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Criteria for Standing to Contest Zoning Variances Explained

The Second Department determined the petitioners did not have standing to contest zoning variances granted for property .69 miles from where the petitioners live:

To establish standing, a petitioner must show that he or she “would suffer direct injury different from that suffered by the public at large, and that the injury asserted falls within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted” … . “Injury-in-fact may arise from the existence of a presumption established by the allegations demonstrating close proximity to the subject property or, in the absence of such a presumption, the existence of an actual and specific injury” … . Here, the appellants failed to satisfy these requirements.

The appellants live .69 miles away from the subject beach club. Thus, they are not entitled to a presumption of injury … . Their allegations of injury-in-fact due to overcrowding and congestion are purely speculative … . Moreover, the alleged injuries are not specific to the appellants and distinguishable from those suffered by the public at large… . Matter of Radow v Bpoard of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 2014 NY Slip Op 05645, 2nd Dept 8-6-14

 

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