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ALTHOUGH MOTHER DID NOT APPEAR AT THE SCHEDULED CONFERENCE AND DID NOT HAVE A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE IN THIS NEGLECT PROCEEDING, SHE WAS NOT AWARE FINDINGS OF FACT WOULD BE MADE IN HER ABSENCE; DEFAULT ORDER VACATED ON DUE PROCESS GROUNDS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother was deprived of her right to due process when findings of fact were made in her absence in this neglect proceeding. Although mother did not appear at a scheduled conference, mother was not aware findings of fact would be made:

A parent has a right “to be present at every stage of” a Family Ct Act article 10 proceeding as a matter of due process, but that right “is not absolute” … . Family Ct Act § 1042 provides that “a court may proceed with a hearing . . . in a parent’s absence, so long as the subject child is represented by counsel, and the absent parent may thereafter move to vacate the resulting order and schedule a rehearing” … . Vacatur of that order would ordinarily be warranted if, upon motion, the parent demonstrated “a meritorious defense to the petition, unless . . . [he or she] willfully refused to appear at the hearing” … . If the parent demonstrates that the default itself resulted from a deprivation of his or her “fundamental due process rights,” however, the default is a nullity and no showing of a meritorious defense is required … . …

… [A]lthough respondent was arguably on notice of the April 2018 conference, she did not receive notice that a potential fact-finding hearing might be conducted at it so as to satisfy due process … . Indeed, despite the references in the order of fact-finding to an inquest, there is no dispute that Family Court departed from “the proper course” of conducting a hearing in respondent’s absence by accepting the allegations in the petition as proven by virtue of respondent’s default … . It would offend due process to hold that respondent “default[ed] in attending a hearing that she did not know was going to happen and did not, in fact, happen” … . Thus, notwithstanding the failure of respondent to articulate a meritorious defense, Family Court abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion. Matter of Arra L. (Christine L.), 2020 NY Slip Op 02829, Third Dept 5-14-20

 

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THE RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE AN ALLEGEDLY BIASED JUROR; THE RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT A CONSTITUTIONAL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM; THEREFORE DIRECT APPEAL, AS OPPOSED TO A MOTION TO VACATE THE CONVICTION, WAS NOT AVAILABLE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a comprehensive, extended dissenting opinion, determined defendant’s constitutional ineffective assistance argument based upon defense counsel’s failure to challenge an allegedly biased juror was properly rejected. The record was deemed insufficient to support the constitutional challenge. A motion to vacate the conviction, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section 440, based upon matters not in the record, may be the only avenue available to the defendant here. The defendant was charged with depraved indifference murder stemming from a drive-by shooting:

We reject defendant’s argument here that prospective juror number 10’s statements during voir dire reflect actual bias against defendant predicated on any evidence precluding the juror from rendering an impartial verdict, as opposed to general discomfort with the case based on media coverage. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the juror’s verbatim statements did not reveal what about the case gave rise to his uneasiness — whether it be the seemingly random nature of the shooting, the defendant’s or victim’s identity, or the manner in which the police investigated … . Nor did this juror convey that his uneasiness was connected to any particular personal experience or relationship, … or whether his impressions risked predisposition toward the prosecution or defense. Moreover, as both the prosecutor and trial court indicated in questioning the juror, this case turned not on a dispute about the nature of the crime but on the prosecutor’s ability to prove that this defendant committed it — an issue not impacted by the juror’s apprehension.  * * *

A defendant’s views at trial about a prospective juror as conveyed to counsel are relevant to an ineffectiveness claim based on the joint decision to accept that juror. Here, where we do not know what was said between defendant and his counsel or how that conversation may have affected counsel’s impression of prospective juror number 10, the ineffective assistance claim cannot be resolved on direct appeal. People v Maffei, 2020 NY Slip Op 02680, CtApp 5-7-20

 

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FATHER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT TOOK SIX MONTHS TO HOLD A POST-DISPOSITIONAL HEARING AFTER A FAILED TRIAL DISCHARGE OF THE CHILDREN TO FATHER; THE CHILDREN WERE FINALLY RETURNED TO FATHER AND THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, determined that father was entitled to an expedited post-dispositional hearing after the children were removed from the father’s custody based upon a failed trial discharge. The children were eventually returned to father, but the hearing took six months and the children were not returned to father until eight months after the decision was issued. The First Department ruled on the appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine, finding that this situation was likely to recur. The court held that father was entitled to an “expedited hearing” after the children were removed under due process principles:

We find that a parent’s private interest in having custody of his or her children, the children’s private interest in residing with their parent, and the undisputed harm to these interests are factors that merit equal consideration. On this record, ACS [Administration for Children’s Services]  fails to establish that the lengthy delay was related to its interest in protecting the children. Rather, the hearing was prolonged over six months because of the court’s and attorneys’ scheduling conflicts. There is no indication that the completion of the hearing was caused by difficult legal issues, or by the need to obtain elusive evidence, or by some other factor related to an accurate assessment of the best interest of the children … .

Even though this is a post-dispositional matter, the father is entitled to the strict due process safeguards afforded in neglect proceedings. “The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State” … . This rationale equally applies to the primacy of a parent’s fundamental liberty interest, and the importance of procedural due process in protecting that interest, particularly when a parent and child are physically separated … . Accordingly, we find that a parent is entitled to a prompt hearing on the agency’s determination to remove the children from his or her physical custody through a failed trial discharge. Matter of F.W. (Monroe W.), 2020 NY Slip Op 02385, First Dept 4-23-20

 

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THE “FALSELY REPORTING AN INCIDENT” STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO DEFENDANT’S FALSE TWEETS ALLEGING A RACIALLY-MOTIVATED ASSAULT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s “falsely reporting an incident” conviction, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, determined defendant’s tweets were protected by the First Amendment. Defendant was accused of falsely tweeting she was the victim of a racially-motivated assault:

… [A]lthough it was “not unlikely” that defendant’s false tweets about a racial assault at a state university would cause public alarm (Penal Law § 240.50 [1]), what level of public alarm rises to the level of criminal liability? Indeed, United States v Alvarez (567 US at 734 [Breyer, J., concurring]) informs us that criminalizing false speech requires either proof of specific harm to identifiable victims or a great likelihood of harm. Certainly, general concern by those reading defendant’s tweets does not rise to that level, nor does the proof adduced at trial, which established that defendant’s tweets were “retweeted” a significant number of times. In fact, because these “retweets” led to nothing more than a charged online discussion about whether a racially motivated assault did in fact occur, which falls far short of meeting the standard set forth in United States v Alvarez (567 US at 734 [Breyer, J., concurring]), we reach the inescapable conclusion that Penal Law § 240.50 (1), as applied to defendant’s conduct, is unconstitutional. …

… “[T]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true” (United States v Alvarez, 567 US at 727) and “social media platforms are information-disseminating fora. By the very nature of social media, falsehoods can quickly and effectively be countered by truth, making the criminalizing of false speech on social media not ‘actually necessary’ to prevent alarm and inconvenience” … . This could not be more apparent here, where defendant’s false tweets were largely debunked through counter speech; thus, criminalizing her speech by way of Penal Law § 240.50 (1) was not actually necessary to prevent public alarm and inconvenience … . People v Burwell, 2020 NY Slip Op 02205, Third Dept 4-9-20

 

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BECAUSE MOTHER’S ATTORNEY APPEARED MOTHER WAS NOT IN DEFAULT; FAMILY COURT’S REFUSAL TO ADMIT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OFFERED BY MOTHER’S ATTORNEY DEPRIVED MOTHER OF DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother was not in default because her attorney appeared and the court’s refusing to admit documentary evidence offered by mother’s attorney deprived mother of her right to due process of law:

The mother failed to appear … when continued fact-finding on the permanent neglect petition was scheduled, and an adjournment was granted. When the mother failed to appear on the next hearing date, … the mother’s counsel stated that she would be participating in the proceeding on the mother’s behalf and sought to admit into evidence certain documents. … [T]he mother was, therefore, not in default with respect to the fact-finding hearing … .

The Family Court’s refusal to permit the mother’s counsel to admit into evidence the documentary evidence on behalf of the mother based upon the mother’s failure to appear … , violated the mother’s right to due process. ” A parent has a right to be heard on matters concerning her [or his] child and the parent’s rights are not to be disregarded absent a convincing showing of waiver'” … . Matter of Amira W.H. (Tamara T.H.), 2020 NY Slip Op 02264, Second Dept 4-9-20

 

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FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO COMPLY WITH THE ‘CULTURAL NORMS’ OF HASIDIC JUDAISM WHEN THE CHILDREN STAY WITH HIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined father should not have been directed to comply with the “cultural norms” of Hasidic Judaism when the children stay with him:

We agree with the father that, by directing him to comply with the “cultural norms” of Hasidic Judaism during his periods of parental access, the Supreme Court ran afoul of constitutional limitations by compelling the father to himself practice a religion, rather than merely directing him to provide the children with a religious upbringing (see Cohen v Cohen, 177 AD3d at 852; Weisberger v Weisberger, 154 AD3d at 53). While the court referred to the “cultural norms” by which the children were raised, the testimony at the hearing made clear that the “cultural norms” referenced were that each parent would comply with the religious requirements of Hasidic Judaism. Under this Court’s decisions in Weisberger and on the prior appeal, the court’s directive that the father himself comply with these religious practices was an unconstitutional modification of the religious upbringing provision in the judgment of divorce, which must be reversed … . Cohen v Cohen, 2020 NY Slip Op 02263, First Dept 4-9-20

 

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TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE ADMISSION OF DNA PROFILES WAS HEARSAY WHICH VIOLATED THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant’s conviction, over a concurrence, determined the testimony which formed the basis for the admission in evidence of DNA profiles was hearsay which violated the Confrontation Clause:

In People v John, we held that, when confronted with testimonial DNA evidence at trial, a defendant is entitled to cross-examine “an analyst who witnessed, performed or supervised the generation of defendant’s DNA profile, or who used his or her independent analysis on the raw data” (27 NY3d 294, 315 [2016]). In People v Austin, we reiterated that a testifying analyst who did not participate in the generation of a testimonial DNA profile satisfies the Confrontation Clause’s requirements only if the analyst “used his or her independent analysis on the raw data to arrive at his or her own conclusions” (30 NY3d 98, 105 [2017] … ). The records before us do not establish that the testifying analyst had such a role in either case. Accordingly, because the analyst’s hearsay testimony as to the DNA profiles developed from the post-arrest buccal swabs “easily satisfies the primary purpose test” for determining whether evidence is testimonial … , we conclude that her testimony and the admission of those DNA profiles into evidence, over defendants’ objections, violated defendants’ confrontation rights. People v Tsintzelis, 2020 NY Slip Op 02026, CtApp 3-24-20

 

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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, ASSESSED POINTS ON A THEORY NOT RAISED BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF SEX OFFENDERS OR THE PEOPLE; DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, assessed points on a theory not raised by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders or the People:

… [D]efendant contends, and the People correctly concede, that County Court violated his right to due process by sua sponte assessing points on a theory not raised by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders or the People … . The due process guarantees in the United States and New York Constitutions require that a defendant be afforded notice of the hearing to determine his or her risk level pursuant to SORA and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the risk level assessment … . Here, no allegations were made either in the risk assessment instrument (RAI) or by the People at the SORA hearing that defendant should be assessed 30 points under risk factor 3, and defendant learned of the assessment of the additional points under that risk factor for the first time when the court issued its decision … . …

The court stated that, if defendant were a presumptive level one risk, an upward departure to level two would be warranted based on certain aggravating factors stemming from the nature of the crimes. Because those factors were not presented as bases for departure in the RAI or by the People at the hearing, defendant was not afforded notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond to them … . People v Wilke, 2020 NY Slip Op 02002, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

 

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THAT NEW YORK’S PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST PROPERTY OWNERS IN “MAJORITY-MINORITY” NEIGHBORHOODS; COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Kern, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint alleging the New York property tax system is unconstitutional should have been dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a cause of action. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. With respect to the allegations the property tax system discriminates against property owners in “majority-minority” neighborhoods, the court wrote:

… [P]laintiff does not adequately allege a causal connection between the property tax system and any racial disparities in the availability of housing. Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient concrete facts or produce statistical evidence showing that the application of the property tax system, as opposed to other factors, causes financial barriers that inhibit the ability of minority residents to own homes. Additionally, plaintiff does not allege sufficient concrete facts or produce statistical evidence showing how the current property tax system contributes to higher rates of foreclosure or discourages the production of rental units in majority-minority communities. …

… [P]laintiff has failed to meet its burden “to allege facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection” between the property tax system and the continued segregation of New York City neighborhoods sufficient to “make out a prima facie case of disparate impact” … . …

… [P]laintiff argues that the terms and conditions of all home, condominium and cooperative sales and apartment rentals include the transfer of an illegal tax burden that make purchasing or renting a dwelling more expensive in affected communities. The portion of the FHA [Fair Housing Act] upon which plaintiff relies makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” … . However, in the context of taxation, defendants are not involved in the terms and conditions of the sale or rental of property … . Tax Equity Now NY LLC v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 01401, First Dept 2-27-20

 

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28-YEAR PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY IN THIS MURDER CASE DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; DNA PROFILE STEMMING FROM DEFENDANT’S 2008 ARREST MATCHED BLOOD EVIDENCE FROM THE 1984 MURDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, determined the 28 year pre-indictment delay in this murder case did not violate defendant’s due process rights. Defendant was arrested in 2008 and his DNA profile was obtained. He had been a suspect in the 1984 murder and the blood evidence from the murder was linked to the defendant:

… [T]he preindictment delay of more than 28 years was undoubtedly extraordinary, a fact that weighs in favor of the defendant … . However, under the circumstances presented, the People met their burden of demonstrating good cause for the delay … . The record of the Singer hearing supports the hearing court’s determination that the People acted in good faith in deferring commencement of the prosecution until after they were able to match the defendant’s DNA profile with the one found on some of the blood-stained items recovered from the crime scene.

While the defendant correctly points out that DNA testing of the crime scene evidence could have been performed years earlier, there is nothing to suggest that such tests would have yielded any meaningful information, as the defendant’s own DNA profile was not available to investigators for comparative purposes until it was entered into CODIS in March of 2008. Nor are we persuaded by the defendant’s contention that the People could have sought a court order compelling the defendant to produce a DNA sample for analysis before 2008 … . Considering that the outcome of such a proceeding, under the particular facts of this case, would be very difficult to predict … , we are loath to saddle the People with an affirmative duty to embark upon a course that could ultimately prove unsuccessful, and possibly jeopardize an ongoing investigation. People v Innab, 2020 NY Slip Op 01363, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

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