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RIDING IN A PICKUP TRUCK IS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK, FALLING OFF THE TAILGATE OF A MOVING TRUCK NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1), RIDING ON THE TAILGATE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dickerson, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant general contractor’s motions for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action should have been granted. Plaintiff was sitting on an unsecured cast iron gate, which was resting on the tailgate of a pickup truck, when he and the gate fell from the moving truck. The Second Department determined the fall was not the result of a task involving an elevation-related risk, but rather was the result of riding in a pickup truck (not an elevation-related risk). In addition, the court found that plaintiff’s negligence (choosing to ride in the truck while sitting on the unsecured gate with his legs hanging off the tailgate) constituted the sole proximate cause of the accident:

… [T]he plaintiff in this case was not engaged in the task of unloading the truck at the time of the accident. The grate, on which the plaintiff had been sitting, only fell onto the plaintiff because the plaintiff had fallen off the truck and onto the ground as a result of the movement of the truck. “Liability under Labor Law § 240(1) depends on whether the injured worker’s task creates an elevation-related risk of the kind that safety devices listed in section 240(1) protect against'” … . Here, the task that the plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the accident was the task of riding in a pickup truck. As the Court of Appeals and this Court have already held, the task of riding in a pickup truck does not present an elevation-related risk … . * * *

Under the circumstances, the plaintiff’s decision to sit in this position during the drive was so unforeseeable as to break the causal nexus between the alleged failure … to comply with Labor Law § 240(1) and the plaintiff’s injuries, and the plaintiff’s decision to sit in this position was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of his injuries … . Eddy v John Hummel Custom Bldrs., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08502, 2nd Dept 12-21-16

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (RIDING IN A PICKUP TRUCK IS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK, FALLING OFF THE TAILGATE OF A MOVING TRUCK NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1), RIDING ON THE TAILGATE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT)/TRUCKS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, RIDING IN A PICKUP TRUCK IS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK, FALLING OFF THE TAILGATE OF A MOVING TRUCK NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1), RIDING ON THE TAILGATE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT)/SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, RIDING IN A PICKUP TRUCK IS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK, FALLING OFF THE TAILGATE OF A MOVING TRUCK NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1), RIDING ON THE TAILGATE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT)/ELEVATION-RELATED RISK (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, RIDING IN A PICKUP TRUCK IS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK, FALLING OFF THE TAILGATE OF A MOVING TRUCK NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1), RIDING ON THE TAILGATE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT)

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