The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the criteria for a “falling object” case under Labor Law 240(1) had not been met. Tires were stored on the roof of a shed. As plaintiff was climbing a ladder to the roof of the shed, a tire struck the ladder and plaintiff fell. Because the tire was not being hoisted and did not need to be secured, Labor Law 240(1) did not apply to the facts:
“To prevail on a cause of action pursuant to section 240(1) [of the Labor Law] in a falling object case, the injured worker must demonstrate the existence of a hazard contemplated under that statute and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein” … . “This requires a showing that at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking” … . “Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply in situations in which a hoisting or securing device of the type enumerated in the statute would not be necessary or expected'”… .
Here, the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrated that the tires were not materials that were being hoisted or secured for the purposes of the undertaking, nor was it expected, under the circumstances of this case, that the tires would require securing for the purposes of the undertaking at the time one or more tires fell … . Therefore, “the special protection’ of Labor Law § 240(1) was not implicated” … . Ruiz v Ford, 2018 NY Slip Op 02820, Second Dept 4-25-18
LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A LADDER WHEN A TIRE STORED ON THE ROOF OF A SHED FELL AND STRUCK THE LADDER, THE TIRE WAS NOT BEING HOISTED AND DID NOT NEED TO BE SECURED FOR THE PURPOSES OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, THE ACCIDENT THEREFORE WAS NOT COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT))/FALLING OBJECTS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A LADDER WHEN A TIRE STORED ON THE ROOF OF A SHED FELL AND STRUCK THE LADDER, THE TIRE WAS NOT BEING HOISTED AND DID NOT NEED TO BE SECURED FOR THE PURPOSES OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, THE ACCIDENT THEREFORE WAS NOT COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT))