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ABSENT SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OR OTHER IMPROPER RESULTS, A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DISCONTINUE THE ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE SHOULD BE GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion for leave to discontinue the action without prejudice should have been granted:

The plaintiff and the defendants own abutting real properties located in Brooklyn. In 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, inter alia, for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants, among other things, erected a concrete wall and planted grass and trees on portions of the plaintiff’s property without the plaintiff’s permission. The defendants, inter alia, asserted a counterclaim for adverse possession of the disputed portions of the plaintiff’s property. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3217(b) for leave to discontinue the action without prejudice. In an order dated November 17, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion. …

The Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3217(b) for leave to discontinue the action without prejudice. The determination of a motion pursuant to CPLR 3217(b) for leave to discontinue an action without prejudice is within the sound discretion of the court … . “Generally such motions should be granted unless the discontinuance would prejudice a substantial right of another party, circumvent an order of the court, avoid the consequences of a potentially adverse determination, or produce other improper results” … . Here, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion, as there was no showing of substantial prejudice or other improper results … . KNG Realty NY Co., LLC v Halpern, 2024 NY Slip Op 06329, Second Dept 12-18-24

Practice Point: If there is no showing of substantial prejudice, a motion for leave to discontinue an action without prejudice should be granted.​

 

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