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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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UNBEKNOWNST TO ALL DURING THE 1992 SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEEDING, THE DECEDENT’S BROTHER WAS STILL ALIVE; DECEDENT’S NEPHEW TOOK POSSESSION OF DECEDENT’S PROPERTY, A THREE-STORY BUILDING, IN 1993; THE NEPHEW FIRST BECAME AWARE OF DECEDENT’S BROTHER’S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN 2019; THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED THE NEPHEW ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a dissenting opinion, determined respondent (Mr. Golobe), who “inherited” the building after his aunt (Dorothy) died, was entitled to the building through adverse possession after it became known that Dorothy’s brother, Yale, was still alive. During the Surrogate’s Court proceeding a family friend […]

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TO SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE FOUR-YEAR LOOKBACK FOR A “FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO INFLATE RENTS” ACTION, THE PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ALLEGE RELIANCE ON A FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION; IT IS ENOUGH TO ALLEGE SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF FRAUD OR A COLORABLE CLAIM OF FRAUD (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined that to sufficiently allege the applicability of the fraud exception to the four-year statute of limitations (“lookback” period) in a “fraudulent scheme to inflate rents” action, a plaintiff need not allege satisfaction of each element of common-law fraud […]

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NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW 11, WHICH ALLOWS NON-CITIZENS TO VOTE, VIOLATES THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined New York City Local Law 11, which allowed non-citizens to vote, violates the New York Constitution: Local Law 11 allows “municipal voters” to vote in New York City elections for the offices of Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Borough […]

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THE MAJORITY AFFIRMED DEFENDANT’S DRIVING-RELATED RECKLESS-ENDANGERMENT-FIRST-DEGREE CONVICTION STEMMING FROM HIS STRIKING SEVERAL CARS, CAUSING ONE TO FLIP, AND CRASHING INTO A HOUSE; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE PROOF DID NOT SUPPORT THE “DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE” ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department affirmed defendant reckless endangerment first degree conviction over a two-justice dissent which argued the evidence did not support the “depraved indifference” element of the offense: From the dissent: As the majority details, on the morning of June 27, 2018, defendant was driving his vehicle in the Town of Colonie, Albany County when […]

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THIS CASE PRESENTS THE RARE CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE DEFENDANT’S SECOND MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED, DESPITE THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR MOTION WHICH WAS BASED ON THE SAME GROUND, I.E., DEFENSE COUNSEL’S MISINFORMATION ABOUT WHEN DEFENDANT WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined the defendant’s second motion to vacate his murder conviction (by guilty plea) based on his attorney’s erroneously informing him he would be eligible for parole haff-way through the 15-year sentence required a hearing. Defendant had made a prior motion on the same ground which was denied by another […]

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THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TOWN AND A FARM IN WHICH THE TOWN ALLEGED THE FARM WAS RUNNING A COMMERCIAL MULCHING OPERATION IN VIOLATION OF THE TOWN CODE; THE COMMISSIONER PROPERLY DETERMINED THE FARM WAS NOT VIOLATING THE TOWN CODE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, determined the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets had jurisdiction over the matter and had the authority to determine a farm located in the Long Island Pine Barrens Maritime Reserve (Central Pine Barrens) was not running a commercial mulching operation in violation of the Code of […]

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WHERE IT HAS BEEN MORE THAN A YEAR SINCE DEFENDANT FAILED TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT, THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO NOTICE BEFORE ENTRY OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT; HERE THE FAILURE TO GIVE DEFENDANT NOTICE RENDERED THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT A NULLITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined it had been more than a year since defendant Callahan had failed to answer the complaint and, therefore, Callahan was entitled to notice before a default judgment could be entered. No notice was given: “Pursuant to CPLR 3215(g)(1), ‘whenever application [for judgment by default] […]

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THE SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF WAS REASONABLE AND ENFORCEABLE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION, WHICH WAS COMMENCED SIX MONTHS AND ONE DAY AFTER PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED, WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the six-month statute of limitations in the employment contract with plaintiff was reasonable and enforceable. Therefore plaintiff’s action, which was commenced one day after the six-month limitation period had expired, was time-barred: “Parties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time within which an action […]

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THE RELIGIOUS NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION, THE OWNER OF THE RESIDENCE PROVIDED FOR THE TORAH READER AND HIS FAMILY, WAS ENTITLED TO A REAL-PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ventura, determined the not-for-profit religious corporation was entitled to an exemption from real property tax for a residence used by Marcus, the Torah reader, and his family:​ This appeal provides this Court with an opportunity to clarify the standards courts should consider when […]

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ALTHOUGH THE VEHICLE OWNER, HERE A CAR DEALERSHIP, IS USUALLY VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT CAUSED BY A DRIVER OPERATING THE VEHICLE WITH THE OWNER’S PERMISSION, HERE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DRIVER, WHO WAS TEST DRIVING THE VEHICLE, EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE PERMISSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined summary judgment against the owner of the vehicle in this traffic accident case should not have been granted. Although summary judgment against the driver, Patel, was properly granted, there was a question of fact whether the driver had exceeded the scope of the permission granted by the […]

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