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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOCUMENTARY...
Civil Procedure, Evidence

EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211(a)(1).

The Second Department determined the evidence submitted by defendant law firm in support of a motion to dismiss the malpractice complaint based on documentary evidence was properly denied. The letters and affirmation did not constitute “documentary evidence” and did not utterly refute plaintiff's allegations:

“The evidence submitted in support of a [CPLR 3211(a)(1)] motion must be documentary' or the motion must be denied” … . To qualify as documentary evidence, the evidence “must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity” … . “[J]udicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable,' would qualify as documentary evidence' in the proper case” … . Affidavits and letters “were not the types of documents contemplated by the Legislature when it enacted this provision”… .

Here, the letters … did not constitute documentary evidence for the purpose of a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1)… ,  Similarly, the affirmation of one of [the law firm's] members was not documentary evidence for the purpose of this motion … . Anderson v Armentano, 2016 NY Slip Op 03690, 2nd Dept 5-11-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211(a)(1))/EVIDENCE (CIVIL MOTION TO DISMISS, EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211(a)(1))/DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (CIVIL MOTION TO DISMISS, EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211(a)(1))/DISMISS, MOTION TO (CIVIL MOTION TO DISMISS, EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211(a)(1)

May 11, 2016
Tags: Second Department
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