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Bank Account in Name “Ann … or Thomas…” Could Be Turned Over to Pay Debt Owed by Thomas 

In finding that the funds held in a bank account in the name of “Ann Sledjeski or Thomas Sledjeski” should have been turned over to pay Thomas Sledjeski’s debt, the Second Department wrote:

The Supreme Court should have granted the unopposed petition pursuant to CPLR 5225(b) to direct Hudson City Savings Bank to turn over the funds of an account it held in the name of “Ann Sledjeski or Thomas Sledjeski,” to partially satisfy a judgment entered in favor of the petitioner and against Thomas C. Sledjeski. ” [T]he opening of a joint bank account creates a rebuttable presumption that each named tenant is possessed of the whole of the account so as to make the account vulnerable to levy of a money judgment by the judgment creditor of one of the joint tenants'” (…see Banking Law § 675[b]). Therefore, the petitioner was not required to establish that the judgment debtor was the sole contributor of funds to the account. Moreover, since none of the respondents appeared or answered the proceeding, they failed to rebut the presumption …  Matter of JRP Old Riverhead, Ltd v Hudson City Sav Bank, 2013 NY Slip Op 03484, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

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