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JUDGE WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT; ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN JOINED AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO APPEAR AT A SCHEDULED CONFERENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court was without authority to dismiss (sua sponte) the complaint in this foreclosure action because (1) issue had not been joined, and (2) there was no evidence plaintiff failed to appear at a conference:

CPLR 3216(b)(1) states that no dismissal should be made under this statute unless issue has been joined. “A court may not dismiss an action based on neglect to prosecute unless the CPLR 3216 statutory preconditions to dismissal are met”  … . Here, none of the defendants submitted an answer to the complaint and, thus, issue was never joined (see CPLR 3216[b][1] …). “Since at least one precondition set forth in CPLR 3216 was not met here, the Supreme Court was without power to dismiss the action pursuant to that statute” … . …

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, where, as here, a party “appeared as scheduled, [22 NYCRR 202.27] provides no basis for the court to summarily dismiss the action” for failure to prosecute … . In general, “[t]he procedural device of dismissing a complaint for undue delay is a legislative creation, and courts do not possess the inherent power to dismiss an action for general delay where the plaintiff has not been served with a 90-day demand to serve and file a note of issue pursuant to CPLR 3216(b) … . Bank of N.Y. v Harper, 2019 NY Slip Op 07378, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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