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COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DIOCESE OF BUFFALO ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY A PRIEST DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief against the Diocese of Buffalo NY stemming from alleged sexual abuse by a priest did not state a cause of action for public nuisance based on common law and Penal Law 240.45 (criminal nuisance). The court noted that a nuisance suit in this context would conflict or compete with the classification system under the Sex Offender Registration Act and, to the extent plaintiff seeks damages, a suit pursuant to the Child Victims Act is available:

“Conduct does not become a public nuisance merely because it interferes with . . . a large number of persons. There must be some interference with a public right. A public right is one common to all members of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured” … . Here, the complaint alleges the infringement of, at most, a common right of a particular subset of the community, i.e., a group of Roman Catholic parishioners in the area of the Diocese who attended or were active in the priest’s parishes. The complaint does not allege that the general public was exposed to the priest’s conduct, nor does it otherwise allege interference with a collective right belonging to all members of the public … . …

Penal Law § 240.45 does not imply a private right of action under the circumstances presented here. “Where a penal statute does not expressly confer a private right of action on individuals pursuing civil relief, recovery under such a statute may be had only if a private right of action may fairly be implied’ ” … . Three essential factors are considered in determining whether a private right of action may fairly be implied: “(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme” … . Golden v The Diocese of Buffalo, NY, 2020 NY Slip Op 03354, Fourth Dept, 6-12-20

 

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PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE NUISANCE EXPLAINED; BECAUSE DEFENDANTS SOLD THEIR PROPERTY, THE APPEAL RELATED TO THE INJUNCTION CAUSE OF ACTION WAS MOOT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiffs’ private nuisance cause of action should not have been dismissed, but the public nuisance cause of action was properly dismissed. The Third Department noted that, because defendants’ property had been sold, the injunction aspect of the case was moot. The defendants had put in a parking area and a retaining wall which plaintiffs’ alleged blocked their view of oncoming traffic making it dangerous for plaintiffs’ to pull out from their driveway:

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants paved a significant area of their front yard and proceeded to park cars and trucks thereon, and, as a result, their view of oncoming traffic was significantly hindered when they used their driveway. As a consequence, they claimed that they suffered great anxiety, as they continually worried about being in a traffic accident. What plaintiffs can ultimately prove, or whether damages of this sort are recoverable, is not our concern when determining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action … . Rather, “the dispositive inquiry is whether plaintiffs have a cause of action and not whether one has been stated, i.e., whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . Here, after applying the strict standards of a pre-answer motion to dismiss, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ cause of action for private nuisance.

… “A public nuisance is actionable by a private person only if it is shown that the person suffered special injury beyond that suffered by the community at large” … . Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants interfered with the use of a public place or public rights. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs and the public (pedestrian, cyclist or motorist) are at risk of suffering a collision. “[W]here the claimed injury is common to the entire community, a private right of action is barred” … . Moreover, we find without merit plaintiffs’ claim that they suffer a special damage in that they will suffer liability as a result of any collision that might occur. Even were we to conclude that this claim is not completely speculative, the injury proposed by plaintiffs is not different in kind, but merely in degree, to that which may be suffered by the public as a whole. As such, it does not qualify as a “special injury” so as to allow plaintiffs to bring a public nuisance cause of action … . Duffy v Baldwin, 2020 NY Slip Op 02836, Third Dept 5-14-20

 

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ACTION AGAINST GAS COMPANY FOR CONTAMINATION OF REAL PROPERTY ACCRUED WHEN INJURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AND WAS TIME BARRED; ACTION FOR NUISANCE RELATING TO REMEDIATION EFFORTS, HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT TO A DIFFERENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION AND WAS NOT TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the causes of action against a gas company to recover damages for contamination of real property were time-barred, but the nuisance actions stemming from remediation efforts were not time-barred:

“Generally, an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property must be commenced within three years of the injury” … . “[T]he three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances,” however, “shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier” (CPLR 214-c[2] …). “For purposes of CPLR 214-c, discovery occurs when, based upon an objective level of awareness of the dangers and consequences of the particular substance, the injured party discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based'” … .  …

… [T]he defendants here demonstrated that they undertook extensive efforts beginning in 1999 to inform and engage with property owners potentially affected by the contamination and remediation by conducting, among other things, door-to-door canvassing, direct mailings of newsletters and fact sheets, numerous public meetings, and highly visible and disruptive remediation work. The defendants also inspected the subject property twice in 2005 to determine whether certain remediation work between those inspections caused any damage, and mailed the results of their inspections to the plaintiff in 2006. … The defendants … established, prima facie, that the plaintiff should have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the primary condition upon which its exposure-related claims were based prior to January 22, 2007 … . …

We disagree, however, with the Supreme Court’s determination that the causes of action to recover damages for public and private nuisance allegedly arising from the defendants’ remediation work were time-barred … . These causes of action are subject to the limitations period in CPLR 214(4) rather than CPLR 214-c(2) because they do not seek “to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure” … .  Here, the papers submitted in support of the defendants’ motion demonstrated that there was no dispute that the defendants conducted remediation work in close proximity to the subject property shortly after new tenants signed a lease to occupy the space in 2008 … . Onder Realty, Inc. v Keyspan Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 07406, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON SINKHOLES ON PLAINTIFFS’ LAND WHICH ALLEGEDLY RESULTED FROM THE FAILURE OF A BULKHEAD ON DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the plaintiffs did not state causes of action for private and public nuisance based upon the alleged effects of a body of navigable tidal water (Henry Street Basin) which is adjacent to plaintiffs’ and defendant’s properties. Plaintiffs alleged a bulkhead built by defendant was falling into disrepair resulting in sinkholes on plaintiffs’ property:

A nuisance is the actual invasion of interests in land, and it may arise from varying types of conduct” … . In the present case, the private nuisance claim is predicated upon the defendant’s alleged negligence in maintaining its property. Where “a nuisance has its origin in negligence, negligence must be proven” … . Duty is an essential element of negligence … .

Here, the defendant had no duty to prevent the natural encroachment of public waters upon Sunlight’s property… . The “maxim” that “requires one so to use his lands as not to injure his neighbor’s . . . does not require one lot owner so to improve his lot that his neighbor can make the most advantageous use of his, or be protected against its natural disadvantages” … . Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action sounding in private nuisance … .

The plaintiffs further failed to state a cause of action sounding in public nuisance. “A public nuisance exists for conduct that amounts to a substantial interference with the exercise of a common right of the public, thereby offending public morals, interfering with the use by the public of a public place or endangering or injuring the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons” … . Here, the plaintiffs’ mere allegation that “[t]he deteriorated state of the Bulkhead [was] substantially certain to result in an interference with the public’s use or enjoyment of the Henry Street Basin and/or may endanger or injure the health of persons using the Henry Street Basin” was too conclusory and speculative to set forth a viable cause of action sounding in public nuisance. Sunlight Clinton Realty, LLC v Gowanus Indus. Park, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06783, Second Dept 10-10-18

REAL PROPERTY LAW (NUISANCE, PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON SINKHOLES ON PLAINTIFFS’ LAND WHICH ALLEGEDLY RESULTED FROM THE FAILURE OF A BULKHEAD ON DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT))/NUISANCE (PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON SINKHOLES ON PLAINTIFFS’ LAND WHICH ALLEGEDLY RESULTED FROM THE FAILURE OF A BULKHEAD ON DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT))

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PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION BROUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF WHO ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE BY A PRIEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE DIOCESE SHOULD HAVE RELEASED THE NAMES OF PRIESTS ACCUSED OF ABUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the public nuisance cause of action, based upon the sexual abuse of plaintiff by a priest and the Diocese's failure to release the names of accused priests, should have been dismissed:

“A public nuisance exists for conduct that amounts to a substantial interference with the exercise of a common right of the public, thereby offending public morals, interfering with the use by the public of a public place or endangering or injuring the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons” … . “A public nuisance is a violation against the State and is subject to abatement or prosecution by the proper governmental authority” … . A public nuisance is actionable by a private person only where the person suffered special injury beyond that suffered by the community at large … .

Here, the complaint failed to identify any cognizable right common to all members of the general public that the Diocese has interfered with by, among other things, failing to disclose the names of priests who had been accused of, but neither charged with nor convicted of, molesting children … . Notwithstanding a moral or ethical duty to notify the public, or investigate and report instances of suspected child molestation, the complaint does not allege that the Diocese violated any laws recognizing the public's right to information regarding accusations of child molestation, or that the Diocese violated any legal duty to report such accusations to appropriate authorities. …

… The complaint does not allege that any member or employee of the Diocese is a mandated reporter, or that any such member or employee violated Social Services Law § 413 in failing to report to appropriate authorities allegations of suspected child abuse. …

Furthermore, although parish and Diocese property may be open to the public, it still is private property … . Monaghan v Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 2018 NY Slip Op 06527, Second Dept 10-3-18

PUBLIC NUISANCE (SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS, PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION BROUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF WHO ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE BY A PRIEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE DIOCESE SHOULD HAVE RELEASED THE NAMES OF PRIESTS ACCUSED OF ABUSE (SECOND DEPT))/PRIESTS (SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS, PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION BROUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF WHO ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE BY A PRIEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE DIOCESE SHOULD HAVE RELEASED THE NAMES OF PRIESTS ACCUSED OF ABUSE (SECOND DEPT))/SEXUAL ABUSE (PRIESTS, (SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS, PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION BROUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF WHO ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE BY A PRIEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE DIOCESE SHOULD HAVE RELEASED THE NAMES OF PRIESTS ACCUSED OF ABUSE (SECOND DEPT))/SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS, PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION BROUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF WHO ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE BY A PRIEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE DIOCESE SHOULD HAVE RELEASED THE NAMES OF PRIESTS ACCUSED OF ABUSE (SECOND DEPT))

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CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that municipal code provisions requiring a rental permit and limiting the occupancy of rental units to a “family” as defined in the code were not unconstitutionally vague:

The record therefore reflects that the rental occupancy restriction was enacted to, among other things, serve a legitimate governmental interest in diminishing public nuisances created from the overcrowding of dwelling units occupied by transient residents … . Because the ordinance does not favor certain types of families over others, or restrict the size of unrelated persons living as a functionally equivalent family without also restricting the size of a traditional family, it does not suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as the ordinances in McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay (66 NY2d at 549) or Baer v Town of Brookhaven (73 NY2d 942, 943 [1989]). Moreover, the ordinance here contains objective criteria for rebutting the presumption that four or more persons living together in a single dwelling unit who are unrelated by blood, marriage or legal adoption do not constitute the functional equivalent of a traditional family … , and the occupancy restriction bears a reasonable relationship to the goals sought to be achieved by the ordinance. In light of the foregoing, plaintiffs have not established that the challenged provisions of the ordinance are unconstitutional … . Grodinsky v City of Cortland, 2018 NY Slip Op 05236, Third Dept 7-12-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (LANDLORD-TENANT, CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, LANDLORD-TENANT, CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT))

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NUISANCE LAW COULD LEAD TO EVICTION FOR REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE, THE REACH OF THE LAW VIOLATED TENANTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND WAS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE LANDLORD.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined a village nuisance law was facially unconstitutional and could not be enforced against the owner of several properties which rented out single rooms. Apparently, criminal activity, including domestic abuse, at these properties was a concern for the village. The local village nuisance law assigned points for certain conditions or incidents at the properties. Points were assessed even when police were called to the properties by crime victims. Once a certain number of points are accumulated, the village can take certain enumerated actions against the property owner, including ordering the eviction of tenants. The reach of the nuisance statute therefore encroached on the tenant’s first amendment right to report crimes to the police (to petition the government for redress of grievances):

The Nuisance Law’s provisions pertaining to remedies demonstrate that the loss of a tenant’s home may result directly from the designation of a property as a public nuisance. As previously noted, the Nuisance Law expressly permits owners to include the eviction of tenants in the required plans to abate public nuisances — again, with no exception for tenants who may have caused points to be assessed against a property by summoning police because they were victimized by criminal activity, or who otherwise exercised their constitutionally-protected right to request police assistance. Further, as the relief permitted by article II of the Nuisance Law includes the property’s temporary closure, all tenants and occupants of a property where illegal activity occurs — not just those who actually commit a violation — are at risk of losing their homes upon a declaration that the property is a public nuisance. The plain language of the law therefore tends to discourage tenants from seeking help from police. As the amici curiae assert, this discouragement may have a particularly severe impact upon victims of domestic violence … . If a tenant who has an order of protection against an individual because of prior domestic violence calls police for assistance in enforcing the order, points may be assessed against the property. Further, if a tenant summons police because he or she has been the victim of a crime of domestic violence involving assault or one of the other offenses worth 12 points, the Nuisance Law automatically deems the property to be a public nuisance, placing the tenant at risk of losing his or her home solely because of this victimization. Board of Trustees of The Vil. of Groton v Pirro, 2017 NY Slip Op 04938, 3rd Dept 6-5-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (NUISANCE LAW, LANDLORD-TENANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, NUISANCE LAW COULD LEAD TO EVICTION FOR REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE, THE REACH OF THE LAW VIOLATED TENANTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND WAS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE LANDLORD)/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, LANDLORD-TENANT, NUISANCE LAW COULD LEAD TO EVICTION FOR REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE, THE REACH OF THE LAW VIOLATED TENANTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND WAS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE LANDLORD)/LANDLORD-TENANT (MUNICIPAL LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, NUISANCE LAW COULD LEAD TO EVICTION FOR REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE, THE REACH OF THE LAW VIOLATED TENANTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND WAS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE LANDLORD)/NUISANCE LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,  NUISANCE LAW COULD LEAD TO EVICTION FOR REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE, THE REACH OF THE LAW VIOLATED TENANTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND WAS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE LANDLORD)

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A Shooting Victim’s Negligence and Public Nuisance Actions Against the Manufacturer, Distributor and Resellers of Firearms Is Allowed to Go Forward.

Back in October, 2012, in a full-fedged opinion by Justice Peradotto, the Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court’s dismissal of a complaint brought by a shooting victim which alleged negligence, public nuisance and intentional-violation-of-gun-laws causes of action against the manufacturer, distributor and resellers of firearms.  (Williams v Beemiller, Inc., et al, 100 AD3d 143).

Reargument was subsequently granted.  After reargument, the Fourth Department amended its October opinion by adding a new section.  Excerpts from the new section follow:

With respect to the common-law negligence cause of action, although “ ‘ [a] defendant generally has no duty to control the conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from harming others’ “ …, “[a] duty may arise … where there is a relationship…between defendant and a third-person’s actions “ … .  In Hamilton [v Berretta USA Corp., 96 NY2d 222], the Court of Appeals determined that no such relationship existed because the plaintiffs were unable to draw any connection between specific gun manufacturers and the criminal wrongdoers … . Here, by contrast, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants sold the specific gun used to shoot plaintiff to an unlawful straw purchaser for trafficking into the criminal market, and that defendants were aware that the straw purchaser was acting as a conduit to the criminal market. Thus, unlike in Hamilton, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that defendants “were a direct link in the causal chain that resulted in plaintiffs’ injuries, and that defendants were realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs” … .

Further [an] intervening criminal act does not necessarily sever the causal connection between the alleged negligence of defendants and plaintiff’s injury … . Rather, “liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant[s’] negligence” … .  Here, plaintiffs allege that defendants… knowingly participated in the sale of 140 handguns, including 87 handguns in a single transaction, to [a] gun trafficking ring.  We conclude that those allegations are sufficient to raise a question of fact whether it was reasonably foreseeable that supplying large quantities of guns for resale to the criminal market would result in the shooting of an innocent victim ….

We likewise conclude that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action for public nuisance … . [P]laintiffs allege that defendants violated federal and state laws by selling guns to a straw purchaser, who funneled the guns into the criminal gun market, thereby posing danger to the general public, and that plaintiff was injured by one of those guns. Thus, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants engaged in unlawful conduct that endangered the lives of “a considerable number of persons” … and that plaintiff “ ‘ suffered special injury beyond that suffered by the community at large’ “ … .Williams v Beemiller, Inc., Motion No. 938/12, CA 11-02092 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

 

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