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FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION TO BE IMPOSED OR THE MAXIMUM POTENTIAL PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION RENDERED THE GUILTY PLEA INVALID (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the failure to inform defendant of the details of postrelease supervision rendered the plea invalid:

… [A]t the plea proceeding, the County Court mentioned that the sentence would include postrelease supervision, but did not specify the period of postrelease supervision to be imposed, nor did the court indicate the maximum potential duration of postrelease supervision that may be imposed. As the People concede, the court’s failure to so advise the defendant prevented his plea from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent … . People v Pryor, 2023 NY Slip Op 03241, Second Dept 6-14-23

Practice Point: A guilty plea is not knowing, voluntary and intelligent unless the defendant is informed of the specific period of postrelease supervision and the maximum potential period of postrelease supervision. It is not enough simply to mention that postrelease supervision will be imposed.

 

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DEFENDANT PEDIATRIC PRACTICE SUBMITTED EXPERT EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF’S ADOLESCENT... WHERE DEFENDANTS AVER SPECIFIC FACTS WHICH REBUT THE STATEMENTS IN THE PROCESS...