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Tag Archive for: Second Department

Criminal Law, Evidence

DNA EVIDENCE RECOVERED AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER POINTED TO THE VICTIM’S BOYFRIEND AS THE PERPETRATOR; BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WAS A SINGLE IDENTIFICATION WITNESS WHO WAS 88 YEARS OLD AND HAD POOR VISION, THE DNA EVIDENCE MAY HAVE LED TO A MORE FAVORABLE VERDICT; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s murder conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the DNA evidence (from under the victim’s fingernails) procured after the trial may have resulted in a verdict more favorable to the defendant. Defendant was identified as the perpetrator by an 88-year-old witness who had poor vision. The DNA recovered from the victim was that of the victim’s boyfriend. There was no other evidence tying defendant to the scene:

… [T]he defense theory at trial was one of mistaken identity. The defendant posited that the perpetrator was actually Samuels’s [the victim’s] boyfriend, Jermaine Robinson. No physical evidence linked the defendant to the crime. The only identity evidence offered by the People at trial was the testimony of a single eyewitness, Marchon, who was 88 years old at the time of the incident and suffered from significantly impaired vision. Marchon’s description to the police of the perpetrator’s appearance was not conclusive and was, in part, more consistent with Jermaine Robinson’s appearance. Under the facts of the case, it would not have been unreasonable to conclude that Marchon confused Samuels’s estranged husband with her current boyfriend in making her identification to the police. Marchon also was not able to conclusively identify the defendant at trial. Moreover, various members of the defendant’s family provided alibi evidence for his whereabouts on the day of the attack. Finally, two Allen charges … were required before the jury was able to reach a verdict.

Under all of these circumstances, while not a “virtual certainty,” there existed a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant had the DNA evidence been admitted at trial … . People v Robinson, 2023 NY Slip Op 01533, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point: Here in this murder case DNA evidence discovered after the trial pointed to a different perpetrator and the single eyewitness was 88 years old and had poor vision. Had the DNA evidence been admitted at trial the verdict may have been more favorable to defendant. New trial ordered.

 

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 17:58:542023-03-24 18:26:43DNA EVIDENCE RECOVERED AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER POINTED TO THE VICTIM’S BOYFRIEND AS THE PERPETRATOR; BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WAS A SINGLE IDENTIFICATION WITNESS WHO WAS 88 YEARS OLD AND HAD POOR VISION, THE DNA EVIDENCE MAY HAVE LED TO A MORE FAVORABLE VERDICT; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law

BECAUSE THE OFFENSE TO WHICH DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY (ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD) WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ANY OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT, IT IS NOT CLASSIFIED AS A VIOLENT FELONY; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined defendant should not have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender. Defendant pled guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon third, which was not a lesser included offense of any of the offenses charged in the indictment. Therefore the attempted criminal possession of a weapon third can not be classified as a violent felony:

Penal Law § 70.02 defines a class E violent felony offense, in pertinent part, as “an attempt to commit any of the felonies of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, six, seven or eight of section 265.02 as a lesser included offense of that section as defined in section 220.20 of the criminal procedure law” … in turn defines a ‘lesser included offense’ as one where the defendant pleads ‘to an offense of lesser grade than one charged in a count of an indictment'” … . Thus, a plea of guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree “constitutes a violent felony offense only when the defendant has been initially charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and pleads guilty to the attempted crime as a lesser included offense” … . Here, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as an added count to the indictment, which did not charge him with the completed crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court should not have sentenced the defendant as a violent felony offender … . People v Nyack, 2023 NY Slip Op 01532, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point: Here defendant pled guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon third. Because that offense was not a lesser included offense of any offense charged in the indictment, it is not classified as a violent felony. Therefore defendant should not have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender.

 

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 15:35:482023-03-24 17:58:20BECAUSE THE OFFENSE TO WHICH DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY (ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD) WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ANY OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT, IT IS NOT CLASSIFIED AS A VIOLENT FELONY; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT). ​
Appeals, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE THE GUILTY PLEA MAY HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS HE WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY INFORMED DEPORTATION WAS POSSIBLE; MATTER SENT BACK TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO VACATE THE PLEA (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined defendant was not informed of the possibility of deportation before entering the guilty plea, although defendant was aware the plea may have a negative impact on his immigration status.. The issue need not be preserved for appeal. The matter was sent back to afford defendant the opportunity to move to vacate the plea:

At the plea proceeding, the court questioned the defendant as to whether he had discussed with defense counsel “the possible negative impact on [his] immigration status as a result of [his] pleas of guilt.” The defendant replied: “Yes. I did explain to him that I was concerned about that.” The court then inquired whether the defendant had “an opportunity to discuss these pleas and their impact on [his] immigration status with an immigration attorney.” In response, the defendant indicated that he had discussed the matter with an immigration attorney, who had informed him of the “possibility” that he would lose “TPS [Temporary Protected Status].” The court did not advise the defendant of the possibility of deportation as a consequence of the guilty plea. People v Hernandez, 2023 NY Slip Op 01530, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point: Here the negative impact of the guilty plea on defendant’s immigration status was discussed prior to his entering the plea, but the possibility of deportation was not specifically addressed. The defendant was given the opportunity to move to vacate the plea. Under the facts, preservation was not required.

 

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 15:12:542023-03-24 15:35:40ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE THE GUILTY PLEA MAY HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS HE WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY INFORMED DEPORTATION WAS POSSIBLE; MATTER SENT BACK TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO VACATE THE PLEA (SECOND DEPT). ​
Constitutional Law, Family Law

FAMILY COURT PROPERLY PROHIBITED FATHER FROM POSTING BLOGS DISPARAGING THE CHILD’S RELATIVES ON SOCIAL MEDIA, BUT THE RESTRICTIONS WERE TOO BROAD IN THAT THEY WENT BEYOND THE NEEDS OF THE CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Family Court had properly prohibited father from posting blogs disparaging the child’s relatives on social media, but that the restrictions on future speech should have been more narrowly tailored to the needs of the case:

“A prior restraint on speech is a law, regulation or judicial order that suppresses speech on the basis of the speech’s content and in advance of its actual expression” … . A party seeking to impose such a restraint bears a “heavy burden of demonstrating justification for its imposition” … . Such party must demonstrate that the speech sought to be restrained is “‘likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest'” … . An order imposing a prior restraint on speech “must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case” … .

Here, that portion of the order which directed the father to erase, deactivate, and delete “any existing blogs and likenesses” was “not tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case” … . Specifically, this restriction required the father to delete “any existing blogs and likenesses,” regardless of whether the blogs or likenesses relate to the child, the mother, the mother’s family, or the instant proceedings…. . Matter of Walsh v Russell, 2023 NY Slip Op 01522, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point: As long as the restrictions on future speech relate to the family court case the constitution is not violated. Here father could be prohibited from posting blogs disparaging the child’s relatives and likenesses of the child. The order to delete past posts was also proper. But the restrictions on future speech were too broad in that they went beyond the needs of the case.

 

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 14:50:002023-03-24 15:12:37FAMILY COURT PROPERLY PROHIBITED FATHER FROM POSTING BLOGS DISPARAGING THE CHILD’S RELATIVES ON SOCIAL MEDIA, BUT THE RESTRICTIONS WERE TOO BROAD IN THAT THEY WENT BEYOND THE NEEDS OF THE CASE (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Family Law

FORMER SISTERS-IN-LAW WHO LIVED ONE MILE APART AND SAW EACH OTHER FREQUENTLY FOR 30 YEARS HAD AN “INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP” WHICH SUPPORTED THE FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the long-term relationship (as sisters-in-law) qualified as an “intimate relationship” which supports a family offense proceeding:

For purposes of Family Court Act article 8, “members of the same family or household” is defined to include “persons related by consanguinity or affinity,” and “persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time” … …

… [T]he petitioner demonstrated that the parties had been in an “intimate relationship” within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e), so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court. Beyond expressly excluding from the definition of “intimate relationship” a “casual acquaintance” and “ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts” … , “the Legislature left it to the courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, what qualifies as an ‘intimate relationship’ within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e)” … . Factors to consider include “the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship” … .

… [T]he petitioner demonstrated that the parties had known each other for more than 30 years, that they had a close relationship as sisters-in-law for most of this period, during which they lived within one mile of one another, frequently had dinner together, engaged in social activities in each other’s homes, attended most holiday celebrations together, supported each other during times of devastating family illnesses, and assisted each other with their respective children … . Matter of Eno v Illovsky, 2023 NY Slip Op 01506, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point: A family offense proceeding can be brought in Family Court only if there was an “intimate relationship” between petitioner and respondent. Here petitioner and respondent had been sisters-in-law for 30 years. lived a mile apart and had seen each other frequently. Their relationship was an “intimate relationship” within the meaning of the Family L

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 14:14:102023-03-24 14:49:39FORMER SISTERS-IN-LAW WHO LIVED ONE MILE APART AND SAW EACH OTHER FREQUENTLY FOR 30 YEARS HAD AN “INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP” WHICH SUPPORTED THE FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Court of Claims, Employment Law, Negligence

THE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT AGAINST THE STATE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED WHEN THE ABUSE OCCURRED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) the Court of Claims in this Child Victims Act (CVA) suit, determined the notice of claim sufficiently alleged the time when the alleged sexual abuse of claimant took place in a state psychiatric center. The court noted that the respondeat superior cause of action should be dismissed because any sexual abuse by a state employee would not be within the scope of employment as a matter of law:

… [T]he Court of Claims incorrectly determined that the claimant was required to allege the exact date on which the sexual abuse occurred … . The claimant’s allegations, including that the abuse occurred in 1993 while she was 14 years old and attending a gym class at Sagamore, were sufficient to satisfy the “time when” requirement of Court of Claims Act § 11(b) in this claim brought pursuant to the CVA … . Wagner v State of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 01546, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point; Here in this Child Victims Act suit, the allegation that the sexual abuse took place in 1993, when claimant was 14 and attending gym class met the “time when” requirement for a notice of claim.

 

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 10:54:422023-03-25 11:22:36THE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT AGAINST THE STATE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED WHEN THE ABUSE OCCURRED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Debtor-Creditor

RECOVERY OF A $280,000 SETTLEMENT PURPORTEDLY PAID TO DEFENDANTS BY PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT PROTECTION ACT WHICH REQUIRES COURT APPROVAL PRIOR TO PAYMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint seeking to recover settlement funds ($280,000) purportedly made to the defendants should have been dismissed. The settlement was never approved by a court in violation of the Structured Settlement Protection Act (SSPA) (General Obligations Law 5-1701):

… [D]efendants demonstrated that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims are prohibited by the SSPA. Enacted in 2002, the purpose of the SSPA … was to establish “procedural safeguards for those who sell settlements that are awarded as a result of litigation,” due to a recognition that “[m]any of the people who receive such settlements are being compensated for very serious, debilitating injuries, and have been unfairly taken advantage of in the past by the businesses that purchase their settlements” … . “Under this law, transfers such as the one at issue are prohibited unless approved by a court of competent jurisdiction based upon express findings … that the transfer is in the best interest of the payee and that the discount rate, fees and expenses used to determine the net amount advanced are fair and reasonable” (… General Obligations Law § 5-1706). In circumstances … where payment for a structured settlement transfer is made to the payee prior to the court’s approval of the transfer, whether intentionally or due to a mistaken belief that the transfer had already been approved, a proposed transferee must seek nunc pro tunc approval of the transfer, and such approval is not guaranteed … . Pinnacle Capital, LLC v O’Bleanis, 2023 NY Slip Op 01540, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point: The Structured Settlement Protection Act (General Obligations Law 5-17-1 et seq) requires court approval of structured settlements. If, as here, there was no court approval before plaintiff purportedly paid the funds to defendants, the plaintiff seeking to recover the funds from the defendants may be out of luck.

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 10:17:422023-03-25 10:54:22RECOVERY OF A $280,000 SETTLEMENT PURPORTEDLY PAID TO DEFENDANTS BY PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT PROTECTION ACT WHICH REQUIRES COURT APPROVAL PRIOR TO PAYMENT (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law

​ THE MISDEMEANOR INFORMATION WAS BASED ON THE POLICE OFFICER’S UNEXPLAINED CONCLUSION THE DOCUMENT WAS FORGED AND DID NOT ALLEGE FACTS TO SUPPORT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE; CONVICTION REVERSED AND INFORMATION DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the conviction and dismissing the misdemeanor information, determined the factual allegations in the information were not sufficient to provide notice of the charged offense. The information relied on the police officer’s conclusory statement that the document was forged:

Where … an allegation “involves a conclusion drawn by a police officer that involves the exercise of professional skill or experience, some explanation concerning the basis for that conclusion must be evident from the accusatory instrument” … .

… [T]he information failed to include sufficient factual allegations regarding the basis for the officer’s conclusion that the “Texas buy tag” was forged. Mere reliance on “his training in the detection and identification of forged instruments” is insufficient. Although the officer made reference to the use of “Z-finest,” he did not explain what “Z-finest” is or how it helped him determine that the tag was forged. Further, he did not explain or describe the Texas “buy tag.” These allegations are too conclusory to meet the prima facie case requirement on the issue of whether the buy tag was a forgery … .

… [E]ven assuming that the information sufficiently alleged that the buy tag was a forgery, the information failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to “establish a presumption that [the] defendant had knowledge of the forged nature of the instrument” … . People v Rodriguez, 2023 NY Slip Op 01535, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point: A misdemeanor information must include factual allegations which support every element of the charged offense. Here the police officer’s unexplained conclusion the document was forged was insufficient. In addition the element requiring knowledge the document was forged was not addressed by the factual allegations. The conviction was reversed and the information dismissed.

 

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 09:51:052023-03-25 10:17:32​ THE MISDEMEANOR INFORMATION WAS BASED ON THE POLICE OFFICER’S UNEXPLAINED CONCLUSION THE DOCUMENT WAS FORGED AND DID NOT ALLEGE FACTS TO SUPPORT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE; CONVICTION REVERSED AND INFORMATION DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law

VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192(2) (DWI) IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192(2-A) (AGGRAVATED DWI) (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department noted that driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1192(2) is a lesser included offense of aggravated driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1192 (2-a):

… [D]riving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) is a lesser included offense of aggravated driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2-a) (see CPL 300.30[4] … ). A verdict of guilt upon the greater count is deemed a dismissal of every lesser count (see CPL 300.40[3]). Accordingly, we vacate the conviction of driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) and the sentence imposed thereon, and dismiss that count of the indictment … .  People v Watson, 2023 NY Slip Op 01538, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point: Vehicle and Traffic Law 1192(2) (DWI) is a lesser included offense of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1192(2-a) (aggravated DWI).

 

March 22, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-22 09:18:012023-03-25 09:50:56VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192(2) (DWI) IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192(2-A) (AGGRAVATED DWI) (SECOND DEPT). ​
Criminal Law

PURSUANT TO THE MARIHUANA REGULATION AND TAXATION ACT (MRTA) (1) DEFENDANT’S MARIHUANA CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY VACATED (2) ANOTHER CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY SUBSTITUTED FOR THE VACATED CONVICTION (3) BUT COUNTY COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER SUBSTITUTING ANOTHER CONVICTION SERVED THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, reversing County Court, determined: (1) defendant’s marijuana conviction was properly vacated under the Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act (MRTA); (2) once vacated, the court had the authority to substitute a conviction for the vacated conviction (which it did); but (3) the court committed reversible error by failing to consider whether substituting a conviction served the interest of justice. The matter was remitted for the “interest of justice” ruling:

… [T]he main questions presented are whether the County Court, having vacated the defendant’s conviction under Penal Law former article 221, had the authority pursuant to CPL 440.46-a(2)(b)(ii) to substitute a conviction under Penal Law article 222 for his vacated conviction, and whether the court failed to consider if it was not in the interests of justice to do so. We hold that the court, having vacated the defendant’s conviction under Penal Law former article 221, had the authority pursuant to CPL 440.46-a(2)(b)(ii) to substitute a conviction under Penal Law article 222 for his vacated conviction. We further hold that the court committed reversible error by failing to consider, as required by the statute, whether it was not in the interests of justice to substitute a conviction for an appropriate lesser offense. People v Graubard, 2023 NY Slip Op 01308, Second Dept 3-15-23

Practice Point: Under the Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act (MRTA) persons convicted of marihuana offenses which have been eliminated or reduced may move to vacate the conviction. Once vacated, the statute allows the substitution of another conviction but the court must consider whether the substitution serves the interest of justice.

 

March 15, 2023
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-03-15 19:24:252023-03-17 20:01:20PURSUANT TO THE MARIHUANA REGULATION AND TAXATION ACT (MRTA) (1) DEFENDANT’S MARIHUANA CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY VACATED (2) ANOTHER CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY SUBSTITUTED FOR THE VACATED CONVICTION (3) BUT COUNTY COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER SUBSTITUTING ANOTHER CONVICTION SERVED THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
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