You are here: / / THE NEW JERSEY TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVOLVED NEW YORK RESIDENTS (PLAINTIFFS),...
,

THE NEW JERSEY TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVOLVED NEW YORK RESIDENTS (PLAINTIFFS), A TRUCK LEASED BY DEFENDANT NEW JERSEY CORPORATION AND THE DEFENDANT TRUCK DRIVER FROM PENNSYLVANIA; NO GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CORPORATION OR THE DRIVER; POSSIBLE LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER THE CORPORATION, BUT NOT THE DRIVER, BASED UPON BUSINESS CONDUCTED IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly denied all but one of the defendants’ motions to dismiss premised on lack of personal jurisdiction, pending further discovery. The traffic accident happened in New Jersey. The plaintiffs’ van was struck from behind by a freight truck leased by Finkle (a New Jersey corporation) from Ryder Truck Rental and driven by defendant Larios, a resident of Pennsylvania. All the plaintiffs were residents of New York. The Second Department found that there was no general jurisdiction under CPLR 301, and no long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a])(3) (tortious act outside the state causing injury within the state). However there may jurisdiction against Finkle pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (conducting business within the state):

… [Plaintiffs] have not alleged facts in opposition which would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under New York’s general jurisdiction statute, CPLR 301, over Larios, who was not domiciled in New York, or over Finkle, which was not incorporated in New York and did not have its principal place of business in New York … . …

Under CPLR 302(a)(3), “[t]he situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff” … . Here, since the accident which caused the injuries occurred in New Jersey, CPLR 302(a)(3) does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over these defendants in New York … .

… .Finkle asserted that it is a New Jersey corporation with its business address in New Jersey, and Larios stated that, at the time of the accident, he was transporting a load for the United States Postal Service within the State of New Jersey. However, Finkle admitted that it had terminals at four New York locations at which it parked its vehicles. Based upon these facts, and given Finkle’s failure to submit trip logs, manifests, or other documentary evidence to support its assertion that the load Larios was transporting was being shipped within the State of New Jersey and had no relationship to Finkle’s New York business, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny as premature that branch of the appellants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Finkle, with leave to renew upon completion of discovery. Qudsi v Larios, 2019 NY Slip Op 04742, Second Dept 6-12-19

 

/by
You might also like
Testimony Insufficient to Overcome Presumption Photo Arrays, Which Were Not Preserved, Were Unduly Suggestive—Subsequent Line-Up, Which Included Persons Much Older than Defendant, Was Unduly Suggestive—New Trial Ordered
COPY OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED UNDER THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE; JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
THE MORTGAGE-PAYMENT MODIFICATION AGREEMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE MORTGAGE DEBT WITHIN THE MEANING OF GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 17-101; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT START ANEW; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).
SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS STUDENT ON STUDENT ASSAULT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE STUDENT’S ACTIONS WERE IMPULSIVE AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED (SECOND DEPT).
EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE ACCEPTED DEFECTIVE GOODS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UCC, THE UCC PROVIDES REMEDIES, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO BE MADE WHOLE AND THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THE ACCEPTANCE; PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT). ​
Civil Forfeiture Should Not Have Been Made Part of Defendant’s Sentence In the Absence of Defendant’s Voluntary Agreement
PROOF OF GENERAL CLEANING PRACTICES DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE WATER WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED.
Arrest Based on Out of State Warrant Not Authorized​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

[gravityform id=”1″ title=”false” description=”false” tabindex=”2″]

Copyright © 2022 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR INSPECTION AND EXPERT EXAMINATION OF... SCHOOL EMPLOYEE’S NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION...