You are here: / Second Department

Tag Archive for: Second Department

, ,

No Demonstration Burst Water Pipe Could Have Been the Result of Negligent Inspection or Maintenance; Municipality Immune from Negligent Design

In affirming Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant town with respect to damages allegedly caused by a burst storm water pipe, the Second Department determined plaintiffs did not raise a question of fact concerning negligent inspection or maintenance:

“A municipality is immune from liability arising out of claims that it negligently designed [a] sewerage system” or storm drainage system”… . However, a municipality is not immune from liability arising out of claims that it negligently maintained its storm drainage system…. For the plaintiffs to recover under a theory of negligent inspection or maintenance of the storm drainage system, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendants had ” notice of a dangerous condition or ha[d] reason to believe that the pipes ha[d] shifted or deteriorated and [were] likely to cause injury,’ that the [defendants] failed to make reasonable efforts to inspect and repair the defect,’ and that such failure caused the plaintiffs’ injuries”….  Bilotta v Town of Harrison, 2013 NY Slip Op 03444, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

,

Proof of Regular Cleaning Negated Constructive Notice Allegation​

In determining the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case should have been granted, the Second Department explained defendant had met its burden on the issue of (the absence of) constructive notice by proof of regular weekly cleaning:

In a slip-and-fall case, a defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it did not create the condition on which the plaintiff slipped, and did not have actual or constructive notice of that condition… . ” To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last cleaned or inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell'”… .  A defendant’s submission of evidence of its general cleaning practices is generally insufficient to meet its burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice … . Here, however, the defendant submitted an affidavit from its superintendent indicating that each and every Monday, he would mop the entire building, including the stairwell where the plaintiff allegedly fell, and that this mopping would always occur between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. This affidavit was specific enough to satisfy the defendant’s initial burden. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Armijos v Vrettos Realty Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 03443, 2nd Dept,. 5-15-13

 

 

Review Criteria for Actions by Zoning Boards of Appeal

In upholding Supreme Court’s annulment of the village Zoning Board of Appeal’s denial of petitioner’s application for a site capacity variance, the Second Department described the review criteria as follows:

Generally, local zoning boards have broad discretion in deciding applications… . “Courts may set aside a zoning board determination only where the record reveals that the board acted illegally or arbitrarily, or abused its discretion, or that it merely succumbed to generalized community pressure” …. “[A] determination will not be deemed rational if it rests entirely on subjective considerations, such as general community opposition, and lacks an objective factual basis” …. “Conclusory findings of fact are insufficient to support a determination by a zoning board of appeals, which is required to clearly set forth how and in what manner the granting of the variance would be improper” … .  Matter of Luburic v Zoning Bd of Appeals of Vil of Irvington, 2013 NY Slip Op 03333, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

, ,

Statute of Frauds Precluded Real Property-Related Action; Equitable Part Performance Doctrine Not Applicable

The Second Department determined the statute of frauds barred the real-property-related action and, since the action was brought “at law,” the equitable “part performance” doctrine could not be applied:

Here, the County established, prima facie, that there is no extant writing subscribed by the County or its agent referencing an alleged oral agreement involving real property, as described by the plaintiff (see General Obligations Law § 5-703[3];…). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. “Part performance by the party seeking to enforce [a] contract [for the sale of real property] may be sufficient in some circumstances to overcome the statute of frauds, but only in an action for specific performance” (…see General Obligations Law § 5-703[4];…). Since, here, the action is pleaded as one at law, and seeks only money damages, without any specific prayer for equitable relief, the plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of part performance to defeat the statute of frauds defense …. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the County’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, based on the statute of frauds. Zito v County of Suffolk, 2013 NY Slip Op 03324, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

,

Anticipatory Repudiation Cause of Action Stated;Four-Year UCC Statute of Limitations Applied

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, the Second Department determined that the plaintiff had pled a valid “anticipatory repudiation” cause of action and that the four-year UCC statute of limitations applied.  The case concerned the return (for a refund) of drugs when the expiration date is close or has passed.  The plaintiff brought the action when it learned the refund would not be offered in full. Regarding the anticipatory repudiation and statute of limitations issues, Justice Leventhal wrote:

Here, the complaint alleges that, when the defendants refused to accept the plaintiff’s attempt to return the unsold merchandise, the defendants anticipatorily repudiated their respective return policies by unambiguously stating that they would not accept the returns. The complaint asserts that the defendants’ anticipatory repudiation occurred before the plaintiff tendered the unsold merchandise to the defendants and before the plaintiff attempted to return the merchandise to the manufacturer in accordance with standard industry practice. When a party repudiates a contract prior to the time designated for performance and before all of the consideration has been fulfilled, the nonrepudiating party can seek to recover damages …. * * *

The general rule applicable to actions to recover damages for breach of contract is that a six-year statute of limitations begins to run when a contract is breached or when one party fails to perform a contractual obligation …. However, UCC 2-725(1) provides that “[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale [of goods] must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued” (see CPLR 203[a]). QK Healthcare, Inc v InSource, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 03312, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

,

Unlicensed Contractor Could Not Sue for Breach of Contract or Quantum Meruit

The Second Department affirmed the dismissal of a contractor’s “breach-of-contract” and “quantum-meruit” causes of action because the contractor was not licensed, and thereby forfeited his right to recover:

Where a home improvement contractor is not properly licensed in the municipality where the work is performed at the time the work is performed, the contractor forfeits the right to recover for the work performed both under the contract and on a quantum meruit basis …. Administrative Code of Suffolk County § 563-17(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to engage in any business as a home improvement contractor without obtaining a license therefor.” Graciano Corp v Baronoff, 2013 NY Slip Op 03301, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

,

Arrest Based on Out of State Warrant Not Authorized​

In reversing the denial of suppression, reversing the conviction and dismissing the indictment, the Second Department explained that the arrest based on out of state warrant (for a violation of probation) was not authorized.  A local criminal court warrant was required:

The detective had no authority to arrest the defendant based on his information that there was an out-of-state violation of probation warrant, as the detective did not obtain a warrant from a local criminal court pursuant to CPL 570.32. While CPL 570.34 provides that a police officer may also arrest a person in this State without a warrant “upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of another state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”…, a violation of probation is not a “crime” … . People v Miranda-Hernandez, 2013 NY Slip Op 03346, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

STREET STOPS, SUPPRESS

Trial Judge’s Violation of CPL 310.30 in Responding to Jury Note Constituted Reversible “Mode of Proceedings” Error

In reversing a conviction because the trial judge did not handle a jury note properly, in violation of CPL 310.30, the Second Department explained:

…[T]he court received a substantive jury note but did not set that note forth on the record and allow counsel a full opportunity to suggest an appropriate response. …[T]he court failed to fulfill its core responsibilities under CPL 310.30, thereby committing a mode of proceedings error that is exempt from the preservation requirements and requires reversal … . Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered … . People v Howell, 2013 NY Slip Op 03342, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

,

Criteria for Downward Departure (SORA)​

The Second Department explained the two factors a defendant must demonstrate for a downward departure in a SORA proceeding:

First, a defendant must identify, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which “tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [SORA] Guidelines”…. Second, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to support that mitigating factor …. In the absence of that twofold showing, the court lacks discretion to depart from the presumptive risk level …. People v Henry, 2013 NY Slip Op 03309, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

, ,

Conflicting Expert Opinions, One of Which Was “Conclusory” with Respect to Proximate Cause, Raised Question of Fact

The Second Department reversed the dismissal of medical malpractice and wrongful death causes of action because a question of fact about whether there was a deviation from the standard of care by a hospital employee was raised by conflicting expert opinions, one of which was “conclusory” on the issue of proximate cause:

Although, generally, a hospital cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a private attending physician, concurrent liability will be imposed where, inter alia, a hospital’s employees commit independent acts of negligence …. Here, Winthrop [the hospital] satisfied its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that Noble, its employee, did not commit any independent acts that deviated from the standard of care while attending to the decedent in the post-operative recovery area …. However, Winthrop failed to satisfy its prima facie burden with respect to the issue of proximate cause, as the opinion rendered by its expert on that issue was conclusory … Therefore, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact only as to whether there was a deviation from the standard of care …. The plaintiff did so through the affidavit of her expert, who opined that Noble deviated from the standard of care by, inter alia, failing to recognize the signs of a complication and timely report those signs to Wong [the decedent’s private attending physician]. In light of the conflicting opinions of the parties’ experts, summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice and wrongful death causes of action insofar as asserted against Winthrop should have been denied …. Rosenstack v Wong, 2013 NY Slip Op 03316, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13