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ATTORNEY ENTITLED TO FEES PURSUANT TO QUANTUM MERUIT DESPITE FAILURE TO FILE A RETAINER STATEMENT AND THE ABSENCE OF A FEE SHARING AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined petitioner-attorney was entitled to fees earned in a medical malpractice action prior to the petitioner's suspension and disbarment. Petitioner sought the fees from substitute counsel (DMR) under a quantum meruit theory. Petitioner's failure to file a retainer statement and the absence of a fee-sharing agreement did not preclude quantum meruit recovery:

… [T]he petitioner was not precluded from recovery on the ground that he failed to file a retainer statement with the Office of Court Administration in accordance with 22 NYCRR 691.20(a)(1), since the petitioner did not seek the recovery of fees on a breach of contract theory, but solely on a quantum meruit basis … . The lack of a fee-sharing agreement between the petitioner and DMR also did not preclude the petitioner from seeking the recovery of fees against DMR … . Moreover, the petitioner did not forfeit his right to recover fees for the work he performed in the medical malpractice action prior to his suspension … . Matter of Grossbarth v Dankner, Milstein & Ruffo, P.C., 2018 NY Slip Op 00144, Second Dept 1-10-18

ATTORNEYS (FEES, QUANTUM MERUIT, ATTORNEY ENTITLED TO FEES PURSUANT TO QUANTUM MERUIT DESPITE FAILURE TO FILE A RETAINER STATEMENT AND THE ABSENCE OF A FEE SHARING AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEY'S FEES (QUANTUM MERUIT, ATTORNEY ENTITLED TO FEES PURSUANT TO QUANTUM MERUIT DESPITE FAILURE TO FILE A RETAINER STATEMENT AND THE ABSENCE OF A FEE SHARING AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT))/RETAINER STATEMENT (ATTORNEY'S FEES,  ATTORNEY ENTITLED TO FEES PURSUANT TO QUANTUM MERUIT DESPITE FAILURE TO FILE A RETAINER STATEMENT AND THE ABSENCE OF A FEE SHARING AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT))/FEE SHARING AGREEMENT (ATTORNEY'S FEES,  ATTORNEY ENTITLED TO FEES PURSUANT TO QUANTUM MERUIT DESPITE FAILURE TO FILE A RETAINER STATEMENT AND THE ABSENCE OF A FEE SHARING AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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