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DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO PROCEED PRO SE, MADE ON THE EVE OF TRIAL, WAS NOT UNTIMELY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DENIED ON THAT GROUND, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s request to proceed pro se, made prior to the prosecution’s opening statement, was not untimely and should not have been summarily denied on that ground. A new trial was ordered:

… [T]he judgment of conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted because the court erred in summarily denying, as untimely, his request to proceed pro se … . “Although requests [to proceed pro se] on the eve of trial are discouraged, the Court of Appeals has found that a request may be considered timely when it is interposed prior to the prosecution’s opening statement,’ as here”… . People v Smith. 2015 NY Slip Op 09757, 4th Dept 12-31-15

CRIMINAL LAW (REQUEST TO PROCEED PRO SE MADE ON EVE OF TRIAL NOT UNTIMELY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/PRO SE (CRIMINAL LAW, REQUEST TO PROCEED PRO SE MADE ON EVE OF TRIAL NOT UNTIMELY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

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JUDGE’S RESPONSE TO JURY NOTE ALLOWED JURY TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF ACTIONS NOT CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT, CONVICTION REVERSED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED.

The Fourth Department determined the trial judge’s response to a jury note allowed the jury to consider evidence of actions not charged in the indictment. Defendant’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a child was therefore reversed and the indictment was dismissed:

As set forth in the indictment and bill of particulars, as well as pursuant to the People’s theory at trial, the endangerment charge was based on the conduct alleged in the preceding six counts of rape in the second degree and incest in the second degree, of which defendant was acquitted. After receiving a jury note during deliberations, the court instructed the jurors that they were not precluded from considering conduct other than the alleged rape and incest when considering the endangerment charge. That instruction allowed the jury to consider conduct not charged in the indictment. ” Because the jury may have convicted defendant of . . . act[s] . . . for which he was not indicted, defendant’s right to have charges preferred by the [g]rand [j]ury rather than the prosecutor at trial was violated’ ” … . Additionally, based on the vague nature of the court’s instruction, “[i]t is impossible to ascertain what alleged act of [endangerment] was found by the jury to have occurred, whether it was one . . . for which he was indicted, or indeed whether different jurors convicted defendant based on different acts” … . People v Utley, 2015 NY Slip Op 09749, 4th Dept 12-31-15

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY ALLOWED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF ACTIONS NOT CHARGED IN INDICTMENT, CONVICTION REVERSED, INDICTMENT DISMISSED)/EVIDENCE (JURY ALLOWED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF ACTIONS NOT CHARGED IN INDICTMENT, CONVICTION REVERSED, INDICTMENT DISMISSED)

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FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA REQUIRED THAT HE BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS CASE MANDATING AN EXPLANATION OF DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES CAME DOWN AFTER DEFENDANT’S PLEA.

The Second Department determined defendant should be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea because he was not informed of the deportation consequences of the plea. Although the Court of Appeals case requiring that the deportation consequences be explained came down after defendant’s plea, the issue was properly raised on defendant’s direct appeal:

Relying upon People v Peque (22 NY3d 168) the defendant contends that his plea of guilty was not knowing and voluntary because the plea record demonstrates that the court never advised him of the possibility that he would be deported as a consequence of his plea. In Peque, the Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of “fundamental fairness,” due process requires that a court apprise a noncitizen pleading guilty to a felony of the possibility of deportation as a consequence of the plea of guilty (id. at 193). A defendant seeking to vacate a plea based on this defect must establish that there is a “reasonable probability” that he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would instead have gone to trial had the court warned of the possibility of deportation (id. at 176, 198).

As a threshold matter, we disagree with the People’s contention that Peque should only apply prospectively. Inasmuch as Peque, decided after the defendant’s plea, involved federal constitutional principles, it must be applied to this direct appeal … . Contrary to the People’s contention, the record does not demonstrate either that the Supreme Court mentioned, or that the defendant was otherwise aware of, the possibility of deportation. Therefore, the defendant’s claim is not subject to the requirement of preservation … . People v Odle, 2015 NY Slip Op 09699, 2nd Dept 12-30-15

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT NOT INFORMED OF DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEA ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW PLEA)/DEPORTATION (DEFENDANT NOT INFORMED OF DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEA, ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW PLEA)

FAILURE TO APPRISE COUNSEL OF THE CONTENTS OF A NOTE FROM THE JURY REQUIRED REVERSAL.

The Fourth Department determined the trial judge’s failure to apprise counsel of the specific, substantive contents of a jury note requesting a readback of testimony required reversal (in the absence of preservation):

As the court brought the jury into the courtroom to respond to the first two notes, the jury gave a third note to the court. The court told the jury that it would respond to the first two notes at that time, and would then discuss the issue raised in the third note with counsel after sending the jury back to the jury room. The court stated that the “third note [had] not yet [been] shown to counsel nor have we had an opportunity to discuss it.” The record further reflects that the jury resumed its deliberations after the court provided requested testimony and instruction in response to the first two notes, and then rendered a verdict of guilty. The third note, which is included in the record, indicates that the jury was seeking the testimony of a particular witness on a specific topic, but there is nothing in the record indicating that the note was shown to counsel, or that it was read into the record before the jury rendered its verdict. Where, as here, “the record fails to show that defense counsel was apprised of the specific, substantive contents of the note . . . [,] preservation is not required” … , and we conclude that the “[c]ourt committed reversible error by violating the core requirements of CPL 310.30 in failing to advise counsel on the record of the contents of a substantive jury note before accepting a verdict” … . People v Brink, 2015 NY Slip Op 09450, 4th Dept 12-23-15

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO APPRISE COUNSEL OF JURY NOTE CONTENTS REQUIRED REVERSAL)/JURY NOTE (FAILURE TO APPRISE COUNSEL OF CONTENTS REQUIRED REVERSAL)/ORAMA ERROR (FAILURE TO APPRISE COUNSEL OF CONTENTS OF JURY NOTE REQUIRED REVERSAL IN THE ABSENCE OF PRESERVATION)

FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA RENDERED THE PLEA INVALID.

he Third Department reversed defendant’s conviction by guilty plea because the defendant was not informed of the period of postrelease supervision at the time of the plea. Defendant was told by the sentencing judge (at the time of the plea) if he violated interim probation (which was to lead to a felony probation) he would be sentenced to four years in prison. No mention was made of postrelease supervision. Defendant violated the terms of the interim probation and was sentenced to four years incarceration plus two years of postrelease supervision:

… [I]t is well settled that, for a defendant’s plea to be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered into, a court must advise him or her of the direct consequences of a plea prior to sentencing, including the existence and duration of any postrelease supervision requirement … . Here, as the People concede, at the time of his plea, defendant was not properly made aware of the postrelease supervision component of his sentence. Accordingly, defendant’s decision to plead guilty was not a knowing, voluntary and intelligent one and, therefore, the judgment of conviction must be reversed … . People v Binion, 2015 NY Slip Op 09142, 3rd Dept 12-10-15

MONTHLY COMPILATION INDEX ENTRIES FOR THIS CASE:

CRIMINAL LAW (POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF)/SENTENCING (POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF)/POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION (FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF)/PLEA (GUILTY PLEA INVOLUNTARY IF DEFENDANT NOT INFORMED OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION)

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INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, AND JUDGE’S ACTIONS TO COERCE THE JURY TO REACH A VERDICT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.

The First Department reversed defendant’s conviction, finding several distinct flaws which deprived defendant of a fair trial. Testimonial hearsay which served to bolster the complainant’s identification of the defendant was improperly admitted. The prosecutor improperly referred to stricken testimony in summation. And the judge effectively coerced the jury into reaching a verdict.  With respect to the coerced verdict, the court wrote:

During jury deliberations, the court should have granted defendant’s mistrial motion, made on the ground that any verdict would be reached under coercive circumstances. The court’s statements during jury deliberation were also prejudicial to defendant’s right to a fair trial. The jury returned two notes, on the second and fourth day of deliberations, announcing that the jury was deadlocked; the second note emphatically listed different types of evidence the jury had considered. The court’s Allen charges in response to both notes were mostly appropriate but presented the prospect of protracted deliberations by improperly stating that the jury had only deliberated for a very short time when it had actually deliberated for days … . The court initially informed the jury that its hours on one day would be extended to 7:00 p.m., before reversing that decision and merely extending the hours to 5:00 p.m., and then it extended the hours to 6:00 p.m. on the next day, a Friday. The court improperly described those changes as a “tremendous accommodation” that was “loathed” by the system … .

The court further indicated that the jury would likely continue deliberating into the next week although jurors had been told during jury selection that the case would be over by the aforementioned Friday, raising concerns for one juror who was going to start a new job the following Monday and another juror who was solely responsible for his child’s care in the first three days of the next week … . After the court informed the latter juror that he would be required to show up the next week despite the juror’s purportedly fruitless efforts to obtain alternative childcare, and then brought the juror back into the courtroom solely to reiterate that point more firmly, the jury apparently returned its verdict within less than nine minutes, at about 3:29 p.m. on the Friday … . The totality of the circumstances supports an inference that the jury was improperly coerced into returning a compromise verdict. People v DeJesus, 2015 NY Slip Op 08959, 1st Dept 12-8-15

CRIMINAL LAW (TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY IMPROPERLY ADMITTED)/CRIMINAL LAW (PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, REFERENCE TO STRICKEN TESTIMONY)/CRIMINAL LAW (COERCED VERDICT, MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE (TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY IMPROPERLY ADMITTED)/HEARSAY (TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY IMPROPERLY ADMITTED)PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (REFERENCE TO STRICKEN TESTIMONY)/COERCED VERDICT (JURY IMPROPERLY PRESSURED TO REACH VERDICT BY JUDGE)/VERDICT (COERCED, JURY IMPROPERLY PRESSURED TO REACH VERDICT BY JUDGE)/MISTRIAL (JUDGE IMPROPERLY COERCED JURY TO REACH A VERDICT, MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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FAILURE TO CLARIFY WHETHER APPEAL WAIVER WAS PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT RENDERED THE WAIVER INVALID.

The Third Department determined defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid because it was not made clear whether the waiver was part of the plea agreement. The court further determined that the sentence for non-violent offenses committed by the 18-year-old defendant was harsh and excessive. With respect to the invalid waiver of appeal, the court wrote:

Defendant was free to waive his right to appeal as an adjunct to the plea agreement, so long as he made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent decision to do so … . It was accordingly incumbent upon County Court to verify, among other things, that defendant understood he was “intentionally relinquish[ing] or abandon[ing] a known right that would otherwise survive a guilty plea” as a component of the plea agreement … . Defendant expressed his willingness to waive his right to appeal during the plea colloquy, but the record is devoid of any indication that an appeal waiver was actually a component of the plea agreement. An appeal waiver was not mentioned when the terms of the plea agreement were recited and, indeed, the People stated that they did not know if defendant was executing an appeal waiver given the absence of any sentencing commitment. Defense counsel then gratuitously offered to have defendant waive his right to appeal in the spirit of “mak[ing] it as easy on everyone as possible.” As a result of these statements, County Court was obliged to determine whether an appeal waiver was required as a “detail[] of the plea bargain” and, if not, whether defendant understood that he did not have to execute one …. . County Court did neither and, given the absence of proof that defendant waived his right to appeal in return for any consideration, we find that waiver to be invalid … . People v Justiniano, 2015 NY Slip Op 08875, 3rd Dept 12-3-15

CRIMINAL LAW (WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID)/APPEALS (WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID)/CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCE HARSH AND EXCESSIVE)/SENTENCING (HARSH AND EXCESSIVE)

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WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID; DESCRIPTION OF THE EXTENT OF THE WAIVER WAS ERRONEOUS; NO ASSURANCE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RIGHTS WAIVED BY GUILTY PLEA AND APPELLATE RIGHTS.

The First Department sent the matter back for resentencing because the record suggested the sentencing judge erroneously thought he did not have the power to impose a reduced sentence. The First Department determined the defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid because the sentencing judge erroneously stated the relevant law and did not make sure the defendant understood the difference between the rights waived by entering a guilty plea and his appellate rights:

Defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal was invalid, where the court failed to adequately ensure defendant’s understanding that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from the rights automatically forfeited by pleading guilty … . The court’s statement that defendant was “waiving [his] right to appeal any legal issues connected with the case, including the sentence” (emphasis added) was incorrect, insofar as a defendant cannot waive certain rights, such as the right to challenge the legality of a sentence or raise a speedy trial claim … . The court’s further statement that the “right of appeal is waived by [defendant], the rights I just mentioned are automatically waived by a plea” was insufficient to explain that the right to appeal is not included with those automatically waived by a guilty plea, since the court had “just mentioned” that right. Moreover, defendant’s execution of a written waiver “does not, standing alone, provide sufficient assurance that the defendant is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily giving up his or her right to appeal” … . People v Flores, 2015 NY Slip Op 08905, 1st  Dept 12-3-15

CRIMINAL LAW (WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WAIVER INVALID)/WAIVER OF APPEAL INVALID

O’RAMA-PROCEDURE ERRORS WERE NOT MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERRORS AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR REVIEW BY OBJECTIONS.

The First Department determined that the O’Rama-procedure errors made by the trial judge did not rise to the level of “mode of proceedings” errors and were not preserved for appeal by objection. The note was read essentially verbatim in open court, but the judge did not give counsel advance notice of the contents of the note and did not give the parties the chance for input re: the response:

The trial court’s handling of the note sent out by the jury during deliberations did not constitute a mode of proceedings error … . The note contained two questions and two requests for exhibits. While the court initially read only the first substantive question into the record in the presence of counsel before the jury was brought into the courtroom, once the jury was brought in, the court read the remainder of the note aloud, essentially verbatim, stopping at the end of each of the four parts to provide its response. Although the court did not inform counsel in advance about the entirety of the note or give the parties any opportunity for input into the court’s proposed responses, by reading the full contents of the note in the presence of the parties and the jury, the court satisfied its core responsibility … . People v Ramirez, 2015 NY Slip Op 08772, 1st Dept 12-1-15

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY NOTES, O’RAMA ERROR NOT PRESERVED)/JURY NOTES (O’RAMA ERROR NOT PRESERVED)

MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR TO PARAPHRASE SUBSTANTIVE JURY NOTE.

The First Department determined the trial judge’s paraphrasing a substantive jury note, rather than reading it into the record verbatim, was a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal:

By only paraphrasing some of the content of the third note, and failing to read the precise content of the that note into the record verbatim at any time, the court violated the procedures set forth in People v O’Rama (78 NY2d 270, 277-278 [1991]), more recently reiterated in People v Nealon ( __ NY3d __ , 2015 NY Slip Op 07781 [2015]) … ). A court does not satisfy its responsibility to provide counsel with meaningful notice of a jury’s substantive inquiry by summarizing the substance of the jurors’ note … . The … note, which was a substantive jury inquiry, should not have been paraphrased, but read in its entirety so that counsel had meaningful notice of its contents and, therefore, an opportunity to formulate a proposed response. Although counsel did not object to how the court handled the … note, the court’s failure to read this substantive note into the record verbatim, is a “mode of proceedings error,” and given this departure, counsel was not required to object to it in order to preserve any claim of error for appellate review … . People v Lane, 2015 NY Slip Op 08771, 1st Dept 12-1-15

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY NOTES, PARAPHRASING  JURY NOTE WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR)/JURY NOTES (PARAPHRASING NOTE WAS A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR (PARAPHRASING JURY NOTE)

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