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INSUFFICIENT PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 90 DAY NOTICE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL), PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted because the proof of compliance with the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 90 day notice mailing requirements was insufficient:

Proof of the requisite mailing is established with proof of the actual mailings, such as affidavits of mailing or domestic return receipts with attendant signatures, or proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure … .

Here, in moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of service or other proof of mailing by the post office establishing that it properly served [defendant] pursuant to RPAPL 1304. The unsubstantiated and conclusory statement of a vice president of the plaintiff that a 90-day pre-foreclosure notice “was forwarded by regular and certified mail” to [defendant] “in full compliance with all requirements of RPAPL § 1304” was insufficient to establish that the notice was actually mailed to [defendant] by first-class and certified mail … . Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Mandrin, 2018 NY Slip Op 02826, Second Dept 4-25-18

​FORECLOSURE (INSUFFICIENT PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 90 DAY NOTICE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL), PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, INSUFFICIENT PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 90 DAY NOTICE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL), PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, 90 DAY NOTICE,  INSUFFICIENT PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 90 DAY NOTICE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL), PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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