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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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WHEN DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY WAS SUSPENDED ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WERE STAYED; NEITHER PROCEDURE FOR LIFTING THE STAY WAS INVOKED; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a stay of the foreclosure action was in effect because of the suspension of defendant McGrath’s attorney. Because plaintiff never served McGrath with the required notice to lift the stay, the summary judgment order should have been vacated: When an attorney is suspended from the practice of law, […]

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THE MOTIONS TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND JOIN AN ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motions to amend the complaint and to join another action should have been granted. The proposed amendment was not time-barred because the original complaint gave notice of the transactions and occurrences upon which the amendment is based. The motion to join another action should have been granted […]

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THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE DISCOVERED THE ALLEGED FRAUD WHICH INDUCED HIM TO SIGN RELEASES; THEREFORE THIS FRUAD-BASED ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED; THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT AND FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant school in this Child Victims Act case (1) did not demonstrate the fraud-based causes of action to set aside or rescind the releases signed by the plaintiff were time-barred and (2) was not entitled to dismissal of the fraudulent inducement and fraudulent concealment causes of action. […]

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A JUROR, AN ATTORNEY, ALLEGEDLY TOLD THE OTHER JURORS THAT THE “BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT” STANDARD COULD BE DISREGARDED; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A “JUROR MISCONDUCT” HEARING IN CONNECTION WITH HIS MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT (FIIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, holding the matter in abeyance, determined the allegations that a juror, A.H., an attorney, told the other jurors the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard did not apply to everything in the case necessitated an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict:​​ Some of the alleged conduct of juror A.H., […]

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IN A FACT-SPECIFIC OPINION, THE COURT OF APPEALS, REVERSING THE APPELLATE DIVISION, DETERMINED THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE UNIVERSITY’S RULING THAT PETITIONER-STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT BY ENGAGING IN UNWANTED SEXUAL ACTIVITY (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannatara, in a fact-specific analysis, determined the university’s ruling that petitioner, P.C., a university student, violated the Code of Student Responsibility by engaging in unwelcome sexual activity with another student, S.G., was supported by the evidence: … [S]ubstantial evidence supports the […]

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WHERE THERE IS A FACTUAL DISPUTE ON A MATERIAL ISSUE WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE COURT CAN DECIDE A LEGAL ISSUE, THE FACTUAL DISPUTE MUST BE RESOLVED IN A HEARING BEFORE THE COURT CAN DECIDE THE LEGAL ISSUE; WHETHER THE RECORD GIVES RISE TO A FACTUAL DISPUTE ON A MATERIAL ISSUE IS A QUESTION OF LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined a factual dispute about whether an attorney (Santamarina) validly waived personal jurisdiction on behalf of defendant Koukis required a hearing: Supreme Court decided Mr. Koukis’s motion without a factual hearing, holding that Mr. Santamarina lacked authority to act on Mr. Koukis’s behalf and vacating his waiver […]

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THE INFORMATION IN THE CHILD-VICTIMS-ACT CLAIM WAS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE STATE TO INVESTIGATE THE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE BETWEEN 1986 AND 1990; CLAIM DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan,, determined the Child Victims Act claim did not provide sufficient information to allow the State to investigate the allegations of sexual abuse between 1986 and 1990: … [W]e conclude that Wright’s [claimant’s] claim lacks the specificity section [Court of Claims […]

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DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BECAUSE HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE MANDATORY FINES FOR THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW OFFENSES; AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT APPLIED; AN APPEAL WAIVER DOES NOT PRECLUDE ARGUING THE PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined defendant’s guilty plea was not voluntary because he was not informed of the mandatory fines for the Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses. Although the error was not preserved, the “no actual or practical ability to object” preservation exception was invoked: An appeal waiver does not preclude […]

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THE DEFENDANT’S MAXIMUM SENTENCE WAS 20 YEARS BUT THE JUDGE REPEATEDLY TOLD DEFENDANT HE WAS FACING 45 YEARS; THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT VOLUNTARILY ENTERED; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant’s guilty plea was not entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently because the judge repeatedly told the defendant he was facing 45 years in prison when his sentence was capped at 20. The dissent argued the […]

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PLAINTIFF, A CANISIUS COLLEGE STUDENT IN 2020, DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT BASED ON THE SHIFT FROM IN-PERSON TO REMOTE LEARNING BECAUSE OF COVID (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff did not state a cause of action for breach of contract based on the cessation of in-person classes at Canisius College during COVID: Plaintiff contends on his appeal that the court erred in granting the motion insofar as it sought to dismiss the […]

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