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Action Under Labor Law Based On Injury On a Ship in Dry-Dock Not Preempted by Federal Maritime Law

A worker on a ship in dry-dock was injured when he fell through an open hole in the floor or deck.  He brought an action pursuant to the Labor Law.  Although the action was within the jurisdiction of federal maritime law, the Second Department held that the state labor law claims were not preempted by general maritime law:

…[T]here is no real dispute that the present action falls within federal maritime jurisdiction … . Contrary to the contention of the defendants third-party plaintiffs, however, the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) are not preempted by general maritime law. Under the circumstances of this case, the application of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), which are local regulations enacted to protect the health and safety of workers in this state, will not unduly interfere with a fundamental characteristic of maritime law or the free flow of maritime commerce … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the cross motion of the defendants third-party plaintiffs which was for summary judgment dismissing those causes of action insofar as asserted against the City. Durando v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 02214, 2012-00535, Index No 33753/08, 2nd Dept 4-3-13

 

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