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BOTH PLAINTIFF PASSENGER AND DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD CONSUMED ALCOHOL BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF PASSENGER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of plaintiff in this traffic accident case. Both the defendant driver (Abbott) and the plaintiff passenger (Crystal) had consumed alcohol before the accident. The action was brought by Crystal’s mother on behalf of Crystal. Abbott had attempted a u-turn and was struck by the car behind her (driven by another defendant, Diederich):

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, she failed to establish, prima facie, that Crystal was free from culpable conduct with regard to the causation of her injuries. In support of her motion, the plaintiff relied upon, inter alia, the deposition transcripts of Abbott and Crystal. The testimony of Abbott and Crystal that they had consumed alcohol at a fraternity party prior to the subject accident raised questions of fact as to whether Crystal had knowledge that Abbott may have been intoxicated, which raised triable issues of fact regarding her comparative negligence … . Since triable issues of fact existed as to the comparative negligence of Crystal, the plaintiff failed to establish her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability against the appellants (… . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion. Vuksanaj v Abbott, 2018 NY Slip Op 02199, Second Dept 3-28-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, INTOXICATION, BOTH PLAINTIFF PASSENGER AND DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD CONSUMED ALCOHOL BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF PASSENGER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (INTOXICATION, BOTH PLAINTIFF PASSENGER AND DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD CONSUMED ALCOHOL BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF PASSENGER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, INTOXICATION, BOTH PLAINTIFF PASSENGER AND DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD CONSUMED ALCOHOL BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF PASSENGER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/INTOXICATION (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, PASSENGER,  BOTH PLAINTIFF PASSENGER AND DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD CONSUMED ALCOHOL BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF PASSENGER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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