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DEFENDANT HOME CARE AGENCY WAS HIRED BY DEFENDANT HEALTHCARE PLAN AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE; THEREFORE THE HEALTHCARE PLAN WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED ASSAULT, BATTERY AND NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION COMMITED BY AN EMPLOYEE OF THE HOME CARE AGENCY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that Lighthouse, the parent company of GuildNet, a long-term healthcare plan, could not be held liable for the assault, battery and negligence allegedly committed by an employee of Ellison Home Care Companion Agency, which provided healthcare aides who attended to plaintiff’s mother. Plaintiff alleged his mother was […]

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THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT SUPPORTED “PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL;” PLAINTIFF ALLEGED FUNDS OWED TO HER WERE DIVERTED TO RENDER THE CORPORATION JUDGMENT PROOF (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the cause of action alleging alter-ego liability should not have been dismissed. The court noted that New York does not recognize a separate cause of action to pierce the corporate veil, but in the context of a motion to dismiss, the issue is whether the facts fit […]

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DEFENDANT HOME CARE AGENCY WAS HIRED BY DEFENDANT HEALTHCARE PLAN AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE; THEREFORE THE HEALTHCARE PLAN WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED ASSAULT, BATTERY AND NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION COMMITED BY AN EMPLOYEE OF THE HOME CARE AGENCY (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that Lighthouse, the parent company of GuildNet, a long-term healthcare plan, could not be held liable for the assault, battery and negligence allegedly committed by an employee of Ellison Home Care Companion Agency, which provided healthcare aides who attended to plaintiff’s mother. Plaintiff alleged his mother was […]

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THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THE WAIVER OF INDICTMENT WAS SIGNED IN OPEN COURT; THE ISSUE NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the waiver of indictment was invalid because it was not signed in open court: Defendant’s waiver of indictment … was invalid because the record does not demonstrate that defendant satisfied the requirement of NY Constitution, art 1, § 6 and CPL 195.20 that the written waiver of indictment […]

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THE DISMISSAL OF TWO FEDERAL LAWSUITS AGAINST DEFENDANT SCHOOL (ALLEGING SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE OF PLAINTIFFS-STUDENTS) ON STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS GROUNDS DID NOT GIVE RISE TO A “VESTED RIGHT” REQUIRING THE DISMISSAL OF THE STATE ACTION UNDER THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT ALLEGING THE SAME FACTS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, determined that the dismissal of two federal lawsuits as barred by the statute of limitations did not create a “vested right” such that a state Child Victims Act action based on the facts alleged in the federal lawsuits should be dismissed. The lawsuits stemmed from […]

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BETWEEN DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCING, THE COURT HELD A HEARING ON WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA); AT THE HEARING DEFENDANT TESTIFIED SHE ACTED IN SELF DEFENSE WHEN SHE STABBED THE VICTIM; THAT TESTIMONY TRIGGERED THE NEED FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION BY THE JUDGE; THE MAJORITY APPLIED AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT TO CONSIDER THE APPEAL AND REVERSE; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESEVATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction by guilty plea, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant raised a question whether defendant stabbed the victim in self-defense in open court between the plea and sentencing which the judge was required to, but failed to explore. The majority applied an exception to the preservation requirement triggered when an […]

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EXCESSIVE QUESTIONING BY THE TRIAL JUDGE WHICH TOOK ON THE FUNCTION AND APPEARANCE OF AN ADVOCATE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the trial judge deprived defendant of a fair trial by excessive questioning ot eh defendant which “took on the function and appearance of an advocate.” The error was not preserved but the appeal was considered in the interest of justice: Supreme Court engaged […]

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DISAGREEING WITH THE THIRD DEPARTMENT, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD THAT THE “DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE” OF A MOTION FOR A REDUCED SENTENCE PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE CORROBORATING THAT DEFENDANT WAS A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS APPEALABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice LaSalle, disagreeing with the Third Department, determined that the “dismissal without prejudice” of a motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) constitutes a denial of the motion which is appealable: … [W]e disagree with the Third Department and conclude […]

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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS DEPENDS ON THE UNDERLYING THEORY, FRAUD IN THIS CASE; AN AGREEMENT TO ASSIGN OR OBTAIN A MORTGAGE IS A CONTRACT INVOLVING AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY AND IS SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE-OF-FRAUDS WRITING-REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that certain causes of action in this dispute over ownership of real property should have been dismissed as time-barred or as violative of the statute of frauds: “Actions for declaratory judgments are not ascribed a certain limitations period. The nature of the relief sought in a declaratory […]

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THE INCIDENT IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY BROKEN GLASS IN A DOOR WAS CAPTURED ON VIDEO WHICH WAS NEGLIGENTLY ERASED; PLANTIFF ALLEGED THE GLASS BROKE WHEN PLAINTIFF PULLED ON THE DOOR; AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BUILDING’S SECURITY COMPANY WHO SAW THE VIDEO CLAIMED PLAINTIFF PUNCHED THE GLASS; PRECLUSION OF TESTIMONY ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE VIDEO WAS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR SPOLIATION; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a two-justice concurrence, determined the video showing plaintiff’s injury from broken glass in a door was negligently, not intentionally, erased. Therefore the proper sanction was an adverse inference charge, not the preclusion of any evidence about the contents of the video. Plaintiff alleged the glass broke when […]

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