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DURING THE FUNERAL PLAINTIFF (ALLEGEDLY) LEARNED DECEDENT’S BODY WAS NOT IN THE CASKET; THE LOSS OF SEPULCHER ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s loss of sepulcher action properly survived summary judgment. During the funeral plaintiff learned the casket was empty:

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, during the funeral service and burial intended for the decedent, the plaintiff became aware that the decedent’s body was not in the casket and the decedent’s body was not located for some period of time. Accordingly, the appellants failed to establish, prima facie, that their alleged actions or inactions did not interfere with the plaintiff’s possession of the decedent’s body and her right to find “solace and comfort in the ritual of burial” … . Gutnick v Hebrew Free Burial Socy. for the Poor of the City of Brooklyn, 2021 NY Slip Op 05696, Second Dept 10-20-21

 

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ALLEGED MISHANDLING OF DECEDENT’S BODY BEFORE PLAINTIFF TOOK CUSTODY OF IT SUPPORTED THE RIGHT OF SEPULCHER CLAIM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a dissent, determined the “right of sepulcher” cause of action properly survived summary judgment:

The record demonstrates that there are factual issues as to whether defendant improperly dealt with the decedent’s body. In his deposition testimony, plaintiff described viewing the body of the decedent, his father, in a closet-like room where supplies were kept. Plaintiff testified that his father’s hands and feet were bound, his stomach had become bloated, he was dirty and unshaven, and a tube was placed down his throat. The decedent’s longtime companion further testified that the area where the body was kept “seemed like [a] garbage dump.” This alleged mishandling and presentation of the body is, contrary to our dissenting colleague’s view, sufficient to raise a factual issue requiring resolution at trial … . * * *

… [T]he right of sepulcher safeguards the surviving next of kin’s right to find “solace and comfort in the ritual of burial” … . Burial rituals involve more than simply placing a body in its final resting place. Indeed, one need only consider the Catholic practice of holding a wake or vigil, or the ritual cleansing of a body following death by Jews and Muslims, as examples of the ways in which human tradition has shown respect to the dead in the moments preceding burial itself… . That plaintiff ultimately took custody of the decedent’s body in a timely fashion does not assuage the harm caused by defendant’s having allegedly improperly dealt with it. Almeyda v Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 03521, First Dept 6-3-21

 

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ALTHOUGH DECEDENT’S BODY WAS DELIVERED TO THE WRONG FUNERAL HOME, PLAINTIFFS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT INTERFERED WITH PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT OF SEPULCHER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiffs did not demonstrate defendant interfered with plaintiffs’ right of sepulcher by releasing the decedent’s body to the wrong funeral home:

“The common-law right of sepulcher affords the deceased’s next of kin an absolute right to the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for preservation and burial . . . , and damages may be awarded against any person who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly deals with the decedent’s body” … . “To establish a cause of action for interference with the right of sepulcher, [a] plaintiff must establish that: (1) plaintiff is the decedent’s next of kin; (2) plaintiff had a right to possession of the remains; (3) defendant interfered with plaintiff’s right to immediate possession of the decedent’s body; (4) the interference was unauthorized; (5) plaintiff was aware of the interference; and (6) the interference caused plaintiff mental anguish” … . …

…[T]the evidence establishes that Cleckley, who was then satisfying a residency to become a licensed funeral director, was directed by his superior to collect and transport the decedent’s body to the funeral home. The plaintiffs presented no evidence either that Cleckley was aware that the funeral home was not authorized to take possession of the decedent’s body or that he was negligent in failing to verify that his superior was authorized to direct him to collect and transport the decedent’s body. Thus, the plaintiffs failed to meet their prima facie burden to show that he wrongfully interfered with the plaintiffs’ right to immediate possession of the decedent’s body … . The plaintiffs likewise failed to demonstrate that Cleckley acted wrongfully or negligently such that he may be held liable for their emotional injuries … . Turner v Owens Funeral Home, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 07237, Second Dept 12-2-20

 

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THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE CITY’S DELAY IN NOTIFYING THE NEXT OF KIN OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF DECEDENT’S BODY AND THE LOCATION OF DECEDENT’S REMAINS ENTITLES THE NEXT OF KIN TO DAMAGES PURSUANT TO THE COMMON-LAW RIGHT OF SEPULCHER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there were questions of fact in this right of sepulcher action stemming from city’s delay in notifying decedent’s next of kin if the identification and location of decedent’s remains.

On June 27, 2003, the plaintiff reported to the police that his 16-year-old son (hereinafter the decedent) was missing, and the New York City Police Department (hereinafter NYPD) commenced a missing person investigation. The decedent’s body was found 10 days later on July 7, 2003. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (hereinafter OCME) conducted an autopsy, but the medical examiner incorrectly determined that the body belonged to a 25 to 30 year old Asian male. Therefore, the body was not identified as that of the decedent. Because the decedent’s body remained unidentified, it was buried in the City public cemetery known as “Potter’s Field” on Hart Island in the Bronx. …

In September or October 2009, the plaintiff and his daughter, the decedent’s sister, provided their DNA samples to the NYPD as part of the missing person investigation. On January 10, 2011, the OCME confirmed that the unidentified body buried in Potter’s Field was that of the decedent. … Approximately one month after the OCME confirmed the identification of the decedent’s body, on February 16, 2011, the NYPD notified the plaintiff of the identification, and further informed him that the decedent had drowned and that the body had been found on July 7, 2003. The next day, the plaintiff was informed by the OCME that the decedent had been buried in Potter’s Field, but he was not informed of the exact location of the burial until 2015. …

“The common-law right of sepulcher affords the deceased’s next of kin an absolute right to the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for preservation and burial . . ., and damages may be awarded against any person who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly deals with the decedent’s body” … .  … [W]hen a municipal defendant has all of the necessary identifying information, the obligation of informing the next of kin of the decedent’s death is a ministerial function that creates a special duty running to the decedent’s next of kin rather than to the public at large … .

… [T]here are triable issues of fact as to whether the delays in informing the plaintiff that the decedent had been identified and in informing the plaintiff of the location of the decedent’s burial interfered with the plaintiff’s right of sepulcher … . However, we note that triable issues of fact exist only with respect to the City’s delay in notifying the plaintiff about the identification and the delay in informing him of the location of the burial. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages with respect to the delay from the time the decedent was first reported missing in 2003 until the identity of the decedent’s body was confirmed on January 10, 2011. Cansev v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 04145, Second Dept 7-22-20

 

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QUESTION OF FACT RAISED ABOUT WHETHER THE HOSPITAL DEFENDANTS MADE A REASONABLE AND SUFFICIENT EFFORT TO LOCATE THE NEXT OF KIN OF THE DECEDENT IN THIS RIGHT-OF-SEPULCHER CASE; THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR, HOWEVER, ENJOYED GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY AND NO SPECIAL DUTY WAS OWED PLAINTIFFS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined plaintiffs had raised a question of fact whether the hospital defendants made reasonable and sufficient efforts to locate the decedent’s next of kin in this right-of-sepulcher case alleging defendants interfered with plaintiffs right to immediate possession of decedent’s body. After the hospital defendants failed to locate the next of kin, the investigation was turned over to the County Public Administrator (PA). After the PA failed to locate the next of kin the decedent was buried. After plaintiffs learned of decedent’s death, the body was exhumed and a memorial service was held at the PA’s expense. The suit against the County PA was properly dismissed because the PA enjoyed governmental function immunity and no special duty was owed plaintiffs:

The common-law right of sepulcher “affords the decedent’s next of kin an absolute right to immediate possession of a decedent’s body for preservation and burial . . . , and damages may be awarded against any person who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly deals with the decedent’s body” … . “To establish a cause of action for interference with the right of sepulcher, [a] plaintiff must establish that: (1) plaintiff is the decedent’s next of kin; (2) plaintiff had a right to possession of the remains; (3) defendant interfered with plaintiff’s right to immediate possession of the decedent’s body; (4) the interference was unauthorized; (5) plaintiff was aware of the interference; and (6) the interference caused plaintiff mental anguish” … . * * *

… [P]laintiffs identified certain records of the hospital defendants, which indicated that decedent had resided, on some occasions, at a local homeless shelter. Those documents were available to the hospital defendants at the time they conducted their search for decedent’s next of kin, and there is no dispute that the hospital defendants did not attempt to contact that homeless shelter during their search.

Plaintiffs also submitted deposition testimony from a person employed by the homeless shelter, who testified that decedent was a frequent resident there and that she knew members of decedent’s family and could have contacted them if she had been notified of decedent’s death. Green v Iacovangelo, 2020 NY Slip Op 03363, Fourth Dept 6-12-20

 

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CITY WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT BASED UPON THE HANDLING OF A DECEASED PERSON DURING HURRICANE SANDY AND NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE CITY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the city was immune from suit stemming from alleged interference with the right of sepulcher during Hurricane Sandy, which flooded the Bellevue Hospital morgue. The court further determined there was no special relationship between plaintiff and the city:

Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the right of sepulcher does not, by definition, trump governmental immunity … acted in its governmental capacity at all relevant times… . The specific act from which plaintiffs’ claims arise is the City’s treatment of the decedent’s body in the context of Hurricane Sandy, i.e., as the hurricane approached, once it had struck, and in its aftermath. Plaintiffs seek to ignore or minimize the significance of that context. However, their claims directly implicate the City’s emergency preparations and the decisions it made during and immediately after the unprecedented hurricane, which caused, among other things, unprecedented flooding in the Bellevue Hospital morgue — all quintessential governmental functions. Moreover, these preparations and decisions were discretionary, not ministerial … . Thus, the record demonstrates the elements of governmental function immunity from liability as a matter of law … .

Plaintiffs failed to establish the special relationship with the City required for holding the City liable for their injury … . In support of their contention that the City violated a statutory duty enacted for their benefit, they rely on statutes that do not contemplate private rights of action and, in any event, are not relevant to this case, which does not involve autopsy, dissection or unclaimed remains (see Public Health Law § 4215) or individuals fighting for control over the disposition of those remains … . Nor did plaintiffs establish that, in its treatment of the decedent’s body in the wake of Hurricane Sandy,the City voluntarily assumed a duty that generated their justifiable reliance … . Lee v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05626, First Dept 8-2-18

SEPULCHER (CITY WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT BASED UPON THE HANDLING OF A DECEASED PERSON DURING HURRICANE SANDY AND NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE CITY (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (SEPULCHER, CITY WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT BASED UPON THE HANDLING OF A DECEASED PERSON DURING HURRICANE SANDY AND NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE CITY (FIRST DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (SEPULCHER, CITY WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT BASED UPON THE HANDLING OF A DECEASED PERSON DURING HURRICANE SANDY AND NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE CITY (FIRST DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (SEPULCHER, CITY WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT BASED UPON THE HANDLING OF A DECEASED PERSON DURING HURRICANE SANDY AND NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE CITY (FIRST DEPT))/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, SEPULCHER, CITY WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT BASED UPON THE HANDLING OF A DECEASED PERSON DURING HURRICANE SANDY AND NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE CITY (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE RIGHT OF SEPULCHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; DEFENDANT HOSPITAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment based upon the common law right of sepulcher should have been denied and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action based upon failure to timely perform an autopsy should have been granted. Plaintiffs elected to terminate a pregnancy because genetic testing indicated the fetus could not live. The defendant hospital provided plaintiffs with a burial form and plaintiffs consented to having the hospital bury the fetus. When plaintiffs allegedly were told the sex of the fetus was male (the genetic testing indicated the fetus was female), the plaintiffs asked for an autopsy. The fetus had been misplaced and was ultimately found in a bin with body parts. The autopsy was performed and confirmed the fetus was female. The hospital argued that the right of sepulcher only applied to “bodies” and the fetus, which was less than 20 weeks old, was not a “body.” The Second Department held that the hospital had essentially waived that argument by agreeing to bury the fetus. Although the plaintiffs, by signing the burial form, relinquished their right to prompt possession of the body, the cause of action alleging the mishandling of the remains was viable. The Second Department went on to hold that there was no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from the delay of an autopsy:

The common-law right of sepulcher “gives the next of kin the absolute right to the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for preservation and burial, and . . . damages will be awarded against any person who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly deals with the decedent’s body” … . Here, although the plaintiffs relinquished their right to prompt possession of the fetal remains when Linru Fan executed a written consent form authorizing the Hospital to arrange for the burial, the plaintiffs also alleged that the Hospital violated their right to sepulcher by mishandling the fetal remains … . However, damages attributable to emotional distress caused by the failure to timely perform an autopsy on the fetus are not recoverable … . Zhuangzi Li v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 2017 NY Slip Op 01405, 2nd Dept 2-22-17

SEPULCHER, RIGHT OF (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE RIGHT OF SEPULCHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT HOSPITAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE RIGHT OF SEPULCHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT HOSPITAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/AUTOPSY (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE RIGHT OF SEPULCHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT HOSPITAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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The State’s “Donate Life Registry” (Re: Consent to Organ Donation) Is a Governmental, Not Proprietary, Function

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Peters, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the “donate life registry,” which is based upon consent to organ donation indicated on driver’s license renewal applications, was a governmental, not a proprietary, function. Therefore the state may not be held liable for negligence with respect to organ donation absent a special relationship. No special relationship was alleged here. The lawsuit alleged claimant’s mother did not consent to the donation of her organs and that the Department of Health negligently interpreted a drawn line on the renewal application as a signature. The Court of Claims had upheld the “violation of the right of sepulcher” cause of action. The opinion includes detailed discussions of the law surrounding governmental versus proprietary functions, as well as the nature of governmental involvement in organ donation:

Quintessential examples of purely governmental functions include police and fire protection … and traffic regulation … . On the other hand, a governmental entity acts in a purely proprietary capacity when it serves as a landlord by virtue of its ownership and maintenance of property … . In determining where along the continuum a governmental entity’s challenged conduct falls, it is necessary to examine “‘the specific act or omission out of which the injury is claimed to have arisen and the capacity in which that act or failure to act occurred'”… . * * *

By establishing the Donate Life Registry and facilitating the identification of organ and tissue donors and the making of anatomical gifts through DMV applications and renewals, defendant is protecting and promoting the health and welfare of the public through the exercise of its general police powers. It is axiomatic that “‘[p]rotecting health and safety is one of municipal government’s most important duties'”… . Drever v State of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 07726, 3rd Dept 10-22-15

 

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Plaintiffs Entitled to Damages Re: City’s Failure to Timely Notify Plaintiffs of the Death of a Family Member

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, affirmed Supreme Court’s rulings re: allegations that (1) the City of New York failed to timely notify plaintiffs of the death of a family member (a 36-hour delay in violation of the right of sepulcher) and (2) the City negligently performed an autopsy, which violated the family’s religious beliefs. The First Department determined plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the “failure to timely notify” causes of action, and the City was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the “negligent performance of an autopsy” cause of action (by statute, in the absence of receipt of an objection on religious grounds, the City has the authority to conduct an autopsy without first seeking consent from the family). With respect to the “failure to timely notify” causes of action, the court wrote:

The first cause of action alleges that as a result of the failure to receive timely notification of the death of Darden Binakaj, plaintiffs sustained emotional injury. The second cause of action specifies that mental anguish resulted from defendants’ interference with the family’s right to the immediate possession of decedent’s body. Thus, these causes of action can be read to advance a claim for violation of the common-law right of sepulcher. * * *

While emotional distress resulting from injury inflicted on another is not compensable under New York law, as the City argues, the emotional harm alleged in this matter is the direct result of the breach of a duty to timely communicate information about a death to plaintiffs themselves … .  In Johnson v State of New York (37 NY2d 378 [1975]), the plaintiff alleged emotional harm as a result of receiving a message that negligently reported the death of her mother, a patient in a state hospital, when in fact the person who had died was another patient with the identical name. The Court of Appeals sustained recovery for emotional suffering on the reasoning that the particular circumstances were associated with ” genuine and serious mental distress . . . which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious'” … . The Court noted that the false message informing the plaintiff of the death and the resulting psychological injury were within the orbit of duty owed by the hospital to the patient’s daughter and that she was entitled to recover for breach of that duty … . Contrary to the City’s contention, Johnson holds that in the case of negligent communications involving the death of a family member, damages are recoverable for purely emotional injury, expressly distinguishing negligent communication that causes emotional suffering from that sustained “solely as a result of injuries inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the relationship” … . The unavoidable implication is that such communication is a ministerial function, as opposed to the discretionary exercise envisioned by the City for which no recovery is available. While the injury alleged in this matter resulted from an untimely rather than false communication, the City’s contention that it cannot be held liable for negligence in informing the plaintiffs about the death of their loved one finds no support under Johnson.

The second cause of action alleges that as a result of the untimely notification, which deprived plaintiffs of any opportunity to state their objection to the autopsy, the City interfered with their right to immediate possession of decedent’s body. As this Court stated in Melfi v Mount Sinai Hosp. (64 AD3d 26, 31 [1st Dept 2009]), “the common-law right of sepulcher gives the next of kin an absolute right to the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for preservation and burial, and . . . damages will be awarded against any person who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly deals with the decedent’s body.” Damages are awarded as compensation to the next of kin for the “solely emotional injury” experienced as a result of the interference with their ability to properly bury their decedent … . * * *

As this Court stated:

“[F]or a right of sepulcher claim to accrue (1) there must be interference with the next of kin’s immediate possession of decedent’s body and (2) the interference has caused mental anguish, which is generally presumed. Interference can arise either by unauthorized autopsy or by disposing of the remains inadvertently or, as in this case, by failure to notify the next of kin of the death” … .

The City states no compelling reason to depart from clear precedent to bar a cause of action for loss of sepulcher in this instance … . Rugova v City of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 06754, 1st Dept 9-8-15

 

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The Medical Examiner Who Conducted an Autopsy of Plaintiffs’ 17-Year-Old Son Upon the Son’s Death in an Auto Accident Was Not Under a Statutory or Ministerial Duty to Return the Brain or to Inform Plaintiffs He Had Removed The Brain for Further Examination and Testing

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over a two-judge dissent, determined the medical examiner, who conducted an autopsy of plaintiffs’ 17-year-old son after his death in a car accident, was under no statutory or ministerial duty to inform plaintiffs he had removed plaintiffs’ son’s brain for further examination and testing, nor was he under a duty to return the brain. Plaintiffs therefore did not have a “negligent infliction of emotional distress” or “violation of right of sepulcher” cause of action against the city. (Plaintiffs had been awarded significant damages at trial:)

When the Legislature enacted statutes granting medical examiners (and others) the authority to conduct autopsies and dissections (see Public Health Law §§ 4209; 4210), it acknowledged through the enactment of section 4215 (1) that there would be situations where the decedent’s body may not be buried or incinerated within a reasonable time after the decedent’s death, as per section 4200 (1)’s directive. Thus, section 4215 strikes a balance permitting the lawful dissection of a body, while concomitantly ensuring that once the lawful purposes have been accomplished the body will be buried, incinerated or properly disposed of as per section 4200 (1), and that the penalties for the interference or injuries to the body would “apply equally to the remains of the body after dissection . . .”

When section 4200 (1) and section 4215 (1) are read in tandem, there is no language that would cause a medical examiner to divine from section 4215 (1) that he or she is required to return not only decedent’s body, but the organs and tissue samples that the medical examiner is legally permitted to remove. Similarly, our right of sepulcher jurisprudence does not mandate that a medical examiner return decedent’s organs and tissue samples. Thus, because there was no governing rule or statutory command requiring a medical examiner to turn over organs and tissue samples, it could not be said that he or she has a ministerial duty to do so. At most, a medical examiner’s determination to return only the body without notice that organs and tissue samples are being retained is discretionary, and, therefore, no tort liability can be imposed for either the violation of the common-law right of sepulcher or Public Health Law § 4215 (1). Once a medical examiner returns a decedent’s body sans the organs and tissue samples, the medical examiner for all intents and purposes has complied with the ministerial duty under section 4215 (1). Absent a duty to turn over organs and tissue samples, it cannot be said that the medical examiner has a legal duty to inform the next of kin that organs and tissue samples have been retained. * * *

There is simply no legal directive that requires a medical examiner to return organs or tissue samples derived from a lawful autopsy and retained by the medical examiner after such an autopsy. The medical examiner’s obligations under both the common-law right of sepulcher and Public Health § 4215 (1) are fulfilled upon returning the deceased’s body to the next of kin after a lawful autopsy has been conducted. If the Legislature believes that next of kin are entitled to notification that organs, tissues and other specimens have been removed from the body, and that they are also entitled their return prior to burial of the body or other disposition, it should enact legislation delineating the medical examiner’s obligations in that regard, as it is the Legislature that is in the best position to examine the issue and craft legislation that will consider the rights of families and next of kin while concomitantly taking into account the medical examiner’s statutory obligations to conduct autopsies. Shipley v City of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 04791, CtApp 6-10-15

 

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