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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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HERE THE MOTION TO RENEW, BASED UPON A CHANGE IN OR CLARIFICATION OF THE LAW, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE THE APPELLATE RULING ON THE PRIOR ORDER (FIRST DEPT).

he First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant landlord’s motion to renew based upon a change in the law should have been granted} On appeal, this Court agreed with defendant that the law as it existed prior to enactment of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) applies in this case. However, […]

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THE USE OF ICE PACKS WAS NOT PART OF THE DEFENDANT MANUFACTURER’S BURN-TREATMENT SYSTEM; THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE BY THE INJURED PLAINTIFF FOR THE FAILURE TO WARN AGAINST APPLYING ICE PACKS TO BARE SKIN (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant Zeltiq, the manufacturer of a system for treating burns (CoolSculpting Systems), could not be held liable for injury allegedly caused by the application of ice packs after the CoolSculpting treatment. The complaint alleged a failure to warn of the the danger of using ice packs. The use […]

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THE APPEAL WAIVER WAS INVALID, CRITERIA EXPLAINED; THERE ARE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS (RAISED BY A DEFENSE INVESTIGATION SUBMITTED WITH THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS) ABOUT WHETHER THE DESCRIPTON OF THE SEARCHED PREMISES IN THE WARRANT WAS ACCURATE, REQUIRING A HEARING; MATTER REMANDED (FIRST DEPT

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, remanding the matter for a suppression hearing, and finding the appeal waiver invalid, determined there were questions about whether the search warrant described the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity. The warrant indicated there was only one apartment, with an unmarked tan door. The […]

THE PROCESS SERVER DID NOT MAKE SUFFICIENT EFFORTS TO PERSONALLY DELIVER THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT BEFORE RESORTING TO NAIL AND MAIL SERVICE; COMPLAINT DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The process server did not make sufficient efforts to personally deliver the summons and complaint before resorting to nail and mail service: … [T]he plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the process server acted with due diligence before relying on affix […]

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IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE THE COURT TO GRANT THEIR REQUEST FOR A COMPETENCY HEARING BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S REJECTION OF A FAVORABLE PLEA OFFER, THE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS REVEALED CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH DEFENDANT ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE; ALTHOUGH THE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS WERE ATTEMPTING TO HELP THE DEFENDANT, THE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS BECAME WITNESSES AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was offered a plea deal which avoided incarceration for robbery and assault. When defendant rejected the offer, the defense attorneys requested a competency examination. In arguing for the competency examination, the defense attorneys described their efforts to convince defendant to accept […]

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ALTHOUGH A COURT HAS THE DISCRETIONARY “INTERESTS OF JUSTICE” POWER TO VACATE ITS OWN ORDER, THAT POWER SHOULD ONLY BE EXERCISED IN UNIQUE OR UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES NOT PRESENT HERE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have vacated its own dismissal of the action in 2013 because (Wilmington) demonstrated none of criteria for vacation of a judgment or order described in CPLR 5015 (a); “Under CPLR 5015(a), the court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from […]

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SUBSEQUENT COMPLAINTS WHICH REPEAT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INITIAL COMPLAINT ARE “SUPPLEMENTAL,” NOT “AMENDED,” COMPLAINTS; DEFENDANT NEED ONLY ANSWER THE INITIAL COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this foreclosure proceeding was not in default. The defendant answered the first complaint but did not answer two subsequent complaints which were designated “amended complaints,” Amended complaints require an answer, but “supplemental complaints” do not require an answer. Here the “amended complaints” merely repeated the allegations […]

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AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE OFFICER TESTIFIED THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S PERSON AFTER A TRAFFIC STOP WAS BASED UPON THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA; THE OFFICER DID NOT TESTIFY HE WAS QUALIFIED BY TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE TO RECOGNIZE THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA; THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the traffic stop was proper (inoperable brake light) but the search of defendant’s person, based on the odor of marijuana, was not: … [T]he officer’s testimony was insufficient to establish that there was probable cause for the search of the defendant’s person. As the law existed in 2020, […]

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WHETHER THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR IS ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION AFTER REVERSAL OF A RESTRAINING NOTICE AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN INSTALLMENT PAYMENT ORDER ARE DISCRETIONARY ISSUES TO BE DECIDED UPON REMAND; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, reversing Supreme Court and remanding the matter, determined that whether the judgment debtor was entitled to restitution based on the reversal of a restraining notice and whether the plaintiff is entitled to an installment payment order were not decided by the reversal, but  rather were […]

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DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL WERE NOT SPECIFIC OR SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT AN INQUIRY BY THE JUDGE; THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over a three-judge dissent, determined defendant had not made specific and serious allegations about the behavior of his attorney which were sufficient to warrant an inquiry by the judge: … [D]efendant argues that the complaints contained in his letter were factually specific and serious […]

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