The Fourth Department, reserving decision on the appeal and remitting the matter again, determined defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. The sole purpose for initially remitting the matter to Supreme Court was to procure a ruling on whether defendant should be afforded youthful offender status. But defense counsel focused only on defendant’s sentencing as an adult and essentially ignored the “youthful offender” issue. The Fourth Department offered a concise description of the New York State (as opposed to the federal) criteria for ineffective assistance:
Where, as here, a defendant contends that they received ineffective assistance of counsel under both the Federal and New York State Constitutions, “we evaluate the claim using the state standard, which affords greater protection than its federal counterpart” … . “In New York, the standard for effective assistance is ‘meaningful representation’ by counsel” … . The ” ‘state standard . . . offers greater protection than the federal test’ because, ‘under our State Constitution, even in the absence of a reasonable probability of a different outcome, inadequacy of counsel will still warrant reversal whenever a defendant is deprived of [fair process]’ … . Although our courts “remain ‘skeptical’ of ineffective assistance of counsel claims where the defendant is unable to demonstrate any prejudice at all” … , in applying our state standard, we consider prejudice to be ” ‘a significant but not indispensable element in assessing meaningful representation’ ” … . Stated differently, “[w]hile the inquiry focuses on the quality of the representation provided to the [defendant], the claim of ineffectiveness is ultimately concerned with the fairness of the process as a whole rather than its particular impact on the outcome of the case” … . “[T]he right to effective representation includes the right to assistance by an attorney who has taken the time to review and prepare both the law and the facts relevant to the defense . . . and who is familiar with, and able to employ[,] . . . basic principles of criminal law and procedure” … . Inasmuch as the defendant “bears the burden of establishing [a] claim that counsel’s performance is constitutionally deficient[,] . . . [the] defendant must demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged failure” … . * * *
The record establishes that, despite the specified purpose of the remittal, defense counsel submitted a memorandum riddled with spelling, grammatical, and syntax errors in which he requested that defendant be resentenced as an adult to a reduced determinate term of imprisonment and an unspecified period of postrelease supervision. Rather than providing an affirmative argument for adjudicating defendant a youthful offender based on the various factors to be considered … , defense counsel merely mentioned youthful offender status in passing to note that which was already known, namely, that the sentencing court had originally failed to address whether defendant should receive youthful offender status and thus never considered certain circumstances related to defendant. Defense counsel thereafter proceeded to make arguments that were relevant to defendant’s initial sentencing as an adult and the appellate challenges thereto but were unrelated to the factors applicable to determining upon remittal whether defendant should be afforded youthful offender status and, in doing so, defense counsel also occasionally misstated the issues considered on defendant’s prior appeals … . People v Nathan, 2025 NY Slip Op 02700, Fourth Dept 5-2-25
Practice Point: Consult this decision for a concise description of the criteria for effective assistance of counsel under the New York State (as opposed to the United States) Constitution.