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THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE IN THE PROCEDURE USED WHEN PLAINTIFF DONATED BLOOD SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO DOCTOR WAS INVOLVED IN THE PROCEDURE; PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE A CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 3012-a WAS DUE TO THE GOOD FAITH BELIEF THE ACTION SOUNDED IN COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE; THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT AFFORDING PLAINTIFF THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE A CERTIFICATE OF MERIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) the action stemming from alleged negligence in drawing blood donated by plaintiff sounded in medical malpractice, not common law negligence; (2) therefore a certificate of merit was required (CPLR 3012-a); and (3) the failure to provide a certificate of merit does not warrant dismissal of the action, rather the plaintiff should be allowed 60 days to provide the certificate:

… [M]any of the plaintiff’s allegations bear a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment to a particular patient …. The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the defendant failed to properly screen the plaintiff for health problems, obtain her medical history, monitor her physical condition, measure her hemoglobin levels, and keep her at the donation site for a specific period of time to observe any signs of an adverse reaction. The issues of whether the plaintiff needed additional screening, monitoring, or supervision, and whether she was at risk of falling due to a medical condition, involve the exercise of medical judgments beyond the common knowledge of ordinary persons. Only a medical professional would know what factors make a person ineligible to donate blood, how much blood should be drawn, what constitutes the signs and symptoms of an adverse reaction, and how to immediately treat an adverse reaction. Thus, the interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant implicates issues of medical judgment that sound in medical malpractice. * * *

… [A]lthough the complaint was not accompanied by a certificate of merit as required by CPLR 3012-a, dismissal of the complaint is not warranted as the plaintiff’s attorney should be provided with an opportunity to comply with the statute now that it is determined that the statute applies to this particular action … . There is no reason to believe from this record that the plaintiff’s attorney’s failure to file a certificate of merit was motivated by anything other than a good faith assessment that CPLR 3012-a did not apply to the action. The proper remedy at this stage, since the defendant had also sought in its underlying motion “such other and further relief as this court may deem just, proper and reasonable” … , is for this Court to extend the plaintiff’s time to serve a certificate of merit upon the defendant until 60 days after service of this opinion and order.  Only if the plaintiff is recalcitrant in complying with both the statute and this Court’s order may the Supreme Court, in its discretion, then dismiss the complaint … . Rabinovich v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 2019 NY Slip Op 08724, Second Dept 12-4-19

 

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