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THE DEFENDANTS DEFAULTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT BASED ON THE BANK’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304, WHICH IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND THEREFORE MUST BE RAISED AS A DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint in this foreclosure action on the ground the bank did not comply with the notice requirements of RPAL 1304. The defendants defaulted and failure to comply with RPAPL 1304 is not a jurisdictional defect. Therefore it must be raised as a defense before a judge can rule on it:

In this action to foreclose a mortgage, in which the defendants failed to appear or answer the complaint, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference, and should not have, sua sponte, directed dismissal of the complaint based on its determination that the plaintiff failed to establish that it complied with RPAPL 1304 … . Therefore, a plaintiff is not required to disprove the defense unless it is raised by defendants, and in this case the defendants failed to appear in the action or answer the complaint … . Chase Home Fin., LLC v Guido, 2020 NY Slip Op 07854, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

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ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER COUNT MUST BE DISMISSED AS AN INCLUSORY CONCURRENT... THE BANKS’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 WAS NOT...