New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Real Property Law
Administrative Law, Municipal Law, Real Property Law

PUSUANT TO THE NYC BUILDING CODE, DEFENDANTS ARE STRICTLY LIABLE FOR DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFFS’ REAL PROPERTY CAUSED BY EXCAVATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgement on their claim that excavation by the defendants damaged plaintiffs’ real property. The NYC Building Code imposes strict liability for damage caused by excavation:

… [T]he plaintiffs demonstrated, prima facie, that [defendants] President and Triborough caused an excavation to be made pursuant to a license granted under New York City Building Code § BC 3309.4 and that the excavation proximately caused damage to the Union Street property … . The plaintiffs’ evidence included, among other things, an affidavit from a professional engineer whose investigation on the plaintiffs’ behalf concluded that the excavation on the President Street property had caused damage to the Union Street property. Further, the plaintiffs’ submissions demonstrated, prima facie, that the Union Street property continued to sustain damages within the statutory period as a result of the ongoing excavation project … DSSR Realty Corp v President SAI II, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 06416, Second Dept 11-4-26

Practice Point: The NYC Building Code imposes strict liability for damage to real property caused by excavation.​

 

November 4, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-04 11:52:352026-11-15 12:22:52PUSUANT TO THE NYC BUILDING CODE, DEFENDANTS ARE STRICTLY LIABLE FOR DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFFS’ REAL PROPERTY CAUSED BY EXCAVATION (SECOND DEPT).
Contract Law, Landlord-Tenant, Real Property Law

HERE PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY ALLEGED A RELETTING FEE (TWO MONTHS RENT) IN A LEASE BUYOUT AGREEMENT VIOLATED REAL PROPERTY LAW SECTION 227 WHICH PROVIDES THAT IF THE LANDLORD EXPEDITIOUSLY RELETS THE PROPERTY THE OUTGOING TENANT MAY OWE NOTHING AT ALL; PLAINTIFF SUCCESSFULLY ALLEGED THE RELETTING-FEE CLAUSE VIOLATED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff adequately alleged the reletting fee (two months rent) in a lease buyout agreement violated the Real Property Law and thereby violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing:

… Real Property Law § 227-e expressly provides, “Any provision in a lease that exempts a landlord’s duty to mitigate damages under this section shall be void as contrary to public policy.” Under Real Property Law § 227-e, if a landlord’s reletting efforts succeed expeditiously, a tenant may not owe anything at all, as plaintiff alleges should have been the case here.

At this stage the allegations are sufficient to sustain plaintiff’s claim that the lease’s reletting fee and the lease buyout agreement violate Real Property Law § 227-e, which, if established, would constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant, implied in all New York contracts, requires the parties to avoid doing “anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract” and includes all “promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included” … . As the amended complaint adequately alleges, a promise not to charge amounts barred by Real Property Law § 227-e is among those promises. Desai v Ninety Five Wall St. LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 06198, First Dept 10-22-26

Practice Point: Real Property Law section 227 provides that if a landlord successfully relets the premises expeditiously, the outgoing tenant may owe the landlord nothing. Therefore a lease buyout agreement which requires a reletting fee (two months rent) may impose a charge barred by Real Property Law 227 and thereby violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

 

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 20:36:302026-10-31 21:33:44HERE PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY ALLEGED A RELETTING FEE (TWO MONTHS RENT) IN A LEASE BUYOUT AGREEMENT VIOLATED REAL PROPERTY LAW SECTION 227 WHICH PROVIDES THAT IF THE LANDLORD EXPEDITIOUSLY RELETS THE PROPERTY THE OUTGOING TENANT MAY OWE NOTHING AT ALL; PLAINTIFF SUCCESSFULLY ALLEGED THE RELETTING-FEE CLAUSE VIOLATED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (FIRST DEPT). ​
Real Property Law

PLAINTIFF ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE DISPUTED PROPERTY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION; TWO JUDGES DISSENTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined the plaintiff had obtained title to the disputed property by adverse possession. There was an extensive two-judge dissent:

We agree with the courts below that, on the unique facts of this case, plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff’s proof on each of the required elements was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession … , and in response defendants raised no triable issue of fact. Among other evidence establishing hostile and exclusive possession of the road, plaintiff’s submissions demonstrated that “it was only plaintiff that had plowed, patched, paved, repaired, and otherwise maintained the entire road for decades” … . Although adverse possession is “not a favored method of procuring title” … , it is a “necessary means of clearing disputed titles” and serves an “important policy of repose” … . It is time for repose here. Genesee County Fish & Game Protective Assn., Inc. v Sullivan, 2026 NY Slip Op 06168, Ct App 10-22-26

 

October 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-22 10:33:132026-10-31 21:34:23PLAINTIFF ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE DISPUTED PROPERTY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION; TWO JUDGES DISSENTED (CT APP).
Criminal Law, Real Property Law

PURUSANT TO CPL 420.25, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DECLARED A DEED WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN OFFERING-A-FALSE-INSTRUMENT-FOR-FILING CONVICTION VOID AB INITIO; THE ARGUMENT THE PEOPLE MUST PROVE THE SIGNATURES ON THE DEED ARE FORGED WAS REJECTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Quirk, determined the Criminal Procedure Law allows the court to declare a deed void ab initio where a deed is the subject of a offering-a-false-instrument-for-filing conviction. The argument the People were required to prove the signatures on the deed were forged was rejected:

This appeal presents issues with respect to CPL 420.45, a statute enacted in 2019 that permits a court, upon motion and after a hearing, to order that an instrument affecting real property be declared void ab initio when, as relevant here, a defendant has been convicted of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree and the instrument is material to the encumbrance, transfer, or purchase of real property. Nonparty Bil-Man Asset Management, LLC (hereinafter the appellant), contends that CPL 420.45 applies only to deeds containing forged signatures and that the People failed to establish that the deed at issue here was forged. The appellant further contends that it rebutted the presumption under CPL 420.45 that the deed at issue was void ab initio. … Supreme Court properly granted the People’s motion, in effect, pursuant to CPL 420.45 to declare the deed void ab initio. * * *

Each guilty plea arose out of a scheme by the defendant and the codefendant to defraud the defendant’s mother, Marta Merino, out of certain real property that she owned in Brooklyn (hereinafter the property). Specifically, the defendant admitted … she recorded a deed (hereinafter the fraudulent deed) with the Office of the City Register of New York that purported to transfer title to the property from her mother to herself. She also admitted … she recorded a second deed, transferring title to the property from herself to 523 73rd Street, LLC, of which she was a member, and that there was never any agreement between the defendant and her mother that the defendant would hold title to the property. The defendant and the codefendant admitted that they stole loan proceeds from the appellant by means of a fraudulent mortgage on the property. * * *

… [T]he plain language of CPL 420.45 does not limit its application to deeds containing forged signatures. People v Merino, 2026 NY Slip Op 05196, Second Dept 9-2-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth discussion of when a real-property-related instrument which is the subject of an offering-a-false-instrument-for-filing conviction can be declared void ab initio by the court. The People need not prove the signatures on the instrument are forged.

 

September 2, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-02 12:16:422026-09-11 13:08:13PURUSANT TO CPL 420.25, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DECLARED A DEED WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN OFFERING-A-FALSE-INSTRUMENT-FOR-FILING CONVICTION VOID AB INITIO; THE ARGUMENT THE PEOPLE MUST PROVE THE SIGNATURES ON THE DEED ARE FORGED WAS REJECTED (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Court of Claims, Eminent Domain, Real Property Law

THERE IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE PERSONAL-SERVICE-OF-A-CLAIM REQUIREMENT IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT FOR ACTIONS SEEKING DAMAGES FOR THE STATE’S APPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY; HERE SERVICE BY REGULAR FIRST-CLASS MAIL WAS NOT A JURIDICTIONAL DEFECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims in the property-appropriation-by-the-state action, determined an exception to the usual service requirements applies. Failure to serve the State with a copy of the claim by personal service or by certified mail is not a jurisdictional defect. Therefore the State’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

The claimants served the claim upon the Office of the Attorney General by regular first-class mail. * * *

… [W]here the claim sought only to recover damages for the State’s appropriation of the claimants’ property, service upon the Attorney General by personal service or certified mail was not required … .

Court of Claims Act § 10 reflects a similar unique exception for appropriation claims. While most types of claims must be both “filed and served upon the attorney general” to be properly commenced within the time prescribed by the statute … , a “claim for the appropriation by the state of lands” does not require service upon the Attorney General within the statutory time limit … . Port Grove Assoc. v State of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 03990, Second Dept 6-24-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a detailed discussion of the service requirements for a Court of Claims action seeking damages for the State’s appropriation of claimant’s property. Failure to effect personal service on the Attorney General is not a jurisdictional defect.

 

June 24, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-06-24 09:29:472026-07-05 10:00:23THERE IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE PERSONAL-SERVICE-OF-A-CLAIM REQUIREMENT IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT FOR ACTIONS SEEKING DAMAGES FOR THE STATE’S APPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY; HERE SERVICE BY REGULAR FIRST-CLASS MAIL WAS NOT A JURIDICTIONAL DEFECT (SECOND DEPT).
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Real Property Law

WHEN DOES A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT RUN WITH THE LAND? WHEN IS A RESTRICIVE COVENANT EXTINGUISHED BY MERGER? WHEN IS A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT RENDERED UNENFORCEABLE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1951?

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a restrictive covenant prohibiting the development of land in a conservation district ran with the land, although there remains a question of fact whether the covenant was rendered unenforceable pursuant to RPAPL 1951. Plaintiff sought to build a home on the land:​

“[A] restrictive covenant will run with the land and will be enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of the land when the following requirements are satisfied: (1) it must appear that grantor and grantee intended that the covenant should run with the land; (2) it must appear that the covenant is one touching or concerning the land with which it runs; [and] (3) it must appear that there is privity of estate between the promisee or party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it, and the promisor or party who rests under the burden of the covenant” … . The only one of these requirements at issue on this appeal is the intent of the parties, “which must be determined from the instrument and, if necessary, by looking also to the surrounding circumstances” … .

Here, the 2000 deed did not expressly recite that the restrictive covenant was to run with the land. Although that deed contained language providing that the County conveyed to BPC Holding, and to its “heirs or successors and assigns,” the right to have and to hold the property, subject to the restrictive covenant, the mere presence of that language was not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that the grantor and the grantee intended that the restrictive covenant run with the land … .

Nevertheless, the County defendants and the Town defendants established, prima facie, that the restrictive covenant was intended to run with the land based upon the surrounding circumstances…. . * * *

“In order to state a cause of action pursuant to RPAPL 1951, a plaintiff seeking a declaration that a restrictive covenant is unenforceable must allege that, upon a balancing of the equities, the restrictive covenant is of no actual and substantial benefit to the party seeking to enforce it” … . Here, the County defendants and the Town defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s alleged hardships due to the restrictive covenant did not “tip the balance of equities in favor of extinguishing [the restrictive covenant]” pursuant to RPAPL 1951(2) … . U & Me Homes, LLC v County of Suffolk, 2026 NY Slip Op 03331, Second Dept 5-27-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an in-depth discussion of the criteria for a restrictive covenant which runs with the land, the criteria for extinguishing a restrictive covenant by merger, and the criteria for rendering a restrictive covenant unenforceable pursuant to RPAPL 1951 because of the hardship it imposes.

 

May 27, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-27 13:46:312026-05-31 14:14:57WHEN DOES A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT RUN WITH THE LAND? WHEN IS A RESTRICIVE COVENANT EXTINGUISHED BY MERGER? WHEN IS A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT RENDERED UNENFORCEABLE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1951?
Real Property Law, Trusts and Estates

THE WILL BEQUEATHED THE REAL PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF ALONE; THE DEFENDANT ADMINSTRATOR DREW UP A DEED WHICH TRANSFERRED THE PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT AS JOINT TENANTS; THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER THE DEED IS VOID AB INITIO OR VOIDABLE; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE DEED WAS VOIDABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Landicino, determined that the deed drawn up by defendant, the administrator of the decedent’s estate, which was inconsistent with a specific bequest in the will, was voidable, not void ab initio. The will bequeathed the real property to plaintiff alone. The defendant administrator drew up a deed which transferred the property to plaintiff and defendant as joint tenants. Supreme Court determined deed was void ab initio. The Second Department reversed and determined the deed was voidable. The opinion is complex and cannot be fairly summarized here:

The primary question presented in this appeal is whether a transfer of property by an administrator c.t.a. in a manner that is inconsistent with a specific bequest in a will is voidable or void ab initio. In our view, an administrator c.t.a. who receives letters of administration c.t.a. from the Surrogate’s Court is cloaked with apparent authority to make a transfer of property from the estate, even if that transfer is contrary to the terms of the decedent’s will. As such, the transfer is voidable, not void ab initio.

The undisputed facts of this case are as follows: On April 13, 1998, Floribel Nelson (hereinafter the decedent) died. Prior to her death, the decedent owned real property located in Brooklyn (hereinafter the subject property). In her will, the decedent bequeathed her entire estate, including the subject property, to the plaintiff, who was the decedent’s grandniece, and two other family members who had apparently predeceased the decedent. Because the will further provided that, “if any [of the named heirs] do not survive [the decedent], then his or her share shall be divided equally among the survivors, and if there is only one survivor, said survivor shall take the whole estate,” the plaintiff was the sole surviving beneficiary of the decedent’s estate at the time of the decedent’s death. Rhiney v Rhiney, 2026 NY Slip Op 02428, Second Dept 4-22-26

Practice Point: Here a deed drawn up by the administrator of the estate conveyed decedent’s real property to the administrator and the plaintiff as joint tenants. However, the will bequeathed the property to plaintiff alone. The court was asked to determine if the deed was void ab initio or voidable. The deed was deemed voidable.

 

April 22, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-04-22 18:58:442026-04-24 21:04:04THE WILL BEQUEATHED THE REAL PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF ALONE; THE DEFENDANT ADMINSTRATOR DREW UP A DEED WHICH TRANSFERRED THE PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT AS JOINT TENANTS; THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER THE DEED IS VOID AB INITIO OR VOIDABLE; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE DEED WAS VOIDABLE (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Real Property Law, Religion

PLAINTIFF SUED A CHURCH ALLEGING THE CHURCH HELD PROPERTY IN TRUST FOR PLAINTIFF AND THE CHURCH WRONGFULLY OUSTED PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROPERTY; RESOLUTION OF THE SUIT WOULD INVOLVE NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW, NOT RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES; THEREFORE, THE LAWSUIT WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the lawsuit concerning ownership of church property was not precluded by the First Amendment because the suit could be decided by applying neutral principles of civil law, not religious principles:

The complaint alleged, among other things, that Synod held the church property in trust for the plaintiff, as the beneficial owner, and that Synod wrongfully ousted the plaintiff from the church property in March 2020 following a series of disputes between the plaintiff and Synod. Synod moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it, arguing, inter alia, that resolution of the causes of action requires review of ecclesiastical matters over which the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. …

“‘The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs'” … . “However, a court may resolve church property disputes ‘when the case can be decided solely upon the application of neutral principles of . . . law, without reference to any religious principle'” … . “‘The neutral principles of law approach requires courts to apply objective, well-established principles of secular law to the issues,’ and ‘[i]n doing so, courts may rely upon internal documents, such as a congregation’s bylaws, but only if those documents do not require interpretation of ecclesiastical doctrine'” … .

Here, contrary to Synod’s contention, it failed to demonstrate that the causes of action cannot be resolved solely upon the application of neutral principles of law, without reference to any religious principle … . Lutheran Church of the Risen Christ, Mo. Synod v Atlantic Dist. of the Lutheran Church Mo. Synod, 2026 NY Slip Op 02260, Second Dept 4-15-26

Practice Point: If a lawsuit against a church involves ownership of property and can be decided based on neutral principles of law (not religious principles) the suit is not precluded by the First Amendment and can be brought in state court.

 

April 15, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-04-15 13:25:302026-04-21 09:47:52PLAINTIFF SUED A CHURCH ALLEGING THE CHURCH HELD PROPERTY IN TRUST FOR PLAINTIFF AND THE CHURCH WRONGFULLY OUSTED PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROPERTY; RESOLUTION OF THE SUIT WOULD INVOLVE NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW, NOT RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES; THEREFORE, THE LAWSUIT WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Limited Liability Company Law, Real Property Law

HERE THE PURPORTED TRANSFER BY DEED OF AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY TO A LIMITED LIABILTY COMPANY WAS NULL AND VOID FROM THE OUTSET BECAUSE THE LLC DID NOT EXIST WHEN THE DEED WAS EXECUTED; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR REFORMATION OF THE DEED NEVER STARTED RUNNING; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT THE TRANSFER TO THE LLC WAS NULL AND VOID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the action seeking a declaratory judgment that a deed is null and void should not have been dismissed as time-barred. The deed was void from the outset because the limited liability company listed as a property owner did not not exist at the time the deed was executed. Because the deed was void (re; the LLC) at the time of execution, the statute of limitations for a reformation of the deed never started running:

“‘A cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213(6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made'” … . Here, however, the deed, insofar as it purported to convey an interest in the property from Gold to the LLC, was void at its inception, since it is undisputed that the LLC did not exist at the time the deed was executed … . Since “a statute of limitations cannot validate what is void at its inception,” the statute of limitations cannot act as a bar to the cause of action for a judgment declaring the LLC’s purported interest in the property null and void … . J​PMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Katz, 2026 NY Slip Op 00359, Second Dept 1-28-26

Practice Point: A statute of limitations cannot be used to validate a purported transfer of property that was void at its inception. Here the statute of limitations for a judgment declaring a purported transfer of property by deed to an LLC which did not exist when the deed was executed should not have been invoked to bar reformation of the deed.​

 

January 28, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-01-28 12:10:002026-02-01 12:37:05HERE THE PURPORTED TRANSFER BY DEED OF AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY TO A LIMITED LIABILTY COMPANY WAS NULL AND VOID FROM THE OUTSET BECAUSE THE LLC DID NOT EXIST WHEN THE DEED WAS EXECUTED; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR REFORMATION OF THE DEED NEVER STARTED RUNNING; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT THE TRANSFER TO THE LLC WAS NULL AND VOID (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Fraud, Real Property Law, Trusts and Estates

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS DEPENDS ON THE UNDERLYING THEORY, FRAUD IN THIS CASE; AN AGREEMENT TO ASSIGN OR OBTAIN A MORTGAGE IS A CONTRACT INVOLVING AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY AND IS SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE-OF-FRAUDS WRITING-REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that certain causes of action in this dispute over ownership of real property should have been dismissed as time-barred or as violative of the statute of frauds:

“Actions for declaratory judgments are not ascribed a certain limitations period. The nature of the relief sought in a declaratory judgment action dictates the applicable limitations period” … . The statute of limitations for an action based upon fraud generally is six years from the date the cause of action accrued (see CPLR 213[8]). … [T]he first and second causes of action were untimely, as the amended complaint alleged that [defendant’s] fraud in obtaining those interests occurred more than six years before the commencement of this action … .

… Causes of action to impose a constructive trust upon real property and to recover damages for unjust enrichment are governed by a six-year statute of limitations, which begins to accrue at the time of the wrongful act giving rise to the duty of restitution … . … [Defendant’s] alleged fraudulent acquisition of ownership interests … occurred more than six years before the commencement of this action.

… The statute of frauds requires any contract transferring or creating an interest in real property to be in writing (see General Obligations Law § 5-703[1] …). Here, [the] … complaint alleged [defendants] breached their agreements to assign or obtain a mortgage in favor of the plaintiffs. A mortgage constitutes an interest in real property, and the agreements to transfer or obtain mortgages in favor of the plaintiffs, therefore, were required to be in writing. Hersko v Hersko, 2026 NY Slip Op 00120, Second Dept 1-14-26

Practice Point: The statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment is that which applies to the underlying theory. Here the six-year statute for fraud applied.​

Practice Point: An agreement to assign or obtain a mortgage is subject to the statute-of-frauds because a mortgage constitutes an interest in real property.

 

January 14, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-01-14 09:12:552026-01-19 10:03:16THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS DEPENDS ON THE UNDERLYING THEORY, FRAUD IN THIS CASE; AN AGREEMENT TO ASSIGN OR OBTAIN A MORTGAGE IS A CONTRACT INVOLVING AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY AND IS SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE-OF-FRAUDS WRITING-REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).
Page 1 of 37123›»

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Arts and Cultural Affairs Law
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Civil Service Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Forcible Touching
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Judiciary Law
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Scroll to top