The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly denied all but one of the defendants’ motions to dismiss premised on lack of personal jurisdiction, pending further discovery. The traffic accident happened in New Jersey. The plaintiffs’ van was struck from behind by a freight truck leased by Finkle (a New Jersey corporation) from Ryder Truck Rental and driven by defendant Larios, a resident of Pennsylvania. All the plaintiffs were residents of New York. The Second Department found that there was no general jurisdiction under CPLR 301, and no long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a])(3) (tortious act outside the state causing injury within the state). However there may jurisdiction against Finkle pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) (conducting business within the state):
… [Plaintiffs] have not alleged facts in opposition which would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under New York’s general jurisdiction statute, CPLR 301, over Larios, who was not domiciled in New York, or over Finkle, which was not incorporated in New York and did not have its principal place of business in New York … . …
Under CPLR 302(a)(3), “[t]he situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff” … . Here, since the accident which caused the injuries occurred in New Jersey, CPLR 302(a)(3) does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over these defendants in New York … .
… .Finkle asserted that it is a New Jersey corporation with its business address in New Jersey, and Larios stated that, at the time of the accident, he was transporting a load for the United States Postal Service within the State of New Jersey. However, Finkle admitted that it had terminals at four New York locations at which it parked its vehicles. Based upon these facts, and given Finkle’s failure to submit trip logs, manifests, or other documentary evidence to support its assertion that the load Larios was transporting was being shipped within the State of New Jersey and had no relationship to Finkle’s New York business, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny as premature that branch of the appellants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Finkle, with leave to renew upon completion of discovery. Qudsi v Larios, 2019 NY Slip Op 04742, Second Dept 6-12-19