Constitutional Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest

EXECUTIVE LAW 552 (PART OF THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT), WHICH CREATED A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR TO PROSECUTE CRIMES OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF VULNERABLE PERSONS IN STATE FACILITIES, IS UNCONSTITIONAL TO THE EXTENT IT ALLOWS THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES BY AN UNELECTED APPOINTEE OF THE GOVERNOR (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over two concurring opinions, determined Executive Law 552 (part of the Protection of People with Special Needs Act), which created a special prosecutor to prosecute crimes of abuse or neglect of vulnerable persons in facilities operated by the state, is unconstitutional to the extent it allows an unelected appointee of the governor to prosecute crimes. The portions of the statute which do not relate to the prosecution of crimes, however, remain viable:

Given that the purpose of enacting the Special Needs Act was to “bolster the ability of the state to respond more effectively to abuse and neglect of vulnerable persons” … , it is apparent that the Legislature would wish that as much of Executive Law § 552 aimed at protecting that class of victims as can be preserved remain in effect. Nor would excising the offending provisions leave the remainder without any beneficial impact. Therefore, while the subdivisions of the statute that provide the special prosecutor with the discretionary authority to bring criminal cases … must be struck as unconstitutional … , the portion of Executive Law § 552 (1) that provides the special prosecutor with non-prosecutorial functions should remain in force. Likewise, we leave intact Executive Law § 552 (2) (a) (ii), which empowers the special prosecutor “to cooperate with and assist district attorneys and other local law enforcement officials in their efforts against . . . abuse or neglect of vulnerable persons,” without interfering with those efforts (emphasis added). Cooperation with the local District Attorney furthers the overarching goal of the Legislature—providing resources to address crimes of abuse and neglect committed against vulnerable persons—without infringing on that constitutional officer’s essential authority. People v Viviani, 2021 NY Slip Op 01934, CtApp 3-30-21

March 30, 2021/0 Comments/by Bruce Freeman

Constitutional Law, Religion

THE REPEAL OF THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW REQUIRING VACCINATION AGAINST MEASLES IS CONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined that the repeal of the religious exemption to the Pubic Health Law which allowed parents to refuse to vaccinate their children against measles was constitutional. The statute also allows a medical exemption, which was not repealed. The declaratoy-judgment complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action:

It is well settled that, “the right of free exercise [of religion] does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that [one’s] religion prescribes (or proscribes)” … . As such, to state a federal free exercise claim, a plaintiff generally must establish that “the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct” … . Significantly, if the law is neutral and of general applicability, a rational basis is all that is required to meet constitutional muster under the First Amendment, even if the law “proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that [one’s] religion prescribes (or proscribes)” … . * * *

Those school children with medical exemptions have been advised by a physician that certain immunizations may be detrimental to their physical health (see Public Health Law § 2164 [8]). There are many arguments to be made as to how children formerly subjected to the religious exemption may also be detrimentally impacted, however, documented concerns as to the physical well-being of children with medical exemptions is a sufficient basis upon which to distinguish the two groups. Indeed, it would be irrational to sacrifice the physical health of some children in the pursuit of protecting public health. In attempting to address the vulnerabilities in its current immunization scheme, the Legislature was permitted to exercise such “broad discretion required for the protection of the public health” … . F.F. v State of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 01541, Third Dept 3-18-21

March 18, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Judges

BUDGETARY CONCERNS RELATED TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC JUSTIFED THE DENIAL OF CERTIFICATION TO CONTINUE SERVING ON THE BENCH TO 46 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES WHO REACHED THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE OF 70 IN 2020 (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, over a partial dissent, determined the Administrative Board of the NYS Unified Court System did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied certification to 46 of 49 Supreme Court Justices who reached the age of 70 in 2020. Retirement at age 70 is mandated by the NYS Constitution. But certification to continue serving on the bench can be granted by the Board. Here the Board based its decision to deny certification to 46 justices on budgetary concerns resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic:

The Board minutes explain that the Board “declined to certify 46 of the 49 [Justices] applying for certification owing to current severe budgetary constraints occasioned by the coronavirus pandemic. Three [Justices], having specialized additional assignments[,] were certified.” The Board’s certification of three applicants reflects both an individualized assessment and a recognition — “at least impliedly” — that additional judicial services are necessary … . …”[W]hether the services of a particular Justice are ‘necessary to expedite the business of the court’ encompasses much more than a mechanical inquiry into the size of the courts’ docket divided by the number of Justices” … . Certainly, it should be recognized that the continued services of the petitioner Justices would advance the needs of the court in managing an expanding caseload. That positive contribution, however, is not the deciding factor, as the Board is charged with balancing the costs of certification with the overall needs of the court system … . … [T]he Board made the extremely difficult judgment call that certification would prove too costly under the economic dilemma presented. … [C]ertification would significantly disrupt overall court operations given that the alternative savings mechanism would require more than 300 layoffs of nonjudicial personnel. Achieving the proper balance for the court system was for the Board to determine. … In our view, the Board acted in accord with the governing standard and within the scope of its broad authority in basing its ultimate decision on the overall needs of the court system. Matter of Gesmer v Administrative Bd. of the N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., 2021 NY Slip Op 01376, Third Dept 3-9-21

March 9, 2021/by Bruce Freeman

Attorneys, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT BEFORE THEY ENTERED THE HOME AND THEREFORE COULD HAVE GOTTEN AN ARREST WARRANT, THERE WAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION BECAUSE THE POLICE ENTERED THE HOME WITH CONSENT; DEFENSE COUNSEL ARGUED THE POLICE DID NOT GET A WARRANT TO DELAY THE ATTACHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PROCURE STATEMENTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers raising a question of first impression, determined the police did not violate the New York Constitution when they entered the home looking for defendant and made a warrantless arrest. The police had probable cause when they went to the home and defense counsel argued they did not get a warrant in order to delay the attachment of the right to counsel and obtain statements. The Second Department determined there was no Payton violation because the motion court credited the police testimony claiming they entered the home with the consent of the person who answered the door:

… [T]he defendant’s appellate counsel specifically contends that where the police, armed with probable cause and ample time to obtain an arrest warrant, nevertheless choose to make a warrantless arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances, their conduct must be deemed to violate the defendant’s indelible right to counsel under the New York State Constitution (see People v Harris, 77 NY2d at 440).

While this issue presents what appears to be an important constitutional question of first impression, we see no viable path to resolving this question in the defendant’s favor within the current framework of New York law. Although the hearing evidence fully supports the defendant’s view that the police went to the subject residence with the intent of making a warrantless arrest—indeed, the People did not present any evidence to suggest any alternative motive for the early morning visit—New York law does not presently recognize a “new category of Payton violations based on subjective police intent” (… People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434). Therefore, we decline to find that the police conduct in this case amounted to a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights under Payton and/or Harris.

Moreover, since the hearing court’s supportable finding of voluntary consent negates the defendant’s Payton claim, we need not consider the defendant’s further contention regarding the causal link between the warrantless arrest and his subsequent statements to the police. People v Cuencas, 2020 NY Slip Op 08118, Second Dept 12-30-20

December 30, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Appeals, Constitutional Law, Municipal Law

THE NYC BOARD OF HEALTH’S RESOLUTION MANDATING VACCINATION AGAINST MEASLES IS VALID AND LAWFUL; THE OBJECTIONS RAISED ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS WERE REJECTED BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION DID NOT SINGLE OUT, TARGET OR EVEN MENTION RELIGION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged, comprehensive opinion by Justice Scheinkman, determined the resolution by the NYC Board of Health mandating vaccination against measles was lawful and valid and did not violate petitioners’ freedom of religion. As a threshold matter the court considered the matter as an exception to the mootness doctrine, because measles outbreaks are likely to occur in the future:

On April 17, 2019, the Board of Health of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene of the City of New York adopted a resolution stating that, due to the active outbreak of measles among people residing within certain areas of Brooklyn, any person over the age of six months who was living, working, or attending school or child care in the affected areas had to be immunized against measles, absent a medical exemption. Failure to comply was made punishable by fines authorized by law, rule, or regulation, for each day of noncompliance. The plaintiffs/petitioners (hereinafter the petitioners), residents of areas covered by the resolution, challenge its validity. We hold that the resolution was lawful and enforceable, reserving, however, whether any fine imposed upon violation is excessive. The resolution was within the authority of the Board of Health of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to make and the resolution itself did not violate any right of the petitioners, including their freedom of religion. * * *

The petitioners profess to hold religious beliefs that hold that a healthy body should not assimilate foreign objects, including vaccine ingredients … . * * *

The Board’s resolution does not target religion or single out religion; it does not even mention religion. There is absolutely no indication that the resolution was adopted for the purpose of infringing the petitioners’ religious practices or suppressing their religious views … . The resolution treats all persons equally, whether religious or not … . The resolution does not create any favored classes at all, much less ones that are secular rather than religious. As the resolution is religiously neutral and generally applicable, it is not subject to strict scrutiny. C.F. v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2020 NY Slip Op 07867, Second Dept 12-23-20

December 23, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

PETITIONERS, INMATES AT A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, RAISED ALLEGATIONS COGNIZABLE IN HABEAS CORPUS REGARDING THE FACILITY’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ISSUE AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petitioners, inmates at Otis Correctional Facility, had made allegations with respect to the facility’s response to COVID-19 which were cognizable in habeas corpus. Therefore Supreme Court should not have refused to issue an order to show cause why the inmates should not be released:

… [T]he petition alleged that the inmates were being unlawfully imprisoned in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because, in light of certain physical conditions and attributes specific to them as well as unalterable conditions of incarceration at Otisville, there were no measures that could be taken to protect them from the grave risk of death or serious illness posed by the COVID-19 virus while they were incarcerated in that facility. Thus, the petitioner alleged, the only remedy to cure the illegality of the inmates’ detention would be their immediate release. Contrary to the respondents’ contention and the conclusion of the Supreme Court, these allegations are properly cognizable in habeas corpus … . Accordingly, the court should not have refused to issue an order to show cause why the inmates should not be released (see CPLR 7003[a]). People ex rel. Tse v Barometre, 2020 NY Slip Op 06280, Second Dept 11-4-20

November 4, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Constitutional Law, Family Law

ORDER PROHIBITING DEFENDANT HUSBAND FROM DISPARAGING PLAINTIFF WIFE TO THIRD PARTIES WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT OF SPEECH; ORDER SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO PROHIBIT DISPARAGING PLAINTIFF TO PLAINTIFF’S PATIENTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the order issued in this divorce proceeding prohibiting defendant husband from discussing, demeaning or disparaging plaintiff wife to third parties was an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech. Plaintiff, a psychologist, wanted to prohibit defendant from talking to her patients. The Second Department held the order should be modified to limit the prohibition disparaging plaintiff to plaintiff’s patients:

The defendant correctly contends that the portion of the order granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for an order directing the defendant not to discuss, demean, or disparage the plaintiff to any third parties, including but not limited to the plaintiff’s patients, was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. A prior restraint on speech is a law, regulation or judicial order that suppresses speech on the basis of the speech’s content and in advance of its actual expression … . Any imposition of prior restraint, whatever the form, bears a “heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, and a party seeking to obtain such a restraint bears a correspondingly heavy burden of demonstrating justification for its imposition” … . An injunctive order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order … . The order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case … . Here, the Supreme Court’s prior restraint on speech was overbroad, and not tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of this case. The plaintiff, a psychologist, was concerned about damage to her professional reputation due to the defendant’s allegedly demeaning statements to her patients. The court’s objective can be achieved by modifying the order to provide only that the defendant shall not discuss, demean, or disparage the plaintiff to her patients … . Karantinidis v Karantinidis, 2020 NY Slip Op 05039, Second Dept 9-23-20

September 23, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Municipal Law

MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR; TWO CAUSES OF ACTION NOT INCLUDED IN THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action should have been treated as a motion for a declaration in the defendant’s favor. The action concerned fines imposed on plaintiff home-owner by NYC for the alleged failure to have the in-home elevator inspected once a year. Plaintiff alleged the relevant regulations were unconstitutional. Plaintiff also included causes of action for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The contract and estoppel causes of action were dismissed because they were not included in plaintiff’s notice of claim. The regulations were deemed constitutional. With regard to the declaratory judgment cause of action and the notice of claim, the court wrote:

“‘A motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action prior to the service of an answer presents for consideration only the issue of whether a cause of action for declaratory relief is set forth, not the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to a favorable declaration'” … . “[W]here a cause of action is sufficient to invoke the court’s power to ‘render a declaratory judgment . . . as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy’ (CPLR 3001; see CPLR 3017[b]), a motion to dismiss that cause of action should be denied” … . However, upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court may reach the merits of a properly pleaded cause of action for a declaratory judgment where “‘no questions of fact are presented [by the controversy]'” … . Under such circumstances, the motion to dismiss the cause of action for failure to state a cause of action “should be treated as one seeking a declaration in [the] defendant’s favor and treated accordingly” … . * * *

A timely notice of claim is a condition precedent to maintaining an action against the City of New York (see Administrative Code § 7-201 … ). Here, the notice of claim attached to the complaint fails to include any allegations relating to the plaintiff’s causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract and promissory estoppel … . Neuman v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 05052, Second Dept 9-23-30

September 23, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS SEEKING RELEASE FROM RIKERS ISLAND BASED UPON THE RISK OF CONTRACTING COVID-19 PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the petitions for writs of habeas corpus brought by inmates at Rikers Island, arguing the risk of contracting COVID-19 at the jail required release, were properly denied. State and Federal constitutional arguments were raised. The analysis, which is too complex to fairly summarize here, came down to weighing the danger to the inmates against the danger to the public entailed by release:

Far from acting recklessly, respondents [city and state] have demonstrated great care to ensure the safety of everyone who enters the facility. By any objective measure, they have been anything but indifferent to the risk that COVID-19 poses to the jail population.

Even petitioners admit that respondents have taken substantial measures to reduce the spread of the virus on Rikers Island, and have had success in doing so. Moreover, petitioners have not cited to any controlling authority to establish that anything short of release constitutes deliberate indifference. …

That the State has agreed to release a significant number of detainees to help control the spread of the virus actually demonstrates that it has given a great deal of consideration to who should and should not be released, and its decision not to release petitioners based on their criminal history backgrounds is thus persuasive. Coupled with what the State and City have done to protect detainees, discussed above, we conclude that the weighing of interests falls in respondents’ favor. Matter of People ex rel. Stoughton v Brann, 2020 NY Slip Op 04236, First Dept 7-23-20

July 23, 2020/by Bruce Freeman

Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Municipal Law

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FORFEITURE OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE WOULD BE A CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE EXCESSIVE FINE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether forfeiture of defendant’s vehicle would impose an excessive hardship and would constitute an constitutionally impermissible excessive fine. Defendant pled guilty to possession of a weapon which was found in his vehicle:

Plaintiff established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant, the registered and titled owner of the vehicle, who pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a firearm, used the vehicle as a means of committing the crime of criminal possession of a firearm … .

In opposition, defendant, acting pro se, submitted an affidavit and supporting evidence in support of his argument that forfeiture of the vehicle, which he needed for getting to work with his tools and picking up his children from school, would impose an excessive and tremendous hardship on him and his family, particularly given that this is his sole criminal offense, and in light of other mitigating facts. This evidence is sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether, under all the factual circumstances, civil forfeiture of the vehicle would be grossly disproportionate to the offense and therefore a constitutionally impermissible excessive fine … . Property Clerk, N.Y. City Police Dept. v Nurse, 2020 NY Slip Op 03866, First Dept 7-9-20

July 9, 2020/by Bruce Freeman