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Extremely Forgiving Nature of CPLR 3216 (Dismissal for Neglect to Prosecute) Explained

The Second Department noted the “extremely forgiving” nature of CPLR 3216 in affirming Supreme Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for neglect to prosecute:

CPLR 3216 is “extremely forgiving” … in that it “never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action based on the plaintiff’s unreasonable neglect to proceed” … . While the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing an action based on neglect to proceed whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay in the prosecution of the action and a meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 3216[e]…), such a dual showing is not strictly necessary to avoid dismissal of the action … . Altman v Donnenfeld, 2014 NY Slip Op 05402, 2nd Dept 7-23-14

 

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