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PLAINTIFF BANK’S ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED ABSENT PROOF OF THE ATTORNEY’S EXPERIENCE AND ABILITIES AND THE NATURE OF THE SERVICES RENDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the court should not have awarded attorney’s fees to plaintiff bank in this breach of contract/guaranty action because the attorney’s experience and abilities and the nature of the services were not spelled out:

… [T]he Supreme Court should not have awarded the bank attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements based solely on the affirmation of legal services provided by the bank’s attorney. “An award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to a contractual provision may only be enforced to the extent that the amount is reasonable and warranted for the services actually rendered” … . “In determining reasonable compensation for an attorney, the court must consider such factors as the time, effort, and .skill required; the difficulty of the questions presented; counsel’s experience, ability, and reputation; the fee customarily charged in the locality; and the contingency or certainty of compensation” … . “While a hearing is not required in all circumstances, the court must possess sufficient information upon which to make an informed assessment of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered” … . “There must be a sufficient affidavit of services, detailing the hours reasonably expended . . . and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” … .

Here, the affirmation of services rendered submitted by the bank’s counsel “did not set forth counsel’s experience, ability, and reputation, and failed to detail the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” … . Sterling Natl. Bank v Alan B. Brill, P.C., 2020 NY Slip Op 04418, Second Dept 8-5-20

 

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