The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice action should not have been granted because there was a question of fact whether the baby was born alive or was stillborn:
The plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages … for emotional distress allegedly sustained by the plaintiff Kristina Khanra as a result of the defendants’ medical malpractice, which caused her to deliver a stillborn baby. The hospital records indicated that, upon removal from the womb by caesarean section, it was observed that the infant was “floppy,” had “no spontaneous respirations,” and had “no heart rate.” The defendants … moved for summary judgment dismissing the first three causes of action insofar as asserted against them, which were premised, among other things, upon Kristina Khanra’s emotional distress, on the ground that the plaintiffs could not recover for any alleged emotional distress because the infant was born alive. …
The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … , by tendering evidence that the infant born to Kristina Khanra by emergency cesarean section was born alive, as a heartbeat was generated 20 minutes after the infant was removed from the womb, as a result of continuous resuscitative efforts … . However, in opposition, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the infant was in fact stillborn, as the infant had no respiratory response, the infant’s Apgar score was zero at 1 minute, 5 minutes, 10 minutes, and 15 minutes after the infant was removed from the womb, the infant otherwise had no indicia of life, and the infant was declared deceased approximately two hours after being removed from a ventilator … . Khanra v Mogilyansky, 2022 NY Slip Op 04160, Second Dept 6-29-22
Practice Point: Whether mother can recover for emotional distress in this medical malpractice action depended upon whether her baby was born alive or stillborn. There can be no recovery for mother’s emotional distress if the baby was born alive. Because there were questions of fact about whether the baby was born alive, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment should not have been granted.