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Court’s Refusal to Allow Defendant to Inspect His Laptop Computer, Evidence from Which Was Central to the People’s Case, Was Reversible Error

The Second Department determined that denial of defendant’s request to inspect his laptop computer, from which evidence was extracted to prosecute him, was reversible error:

The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to compel the People to provide the defendant with the opportunity to inspect the laptop computer that was seized from his home and for an adjournment of the trial, in order to permit the defense to examine that computer (see CPL 240.20[1][f]…). The defendant was entitled to inspect the laptop computer, pursuant to CPL 240.20(1)(f), and the defendant made a timely demand to inspect the laptop computer (see CPL 240.20[1][f]…).

Further, the laptop computer was central to the People’s case against the defendant; the People’s expert witness testified, at length, as to his examination of the laptop computer, the evidence that was extracted from that computer, and the basis for his conclusion that such evidence was accessed from or uploaded to the internet by the defendant. Additionally, the prosecution provided no reason for its failure to provide the computer to the defense. Under these circumstances, this error warrants reversal … . People v Naran, 2014 NY Slip Op 04969, 2nd Dept 7-2-14

 

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