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ALTHOUGH A COURT HAS THE DISCRETIONARY “INTERESTS OF JUSTICE” POWER TO VACATE ITS OWN ORDER, THAT POWER SHOULD ONLY BE EXERCISED IN UNIQUE OR UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES NOT PRESENT HERE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have vacated its own dismissal of the action in 2013 because (Wilmington) demonstrated none of criteria for vacation of a judgment or order described in CPLR 5015 (a);

“Under CPLR 5015(a), the court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, upon the ground of excusable default; newly discovered evidence; fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order; or reversal, modification, or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which it is based” … . “In addition to the specific grounds set forth in CPLR 5015(a), a court may, in its discretion, vacate its own judgment ‘for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice'” … . “However, a court’s inherent power to exercise control over its judgments is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from judgments taken through fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” … . In other words, “[a] court should only exercise its discretionary authority to vacate a judgment in the interests of substantial justice where unique or unusual circumstances . . . warrant such action” … .

Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the Wilmington’s motion which was to vacate the 2013 dismissal order. Importantly, Wilmington did not adequately explain why it delayed nearly eight years before filing its motion … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Sulton, 2025 NY Slip Op 01128, Second Dept 2-26-25

Practice Point: CPLR 5015 (a) gives a court the discretionary power to vacate its own order “in the interests of substantial justice.” That power should only be exercised in unique or unusual circumstances, not present here.

 

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