The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. The proof of default did not meet the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. And the proof mailing in accordance with Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304 was deficient:
… [T]he plaintiff’s submissions, including the affidavit of Daphne Proctor, a “Document Execution Specialist” employed by the loan servicer, failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the business records relied on by the plaintiff to establish the defendant’s default in repayment of the subject loan … . Notably, to the extent that Proctor’s “purported knowledge of [the defendant’s] default was based upon her review of unidentified business records created and maintained by [the loan servicer], her affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value” … .
Moreover, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304. The record contains a single 90-day notice with no clear indication as to whether the mailing was made by registered or certified mail, or by first-class mail … . Furthermore, Proctor, who asserted that the notices required under RPAPL 1304 were mailed, did not aver in her affidavit that she was familiar with the loan servicer’s mailing practices and procedures, and therefore did not establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed … , nor did she aver that she had mailed the notices herself. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Kohli, 2019 NY Slip Op 04751, Second Dept 6-12-19