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WHETHER THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR IS ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION AFTER REVERSAL OF A RESTRAINING NOTICE AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN INSTALLMENT PAYMENT ORDER ARE DISCRETIONARY ISSUES TO BE DECIDED UPON REMAND; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, reversing Supreme Court and remanding the matter, determined that whether the judgment debtor was entitled to restitution based on the reversal of a restraining notice and whether the plaintiff is entitled to an installment payment order were not decided by the reversal, but  rather were discretionary issues to be resolved on remand. The facts are too complex to fairly summarize here:

… CPLR 5015(d) provides that, “[w]here a judgment or order is set aside or vacated, the court may direct and enforce restitution in like manner and subject to the same conditions as where a judgment is reversed or modified on appeal.” … Thus, “CPLR 5015[d] empowers a court that has set aside a judgment or order to restore the parties to the position they were in prior to its rendition, consistent with the court’s general equitable powers” … . The essential inquiry for a court addressing a request for the equitable remedy of restitution is whether it is against equity and good conscious to permit a party to retain the money that is sought to be recovered … . The determination whether to award restitution is committed to the trial court’s discretion … . * * *

Contrary to defendant’s contention that an installment payment order cannot be directed at funds exempt from execution under CPLR 5231 (i.e., 90% of his monthly disability insurance payments), such an order is the expedient for accessing exempt income … . As Professor Siegel stated long ago, “[o]ne of [CPLR 5226’s] prime uses is in that situation . . . where it appears that the judgment debtor can afford more than the 10% to which the income execution is limited” … . Thus, “[t]he court on the [CPLR 5226] motion can direct the debtor to make regular payments to the judgment creditor in any sum it finds the debtor able to afford, not limited by the 10% that restricts the income execution of CPLR 5231” … . Hamway v Sutton, 2025 NY Slip Op 01062, First Dept 2-25-25

Practice Point: Although this opinion is fact-specific, it includes the criteria for some fundamental debtor-creditor issues, i.e., the amount of monthly disability insurance payments which is available to a judgment debtor, the income-sources which are available to a judgment debtor, whether a plaintiff is entitled to an installment payment order, the criteria for a court’s discretionary determination of the amount a judgment debtor can afford to pay every month, etc.

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