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Property Owner’s Liability for Snow and Ice on Sidewalk​

In reversing the grant of summary judgment to the defendant in a slip and fall case, the Second Department explained the controlling law with respect to ice and snow on a municipal sidewalk abutting private property as follows:

Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, which became effective September 14, 2003, shifted tort liability from the City to the property owner for personal injuries proximately caused by the owner’s failure to maintain the sidewalk abutting its premises in a reasonably safe condition (including the negligent failure to remove snow, ice, or other material from the sidewalk), with several exceptions not relevant here … .

Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 does not impose strict liability upon the property owner, and the injured party has the obligation to prove the elements of negligence to demonstrate that an owner is liable …. Thus, in support of a motion for summary judgment dismissing a cause of action pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210, the property owner has the initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it …. Gyokchyan v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 03302, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

Procedure for Sentencing a Second Felony Offender Not Followed

The Second Department sent the matter back for resentencing because of the sentencing court’s failure to follow the statutory procedure for adjudicating defendant a second felony offender:

As the People correctly concede, the sentencing court adjudicated the defendant a second felony offender (see Penal Law § 70.06) absent any indication of compliance with the procedural requirements of CPL 400.21, or any showing that the defendant was given notice and an opportunity to be heard …. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the County Court, Suffolk County, for resentencing in accordance with the mandates of CPL 400.21 ….  People v Puca, 2013 NY Slip Op 03114, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

 

Failure to Cooperate with Probation Department Is Valid Reason for Enhanced Sentence

The Second Department determined defendant’s failure to cooperate with the probation department in violation of his plea agreement was a valid ground for an enhanced sentence:

The condition of the defendant’s plea that he cooperate with the probation department was explicit and objective, and was acknowledged, understood, and accepted by the defendant as part of the plea agreement …. The defendant’s violation of that condition, by refusing to be interviewed by the probation officer, allowed the Supreme Court to impose the enhanced sentence.  People v Patterson, 2013 NY Slip Op 03113, 5-1-18

 

Procedure for Sentencing as Persistent Felony Offender Not Followed

In sending the matter back for resentencing, the Second Department noted that the statutory procedure for sentencing as a persistent felony offender had not been followed:

The Supreme Court erred in failing to provide proper notice of the persistent felony offender hearing pursuant to CPL 400.20(1)-(4), and to set forth specific reasons supporting its determination to sentence the defendant as a persistent felony offender (see Penal Law § 70.10[2]…). People v Brown, 2013 NY Slip Op 03111, 2nd Dept, 3-1-13

 

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Evidence of Physical Injury (re Assault) Insufficient

In reversing an Assault 3rd conviction, the Second Department determined, under a weight of the evidence analysis, the proof of “physical injury” was insufficient:

Upon reviewing the record here, we find that the verdict of guilt was against the weight of the evidence, since the evidence presented at trial did not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant sustained a “physical injury” within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(9). Physical injury is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain” (Penal Law § 10.00[9]). The complainant testified that he sustained bruising and scraping to his right arm, neck, and back, but he did not seek any medical treatment or miss any work. The complainant also provided no details that would corroborate his subjective description of pain, nor did he take any pain medication. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence that the complainant suffered a “physical injury”…, and the judgment must be reversed and the indictment dismissed. People v Boley, 2013 NY Slip Op 03109, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

 

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Sanction for Failure to Negotiate in Good Faith Under Subprime Mortgage Laws Violated Contract Clause

Under CPLR 3408 (one of the Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure Laws enacted in response to the “subprime mortgage crisis”) settlement conferences between the bank and the homeowner are made mandatory.  The statute requires that the parties negotiate “in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible”… .  In this case, Supreme Court determined the bank had not negotiated in good faith.  As a sanction, Supreme Court compelled “specific performance of the original modification agreement” proposed by the bank at the outset of the settlement conference.  In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dickerson, the Second Department, after describing the sanctions imposed in other cases, determined that the sanction in this case amounted to the Court’s rewriting the mortgage in violation of the Contract Clause and the bank’s due process rights.  Justice Dickerson wrote:

 …[T]the Supreme Court’s interpretation of CPLR 3408(f) as authorizing it to, in effect, rewrite the mortgage and loan agreement would violate the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution …. * * *In addition, the Supreme Court’s determination violated [the bank’s] due process rights. [The bank] was not on notice that the Supreme Court was considering a remedy such as the imposition of the terms of the modification proposal on a permanent basis… . Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Meyers, 2013 NY Slip Op 03085, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

 

Joint Custody Inappropriate Where Parents Can Not Cooperate​

In affirming Family Court’s decision to award custody to mother because of the evidence that mother and father could not cooperate, the Second Department wrote:

“[J]oint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion” … . “However, joint custody is inappropriate where the parties are antagonistic towards each other and have demonstrated an inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child'” …. Since the record here is replete with examples of hostility and antagonism between the parties, indicating that they were unable to put aside their differences for the good of the child, the Family Court erred in awarding the parties joint legal custody of the subject child …. Rather, an award of sole legal custody to the mother is in the child’s best interests … . Matter of Wright v Kaura, 2013 NY Slip Op 03105, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

 

Father’s Application for Dismissal of Maternal Aunt’s Custody Petition (After Death of Mother) Granted

After the child’s mother died, petitioner, the child’s maternal aunt, sought custody.  In granting the father’s application to dismiss the petition, the Second Department wrote:

As between a parent and a nonparent, the parent has a superior right to custody which cannot be denied absent a showing of surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness, or other similar extraordinary circumstances …. A nonparent seeking custody of a child against the wishes of a parent has the initial burden of establishing the existence of extraordinary circumstances …. Once extraordinary circumstances are found, the court must then make the disposition that is in the best interests of the child … .  Here, the petitioner failed to establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant a hearing with regard to the child’s best interests … . Matter of Andracchi v Reetz, 2013 NY Slip Op 03090, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

 

 

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Duty to Defend Versus Duty to Indemnify—Question of Fact About Whether Intentional Conduct Policy Exclusion Applies

The plaintiff’s vehicle had been struck from behind by one Schwartz.  Plaintiff drove his vehicle into Schwartz and left the scene. Plaintiff was charged criminally for those actions.  In the personal injury action brought by Schwartz against plaintiff, the defendant insurance company defended plaintiff.  A $25,000 judgment was entered against plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued defendant insurance company for indemnification ($25,000).  Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which was granted.  The Second Department reversed finding a question of fact had been raised by the insurer about whether plaintiff’s injuries were the result of his intentional conduct, a policy exclusion. In explaining the relevant law, the 1st Department wrote:

“While the duty to defend is measured against the possibility of a recovery, the duty to pay is determined by the actual basis for the insured’s liability to a third person” … . The burden to establish coverage and a duty to indemnify lies with the insured … . However, the insurer has the burden of proving facts establishing that the loss falls within an exclusionary clause of the insurance policy … .  * * *  [Here] …the insurer submitted evidence from the criminal prosecution and the underlying personal injury action, including Schwartz’s deposition testimony, which raised a triable issue of fact whether the loss fell within a policy exclusion for bodily injury “intentionally” caused by the insured…Dryer v New York Cent Mut Fire Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 03056, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, REAR-END COLLISIONS

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Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

The plaintiffs, in a nuisance action, sought to enjoin the defendants “from maintaining more than one ‘main building’ on the premises, allegedly in violation of the Village Code.”  The Second Department, citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, ruled that the case for an injunction had not been made out because the plaintiffs never sought a determination of the legality of the use of the premises from the administrative agency responsible for zoning:

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction “generally enjoins courts having concurrent jurisdiction to refrain from adjudicating disputes within an administrative agency’s authority, particularly where the agency’s specialized experience and technical expertise is involved” …. Here, the plaintiffs failed to properly seek a determination regarding the legality of the use of the premises under the Village Code from the administrative bodies authorized to administer and enforce the Village’s zoning law … . Massaro v Jaina Network Sys, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 03066, 2nd Dept, 5-1-13

 

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