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DEFENDANT CLEANING SERVICE CONTRACTOR SUBMITTED EVIDENCE WHICH CREATED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER, PURSUANT TO THE ESPINAL CRITERIA, IT LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant cleaning service contractor’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged defendant was liable under Espinal for launching or creating an instrument of harm by mopping the floor without placing warning signs in the are where she fell:

Generally, a contractual obligation, standing alone, will not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 140). However, there are three exceptions to the general rule … . …

Here, the plaintiff alleged only one of the Espinal exceptions: that the defendant created or launched an instrument of harm. Thus, in support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendant was required to establish, prima facie, that it did not create or launch an instrument of harm … . … [T]he defendant’s submissions demonstrated the existence of triable issues of fact regarding the location of “wet floor” signs and whether the wet floor or the signs were readily observable by a reasonable use of the plaintiff’s senses as she entered the area through a closed door … . Thus, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not create the condition that caused the plaintiff to fall or that it provided adequate notice of the alleged hazardous condition … . Ramsey v Temco Serv. Indus., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 00166, Second Dept 1-8-20

 

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