You are here: / / FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION...
,

FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION TO BE IMPOSED OR THE MAXIMUM POTENTIAL PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION RENDERED THE GUILTY PLEA INVALID (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the failure to inform defendant of the details of postrelease supervision rendered the plea invalid:

… [A]t the plea proceeding, the County Court mentioned that the sentence would include postrelease supervision, but did not specify the period of postrelease supervision to be imposed, nor did the court indicate the maximum potential duration of postrelease supervision that may be imposed. As the People concede, the court’s failure to so advise the defendant prevented his plea from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent … . People v Pryor, 2023 NY Slip Op 03241, Second Dept 6-14-23

Practice Point: A guilty plea is not knowing, voluntary and intelligent unless the defendant is informed of the specific period of postrelease supervision and the maximum potential period of postrelease supervision. It is not enough simply to mention that postrelease supervision will be imposed.

 

You might also like
TWO STATEMENTS FOUND TO BE NONACTIONABLE EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION IN THIS DEFAMATION ACTION, PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO PROOF BURDEN ON A MOTION TO DISMISS, DEFENDANTS NOT SHIELDED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (SECOND DEPT).
College Had No Duty to Supervise Fraternity “Pledging” Activities
THE CITY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN THIS “UNSAFE INTERSECTION DESIGN” CASE BECAUSE NO STUDIES OF THE INTERSECTON HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN AND NO HIGHWAY-PLANNING DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE; THE FACTS THAT THE CITY HAD NO NOTICE OF THE CONDITION AND NO PRIOR ACCIDENTS HAD BEEN REPORTED DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON WHETHER THE CITY HAD CREATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).
THE SENTENCES FOR ASSAULT AND POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED CONSECUTIVELY (SECOND DEPT).
THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN THIS BICYCLE-VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASE CAN BE CONSIDERED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF ARGUED HE WAS NOT COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF DID NOT ELIMINATE ALL QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER HE WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT; PLAINTIFF RAN INTO THE DOOR OF DEFENDANT’S CAR AS IT WAS BEING OPENED (SECOND DEPT).
In an Employment Discrimination Case, Plaintiff Is a Member of a Protected Class By Virtue of His Wife’s Religion
Allegation Plaintiff Driver Stopped Suddenly for No Reason Raised a Question of Fact About Whether the Driver Who Struck Plaintiff’s Vehicle from Behind Was Negligent
Question of Fact about Implied Physician-Patient Relationship In Malpractice Action

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT PEDIATRIC PRACTICE SUBMITTED EXPERT EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF’S ADOLESCENT... WHERE DEFENDANTS AVER SPECIFIC FACTS WHICH REBUT THE STATEMENTS IN THE PROCESS...