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AN EXPERT IN A MED MAL CASE NEED NOT BE A SPECIALIST IN THE RELEVANT FIELD; HERE A PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN LAID A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR AN OPINION ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S CARE; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO DIAGNOSE HER HEART CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants in this med mal case should not have been granted summary judgment. Plaintiff alleged a negligent failure to diagnose her heart condition. Plaintiff’s expert was a primary care physician, not a cardiologist. The Second Department noted that an expert need not be a specialist and found plaintiff’s expert had laid a proper foundation for his opinion:

“[A] medical expert need not be a specialist in a particular field in order to testify regarding accepted practices in that field” … . However, the expert must “be possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience from which it can be assumed that the opinion rendered is reliable” … . Here, the expert, who was in the practice of internal medicine and primary care for more than 35 years, demonstrated based on experience and knowledge that he or she was qualified to render an opinion regarding the symptomology and diagnosis of heart disease and as to whether the defendants properly examined the decedent and investigated her symptoms in accordance with accepted medical practices … . Rosenzweig v Hadpawat, 2024 NY Slip Op 03838, Second Dept 7-17-24

Practice Point: An expert in a med mal case need not be a specialist. Here a primary care physician laid a proper foundation for an opinion re: the defendants’ failure to diagnose plaintiff’s heart condition.

 

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