You are here: / Trade Secrets
,

SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEALED THE ENTIRE COURT RECORD, REDACTION IS APPROPRIATE FOR TRADE SECRETS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the entire court record should not have been sealed. The facts were not discussed, but the court noted redaction is appropriate to protect trade secrets, confidential business information or proprietary information:

We reverse the order of the motion court for two reasons. First, the motion court erred by sealing the entire court file. As we have previously explained, “We recognize that it may be easier for the parties and the motion court to seal an entire court record, rather than make a determination on a document by document basis about sealing, but administrative convenience is not a compelling reason to justify sealing” … . Indeed, “In camera review and appropriate redaction is a valid method of protecting trade secrets” …

Second, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing grounds for protecting from public access any or all of the information in Exhibit A to the complaint, let alone the entire court record. They failed to show that Exhibit A, or any other document likely to become part of the record, contains trade secrets, confidential business information, or proprietary information … . Vergara v Mission Capital Advisors, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05610,First Dept 10-8-20

 

, , ,

MOTION TO VACATE THE NOTE OF ISSUE AND COMPEL DISCOVERY PROPERLY DENIED; MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS AND BREACH OF A NON-COMPETITION CLAUSE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined: (1) plaintiff’s motion to vacate the note of issue and compel additional discovery was properly denied because the criteria of 22 NYCRR 202.21 were not met; (2) the misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action re: customer lists was properly dismissed; (3) the misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action re: development of a laser should not have been dismissed; and (4), the breach of the non-competition clause cause of action should not have been dismissed:

The elements of a cause of action to recover damages for misappropriation of trade secrets are: (1) possession of a trade secret; and (2) use of that trade secret in breach of an agreement, confidential relationship or duty, or as a result of discovery by improper means (see Tri-Star Light. Corp. v Goldstein, 151 AD3d 1102, 1106). A trade secret includes any compilation of information which provides the company with an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it … . …

… [T]he plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant used its trade secrets in the manufacture of particular lasers … . …

A restrictive covenant will not be enforced if it is unreasonable in time, space, or scope  … . Thus, “a restrictive covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to the extent that it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee” … . … [T]he plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether the noncompetition clause should be partially enforced. A restrictive covenant may be partially enforced to the extent necessary to protect a company’s legitimate interests … . In particular, “restrictive covenants will be enforceable to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential customer information” … .  Photonics Indus. Intl., Inc. v Xiaojie Zhao, 2020 NY Slip Op 04330, Second Dept 7-29-20

 

,

DISCOVERY OF DEFENDANT’S SOURCE CODE, A TRADE SECRET, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED FOR “ATTORNEYS AND EXPERT EYES ONLY” (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the discovery-production of defendant’s source code, a trade secret, should have been for “attorneys and expert eyes only.”

The production of defendants’ source code, which is a trade secret … , should have been ordered to be produced for “attorneys and expert eyes only” … . Plaintiffs’ assertion that they have the expertise to review and opine on the source code and should not be subjected to retaining an expert, does not support unfettered access to defendants’ confidential algorithm. BEC Capital, LLC v Bistrovic, 2019 NY Slip Op 08144, First Dept 11-12-19

 

,

NOTE OF ISSUE AND CERTIFICATE OF READINESS CONTAINING INCORRECT INFORMATION (I.E., DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETE) SHOULD HAVE BEEN VACATED; STIPULATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT TRADE SECRETS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the motion to vacate the note of issue and a certificate of readiness because the information therein was not correct (discovery was not complete). The court further determined that the confidentiality stipulation was sufficient to protect trade secrets during discovery:

… [C]ontrary to the statements on the certificate of readiness, discovery was incomplete when the note of issue and certificate of readiness were filed. Thus, “a material fact in the certificate of readiness [was] incorrect,” and the note of issue and certificate of readiness must be vacated … . …

… [D]efendants requested that the court issue a protective order that included the designation of a third-party neutral expert and an “attorney and expert eyes only” designation for disclosure. The court denied defendants’ request, and directed the parties to execute a confidentiality stipulation and order and to proceed with discovery pursuant to Rule 11-g of the Rules of the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court (see 22 NYCRR 202.70). The confidentiality stipulation and order provides, inter alia, that “Confidential Information shall be utilized by the Receiving Party and its Counsel only for purposes of this litigation and for no other purposes. Any violation of this Stipulation and Order may be enforced as a contempt of Court.” We conclude that the court provided defendants with adequate protection of their intellectual property and trade secrets. Backer & Assoc., LLC v PPB Eng’g & Sys. Design, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 04541, Fourth Dept 6-7-19

 

, , , ,

IN THIS MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT ACTION, DAMAGES CANNOT BE MEASURED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AVOIDED BY THE COMPANY WHICH MISAPPROPRIATED THE TRADE SECRETS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, over an extensive three-judge dissenting opinion, determined that the “cost avoidance” measure of damages should not be applied in this misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition and unjust enrichment action. Plaintiff proved at trial that former employees defected to defendant rival company, bringing trade secrets with them. Plaintiff’s only proof of damages was its expert’s opinion about how much it would have cost the rival company to develop the product without the misappropriated trade secrets (“avoided costs”):

… [T]he measure of damages in a trade secret action must be designed, as nearly as possible, to restore the plaintiff to the position it would have been in but for the infringement. Whether those losses are measured by the defendant’s profits, revenues, cost savings or any other measure of unjust gain, there is “no presumption of law or of fact” that such a figure will adequately approximate the losses incurred by the plaintiff … . A plaintiff therefore may not elect to measure its damages by the defendant’s avoided costs in lieu of its own losses. * * *

… [D]amages in trade secret actions must be measured by the losses incurred by the plaintiff, and … damages may not be based on the infringer’s avoided development costs. * * *

… .[W]here a defendant saves, through its unlawful activities, costs and expenses that otherwise would have been payable to third parties, those avoided third-party payments do not constitute funds held by the defendant “at the expense of” the plaintiff. Therefore, a plaintiff bringing an unjust enrichment action may not recover as compensatory damages the costs that the defendant avoided due to its unlawful activity in lieu of the plaintiff’s own losses. E.J. Brooks Co. v Cambridge Sec. Seals, 2018 NY Slip Op 03171, CtApp 5-3-18

​CORPORATION LAW (MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, IN THIS MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT ACTION, DAMAGES CANNOT BE MEASURED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AVOIDED BY THE COMPANY WHICH MISAPPROPRIATED THE TRADE SECRETS (CT APP))/TRADE SECRETS (MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, IN THIS MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT ACTION, DAMAGES CANNOT BE MEASURED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AVOIDED BY THE COMPANY WHICH MISAPPROPRIATED THE TRADE SECRETS (CT APP))/UNFAIR COMPETITION (MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, IN THIS MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT ACTION, DAMAGES CANNOT BE MEASURED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AVOIDED BY THE COMPANY WHICH MISAPPROPRIATED THE TRADE SECRETS (CT APP))/UNJUST ENRICHMENT  (MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, IN THIS MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT ACTION, DAMAGES CANNOT BE MEASURED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AVOIDED BY THE COMPANY WHICH MISAPPROPRIATED THE TRADE SECRETS (CT APP))/DAMAGES (AVOIDED COSTS, (MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, IN THIS MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT ACTION, DAMAGES CANNOT BE MEASURED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AVOIDED BY THE COMPANY WHICH MISAPPROPRIATED THE TRADE SECRETS (CT APP))/AVOIDED COSTS (DAMAGES, MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, IN THIS MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT ACTION, DAMAGES CANNOT BE MEASURED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AVOIDED BY THE COMPANY WHICH MISAPPROPRIATED THE TRADE SECRETS (CT APP))/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, IN THIS MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT ACTION, DAMAGES CANNOT BE MEASURED BY THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS AVOIDED BY THE COMPANY WHICH MISAPPROPRIATED THE TRADE SECRETS (CT APP))

, ,

TRADE SECRET EXEMPTION DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF DISCLOSURE WOULD RESULT IN COMPETITIVE INJURY.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rose, determined the exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) for trade secrets did not require a showing that disclosure of the trade secrets would result in substantial competitive injury. Rather, the statute, Public Officers Law 87 (2) (d), provides two distinct exemptions from disclosure: one for bona fide trade secrets and one for documents which, if disclosed, would cause substantial injury to the competitive position of the owner of the documents. Supreme Court’s finding that the exemption for trade secrets did not require proof of injury to competitive position was upheld. There are strict criteria in place for determining whether information constitutes a bona fide trade secret. Applying those criteria, Supreme Court properly determined that several documents provided by petitioner (Verizon) to the Department of Public Service were exempt from FOIL disclosure as bona fide trade secrets:

 

As pertinent here, Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (d) protects from FOIL disclosure “all records” that “are trade secrets or are submitted to an agency by a commercial enterprise or derived from information obtained from a commercial enterprise and which if disclosed would cause substantial injury to the competitive position of the subject enterprise.” Respondents argue that this language unambiguously indicates that the Legislature intended to create a single FOIL exemption for all types of confidential commercial information imparted to an agency — including trade secrets — and to subject all such information to the same showing of substantial competitive injury. * * *

Our courts have long recognized “[t]he importance of trade secret protection and the resultant public benefit” … , and have developed a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether specific commercial information is a bona fide trade secret worthy of such protection. First, it must be established that the information in question is a “‘formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives [one] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it'” … . Second, if the information fits this general definition, then an additional factual determination must be made

“concerning whether the alleged trade secret is truly secret by considering: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the business to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to the business and its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by the business in developing the information; [and] (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others” … .

Inasmuch as an entity seeking to establish the existence of a bona fide trade secret must make a sufficient showing with respect to each of these factors, we agree with Supreme Court that it is wholly unnecessary and overly burdensome to require the entity to then make a separate showing that FOIL disclosure of the trade secret would cause substantial injury to its competitive position.  Matter of Verizon N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Serv. Commn.2016 NY Slip Op 00239, 3rd Dept 1-14-16

 

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (REFUSAL TO ALLOW SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ON PETITIONER’S PROPERTY CONSTITUTED AN UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE)/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (REFUSAL TO ALLOW SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ON PETITIONERS’ PROPERTY DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONERS’ RIGHTS TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION, FREE SPEECH OR EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION)/SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (REFUSAL TO ALLOW VIOLATED HUMAN RIGHTS LAW)/PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION (DEFINED FOR PURPOSES OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW)

, , , ,

Elements of Causes of Action for (1) Misappropriation of (a) Trade Secrets, (b) Business Ideas, and (c) Labor, Skills and Expenditures, (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Delaware Law), (3) Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Delaware Law), (4) Unjust Enrichment, and (5) Promissory Estoppel Described in Some Detail

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined the complaint stated causes of action against the Cohen defendants for essentially stealing plaintiffs’ ideas for a website. Defendant Cohen, an investor, eventually served as chairman and CEO of a company formed by plaintiffs to develop the website. The complaint alleged that Cohen caused a strain among the partners which stalled the project. Cohen circulated a liquidation agreement which was never addressed by the other partners. Then, the complaint alleged, Cohen took the plaintiffs’ ideas and website-development work to the founders of Pinterest, which, the complaint alleged, was formed based upon the ideas Cohen misappropriated from plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the Cohen defendants and Pinterest. All the causes of action against Pinterest were dismissed by Supreme Court. The First Department held the complaint stated causes of action against the Cohen defendants for (1) breach of fiduciary duty (under Delaware Law), (2) misappropriation of trade secrets, (3) misappropriation of ideas, (4) and misappropriation of labor, skill and expenditures. (Apparently the unjust enrichment cause of action, which Supreme Court dismissed only re: Pinterest, was not a subject of the appeal.) The First Department found that all the causes of action against Pinterest were properly dismissed.   The opinion includes detailed descriptions of the elements of breach of fiduciary duty (Delaware law), aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, misappropriation of trade secrets, misappropriation of ideas, misappropriation of labor, skills and expenditures, and promissory estoppel. The discussions are too extensive to be fairly summarized here.  Schroeder v Pinterest Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 07232. 1st Dept 10-6-15

 

, , , ,

Tortious Interference with Contract and Unfair Competition Causes of Action Proven–Elements Explained—Punitive Damages Not Warranted–Purpose Explained

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Sweeney, determined that the trial judge (bench trial) properly found that JC Penney (JCP) had tortiously interfered with the exclusivity provision of a contract between Macy’s and Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (MSLO), but that the trial judge had improperly dismissed the cause of action alleging tortious interference with the confidentiality provision of the contract and the cause of action for unfair competition. The First Department agreed with the trial judge that punitive damages were not warranted.  Macy’s had entered a contract with MSLO which gave Macy’s the exclusive right to manufacture and sell MSLO products. JCP was found to have knowingly and forcefully engaged in negotiations with MSLO which resulted in MSLO’s breaching both the exclusivity and confidentiality provisions of the Macy’s contract:

To sustain its claim of tortious interference with contract, Macy’s must prove (1) that it had a valid contract with MSLO; (2) that JCP had knowledge of Macy’s contract with MSLO; (3) that JCP intentionally induced MSLO to breach its contract with Macy’s; (4) that MSLO breached its contract with Macy’s; (5) that MSLO would not have breached its contract with Macy’s absent JCP’s conduct; and (6) that Macy’s sustained damages … .

* * * On the record before us, the evidence establishes that JCP had, as the court found, a “certainty” or “substantial certainty” that it actions would result in a breach, particularly in light of the unambiguous language of the contract requirement that all MSLO goods in the Exclusive Product Categories, including all such goods sold in any MSLO Store, had to be manufactured by Macy’s. * * *

… Macy’s alleges that JCP induced MSLO to disclose the terms of its agreement and confidential financial information. This was a violation of the confidentiality provision of the agreement. Macy’s sufficiently demonstrated that the material disclosed does not fall under any exception to the confidentiality provisions as required by law or legal processes. Further, Macy’s demonstrated that the scope of disclosure was not properly limited with respect to the information provided and the personnel receiving it. As noted, JCP sought this information almost from the inception of its discussion with MSLO. The information was tantamount to trade secrets, as JCP’s executives acknowledged. * * *

It is well settled that “the primary concern in unfair competition is the protection of a business from another’s misappropriation of the business’ organization [or its] expenditure of labor, skill, and money'” (Ruder & Finn v Seaboard Sur. Co., 52 NY2d 663, 671 [1981]…). Indeed, “the principle of misappropriation of another’s commercial advantage [is] a cornerstone of the tort” (52 NY2d at 671). Allegations of a “bad faith misappropriation of a commercial advantage belonging to another by exploitation of proprietary information” can give rise to a cause of action for unfair competition … .

Here, the agreement between Macy’s and MSLO provided Macy’s with valuable exclusive rights to the Martha Stewart trademark and MSLO’s designs in the Exclusive Product Categories, which, as the court found, gave Macy’s a competitive advantage. It is conceded that the MSLO brand had significant value in the retail world, and the record shows JCP was fully aware of Macy’s commercial advantage as the exclusive distributor of these branded products. JCP’s actions in attempting to misappropriate this commercial advantage by inducing MSLO to breach its agreement falls squarely within Ruder and Finn’s definition of unfair competition … . * * *

…In order to be entitled to punitive damages, a private litigant “must not only demonstrate egregious tortious conduct by which he or she was aggrieved, but also that such conduct was part of a pattern of similar conduct directed at the public generally … . Punitive damages are “a social exemplary remedy, not a private compensatory remedy” Macy’s Inc v Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc, 2015 NY Slip Op 01728, 1st Dept 2-26-15

 

, , , ,

Discovery of Trade Secrets Should Have Been Allowed Upon Execution of Confidentiality Agreement, Documents Indispensable to Defense and Not Otherwise Available

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court should have allowed discovery of documents from MREC which included trade secrets because the documents were indispensable to the defense and were otherwise unavailable:

We agree … that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying the cross motion insofar as it sought to condition disclosure of the documents on plaintiff’s execution of a confidentiality agreement … . We therefore modify the order accordingly. “Discoverability of such documents involves a two-fold analysis: the moving party must show that the discovery demand would require it to reveal a trade secret, which then shifts the burden of the responding party to show that the information was indispensable to proving its [case]”… . Here, MREC met its burden of establishing that the documents sought by plaintiff contained information “not known by those outside the business, [and that the documents] were kept under lock and key, were the product of substantial effort and expense, and could not be easily acquired or duplicated” … . We nevertheless conclude that plaintiff established that the documents sought “were indispensable to [its] case and were otherwise unavailable if they could not be obtained from [MREC]”  … . Conley & Son Excavating Co Ltd v Delta Alliance LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 06468, 4th Dept 9-26-14

 

, , ,

Criteria for Discovery from Non-Party Explained/Criteria for Discovery of Trade Secrets Explained

The Second Department explained the criteria for discovery demanded of a non-party [Morgan Stanley] and described the relevant considerations when discovery is opposed on the ground that the material requested constitutes trade secrets.  The court concluded Morgan Stanley had demonstrated certain of the discovery requests related to protected trade secrets:

Pursuant to CPLR 3101(a)(4), a party may obtain discovery from a nonparty in possession of material and necessary evidence, so long as the nonparty is apprised of the “circumstances or reasons” requiring disclosure. Pursuant to the Court of Appeals' recent decision in Matter of Kapon v Koch ( ____ NY3d ____, 2014 NY Slip Op 02327 [2014]), disclosure from a nonparty requires no more than a showing that the requested information is “material and necessary,” i.e. relevant to the prosecution or defense of an action (id., *1). However, “the subpoenaing party must first sufficiently state the circumstances or reasons' underlying the subpoena (either on the face of the subpoena itself or in a notice accompanying it), and the witness, in moving to quash, must establish either that the discovery sought is utterly irrelevant' to the action or that the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious'” (id.). Should the nonparty witness meet this burden, “the subpoenaing party must then establish that the discovery sought is material and necessary' to the prosecution or defense of an action, i.e., that it is relevant” (id.). * * *

Notwithstanding New York's policy of liberal discovery (see id., * 4-5), a party seeking disclosure of trade secrets must show that such information is “indispensable to the ascertainment of truth and cannot be acquired in any other way” … . A witness who objects to disclosure on the ground that the requested information constitutes a trade secret bears only a minimal initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a trade secret … . Contrary to [plaintiff's] contention, Morgan Stanley met its minimal initial burden of showing that the documents requested in paragraphs 11 through 19 in the section of the subpoena duces tecum entitled “Requests for Production” contained trade secrets … . Thus, the burden shifted to [plaintiff] to demonstrate that the information contained in those documents was indispensable to the ascertainment of truth, and could not be acquired in any other way … . Ferolito v Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 05153, 2nd Dept 7-9-14

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2023 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy