intimidate a civilian population with his statements … . Matter of Jaydin R., 2021 NY Slip Op 00176, Second Dept 1-13-21

 

January 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-13 15:32:532021-01-18 10:59:48THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THE APPELLANT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING MADE A TERRORISTIC THREAT IN VIOLATION OF PENAL LAW 490.20; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN INTENT TO INTIMIDATE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION (SECOND DEPT).
Dental Malpractice, Evidence, Negligence

PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT SPECULATIVE OR CONCLUSORY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE AND LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this dental malpractice and lack of informed consent should not have been granted. Plaintiff’s expert’s affidavits raised questions of fact:

“In order not to be considered speculative or conclusory, expert opinions in opposition should address specific assertions made by the movant’s experts, setting forth an explanation of the reasoning and relying on specifically cited evidence in the record” … . In determining a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party … , and “all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party” … . * * *

Summary judgment is not appropriate in a dental malpractice action where, as here, the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions, since conflicting expert opinions raise credibility issues which are to be resolved by the factfinder … . …

“[L]ack of informed consent is a distinct cause of action requiring proof of facts not contemplated by an action based merely on allegations of negligence” … . “To establish a cause of action to recover damages based on lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the person providing the professional treatment failed to disclose alternatives thereto and failed to inform the patient of reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the treatment, and the alternatives, that a reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed in the same circumstances, (2) that a reasonably prudent patient in the same position would not have undergone the treatment if he or she had been fully informed, and (3) that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury” … . Many v Lossef, 2021 NY Slip Op 00165, Second Dept 1-13-21

 

January 13, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-13 14:57:352021-01-16 15:14:22PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT SPECULATIVE OR CONCLUSORY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE AND LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence

THE PROPERTY OWNERS AND THE SECURITY COMPANY WERE PROPERLY FOUND LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SEVERE INJURIES CAUSED BY TWELVE-YEAR-OLD BOYS WHO THREW A SHOPPING CART OVER A FOURTH FLOOR RAILING STRIKING PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND BELOW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, ordering a new trial on damages if the plaintiffs do not stipulate to a reduction from $14.5 to $10 million, determined the defendant property owners and the security company (PSS) were properly found liable for the injuries caused by two twelve-year-old boys who threw a shopping cart over a fourth floor railing onto plaintiff on the ground below. There had been prior incidents where items were thrown over the railing and down an escalator:

… [T]he jury heard evidence that the Owner Defendants had notice of a recurring hazardous condition at the premises, namely, that youngsters frequented the location and threw various items off the elevated structure. According to witnesses and security log entries, young people threw such items as candy, food, rocks, glass bottles and garbage. Additionally, there was documentary evidence that 20 days before plaintiff’s accident, several youths had thrown a shopping cart down the escalator. Yet, according to testimony by one of defendant’s managers, the Owner Defendants did not put into place any remedial measures, such as raising the height of the rails, increasing the number of security guards or putting up warning signs, despite having notice of the recurring dangerous condition. Thus, we decline to disturb the jury’s findings apportioning liability 65% against Owner Defendants and 25% against defendant PSS. Hedges v Planned Sec. Serv. Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 00117, First Dept 1-12-21

 

January 12, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-12 10:54:292021-01-16 11:22:44THE PROPERTY OWNERS AND THE SECURITY COMPANY WERE PROPERLY FOUND LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SEVERE INJURIES CAUSED BY TWELVE-YEAR-OLD BOYS WHO THREW A SHOPPING CART OVER A FOURTH FLOOR RAILING STRIKING PLAINTIFF ON THE GROUND BELOW (FIRST DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEVER THE TWO OFFENSES, WHICH OCCURRED ON DIFFERENT DATES AND WERE UNRELATED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s convictions, determined the two separate crimes which occurred on different dates should not have been joined for a single trial. Defendant was charged with leaving the scene of an accident on September 4, 2011, and DWI on January 15, 2012. The officer who arrested defendant in January 2012 for DWI testified he recognized the vehicle and driver from the video and stills taken during the September 2011 incident:

Offenses are joinable even though they are based on different criminal transactions if proof of one offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the other offense or the offenses are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions … . Severance of counts contained in a single indictment should be granted when a defendant shows that the counts were not joinable under the statutory criteria … .

… [N]one of the proof necessary for each offense was material to the other. The facts underlying defendant’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident stemmed from a September 4, 2011 incident. The victim was lying on the road of the Henry Hudson Parkway. After other drivers stopped to try and pull the victim out of the road, a dark Acura ran him over and continued driving without stopping. … There was video footage and still pictures from the toll plaza that showed the cars of the drivers who stopped to help, followed immediately by the dark Acura. … Defendant was the registered owner of the dark Acura.

The DWI conviction was based on an incident that occurred four months later, on January 15, 2012. At that time, defendant was observed by police officers weaving in and out of his lane and driving 85 mph in a 50-mph zone. The officer who arrested defendant for the DWI was permitted to testify relative to the charge of leaving the scene that he recognized the vehicle and driver in the video and stills taken on September 4, 2011 as the same vehicle and person he stopped on January 15, 2012. People v Santiago, 2021 NY Slip Op 00130, First Dept 1-12-21

 

January 12, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-12 09:47:512021-01-16 10:54:20DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEVER THE TWO OFFENSES, WHICH OCCURRED ON DIFFERENT DATES AND WERE UNRELATED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

THE TRAFFIC STOP AND CANINE SEARCH WERE JUSTIFIED; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE CANINE SEARCH WAS NOT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined the traffic stop was valid and the extended detention for a canine search was justified. The dissent argued the canine search was not justified:

The trooper testified that it was fully dark at the time of the stop and that he and defendant had their vehicles’ headlights on, as did other vehicles passing on the roadway. When the trooper turned off his headlights briefly to check the license plate light, he observed that it did not illuminate the plate. Thus, it was “objectively reasonable” for the trooper to conclude that the requisite visibility did not exist and that a traffic violation had been committed … .  Additionally, the trooper was entitled to rely upon the investigator’s previous observation that defendant was driving without a seatbelt — a separate traffic violation that also provided probable cause for the stop … .

… [T]he trooper’s observations of defendant engaging in behaviors commonly seen in outdoor drug transactions at a location known for such activity, his “slow roll response” and furtive movements after the trooper initiated the stop and his evasive, inconsistent answers to the trooper’s questions created a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot … . Thus, the trooper properly extended the stop beyond its initial justification and conducted the canine search — which, in any event, took place only nine minutes after the initial stop and, according to the trooper, was completed in less than a minute … . People v Blandford, 2021 NY Slip Op 00058, Third Dept 1-7-21

 

January 7, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-07 11:59:492021-01-10 12:17:57THE TRAFFIC STOP AND CANINE SEARCH WERE JUSTIFIED; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE CANINE SEARCH WAS NOT (THIRD DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

A JUROR WHO WAS A RETIRED DETECTIVE ACTED AS AN UNSWORN EXPERT WITNESS IN THE DELIBERATIONS; “MOLINEUX” EVIDENCE DEFENDANT LOOKED AT PORNOGRAPHY BEFORE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTING THE SEX-RELATED OFFENSES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s sex abuse and burglary convictions, determined: (1) a juror who was a retired detective acted as an unsworn expert witness in the deliberations; and (2) evidence defendant looked at pornography before allegedly committing the crimes was not necessary to prove identity and any probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect:

… [A] juror who was a retired detective opined on the feasibility of DNA and fingerprint extraction, the likelihood that tests were conducted and evidence was suppressed regarding a set of keys that were in evidence, and the probability that defendant was lying based on his speech patterns and body language. These opinions, which were communicated to and apparently influenced the jury, were within the scope of the juror’s specialized expertise and were explicitly offered on the basis thereof, and at least some of these opinions concerned material issues, including defendant’s credibility and whether he entered the victim’s apartment by mistake … . …

… [E]vidence that defendant accessed a pornography website on the phone shortly before committing the charged offense should have been excluded at trial as improper propensity evidence. This evidence was not admissible to establish defendant’s intent in sexually abusing the victim, which could be readily inferred from the charged conduct itself … . While it may have been admissible to establish defendant’s intent in entering the victim’s apartment, its probative value was outweighed by its prejudice … . People v Alvarez, 2021 NY Slip Op 00092, First Dept 1-7-21

 

January 7, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-07 11:22:102021-01-11 16:42:54A JUROR WHO WAS A RETIRED DETECTIVE ACTED AS AN UNSWORN EXPERT WITNESS IN THE DELIBERATIONS; “MOLINEUX” EVIDENCE DEFENDANT LOOKED AT PORNOGRAPHY BEFORE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTING THE SEX-RELATED OFFENSES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE RAISED SIDEWALK FLAG AND WHETHER THE DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact about whether defendant had constructive notice of a raised sidewalk flag and whether the defect was trivial in this slip and fall case:

Although the property manager states that the premises were regularly inspected, and any condition observed would have been reported to him, reference to a generalized inspection practice “is insufficient to satisfy defendant[‘s] burden of establishing that [he] lacked notice of the alleged condition of the sidewalk prior to the accident” … .

As a general rule, whether a defect is trivial depends on “the facts presented, including the width, depth, elevation, irregularity and appearance of the defect along with the time, place and circumstance of the injury” … . The relevant inquiry is whether the defect was “difficult for a pedestrian to see or to identify as a hazard or difficult to pass over safely on foot in light of the surrounding circumstances” … . Although defendant relies on photographs to prove his defense that the defect is trivial, summary judgment should not be granted where, as here, “the dimensions of the alleged defect are unknown and the photographs and descriptions inconclusive” … . Trinidad v Catsimatidis, 2021 NY Slip Op 00047, First Dept 1-5-21

 

January 5, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-01-05 10:08:242021-01-10 10:28:50QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE RAISED SIDEWALK FLAG AND WHETHER THE DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).
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