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FOUR MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO THE DECISION BY THE PLANNING BOARD THAT NO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT WAS NECESSARY, PETITION TO ANNUL THAT DECISION WAS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined the four-month statute of limitations applied to the planning board’s decision that an environmental impact statement was not necessary and the petition to annul that decision was untimely:

To the extent that the petition alleges the Planning Board’s noncompliance with SEQRA [State Environmental Quality Review Act], the four-month statute of limitations applies (see CPLR 217[1]…). An action taken by an agency pursuant to SEQRA may be challenged only when such action is final (see CPLR 7801[1]). An agency action is final when the decision-maker arrives at a ” definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury'” … . The position taken by an agency is not definitive and the injury is not actual or concrete if the injury purportedly inflicted by the agency could be prevented, significantly ameliorated, or rendered moot by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party … . Here, the statute of limitations began to run with the issuance of the negative declaration for the project on February 19, 2015, as this constituted the Planning Board’s final act under SEQRA and, accordingly, any challenge to the negative declaration had to be commenced within four months of that date … . Matter of Stengel v Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Bd., 2018 NY Slip Op 08488, Second Dept 12-12-18

 

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