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Criteria for Labor Law 200 Claim Explained

The plaintiff fell when a plank on a catwalk broke.  In the course of the decision, which addressed several Labor Law claims, the Second Department explained the criteria for a Labor Law section 200 cause of action based on an alleged dangerous condition:

Labor Law § 200 “is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to maintain a safe construction site” …. Where, as here, a “premises condition is at issue, property owners may be held liable for a violation of Labor Law § 200 if the owner either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the accident” …. In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing that they lacked actual notice of a dangerous condition, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he had seen rotten, discolored planks on the catwalk and had reported the condition to the defendants’ foreman on three occasions in the two months prior to his accident was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants had actual notice of the dangerous condition. Moreover, photographs of the broken catwalk in the record show cracked, warped, and discolored planks. Thus, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the alleged defect …. Ramirez v Metropolitan Transp Auth, 2013 NY Slip Op 03314, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

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“Service Charge” Could Be “Gratuity” to Which Employer Not Entitled

In upholding the sufficiency of a complaint seeking damages for violations of Labor Law section 196-d, alleging that a 15 to 20% “service charge” on catering and hospital forms was actually a “gratuity,” the Second Department wrote:

Labor Law § 196-d provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o employer . . . shall demand or accept, directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities received by an employee, or retain any part of a gratuity or of any charge purported to be a gratuity for an employee.” In Samiento v World Yacht Inc. (10 NY3d 70, 74), …the Court of Appeals held that depending upon the circumstances, even a mandatory service charge added to a bill “may be a charge purported to be a gratuity’ within the meaning of [Labor Law § 196-d].” The Court stated that a mandatory service charge can purport to be a gratuity “when it is shown that employers represented or allowed their customers to believe that the charges were in fact gratuities for their employees” (id. at 81). “[T]he standard under which a mandatory charge or fee is purported to be a gratuity should be weighed against the expectation of the reasonable customer” and the “reasonable patron standard should govern when determining whether a banquet patron would understand a service charge was being collected in lieu of a gratuity” (id. at 79). Martin v Restaurant Assoc Events Corp, 2013 NY slip Op 03304, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

Defective Release Did Not Trigger 90-Day Clock for Payment of Settlement Amount

The Second Department determined that a release that was defective because it excluded subrogation claims did not start the 90-day clock, pursuant to CPLR 5003-a(e), for payment of the settlement amount:

Here, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the general release provided by the plaintiff was defective, since it expressly excluded potential subrogation claims against the defendant. Therefore, it was insufficient to trigger the 90-day period within which the defendant was required to make payment of the settlement amount, and, accordingly, the plaintiff was not entitled to seek a judgment based on nonpayment under CPLR 5003-a(e)… . Pitt v New York City Hous Auth, 2013 NY Slip Op 03311, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

 

Sufficient Grounds for Custody Hearing Raised​

The Second Department determined Supreme Court erred when it denied plaintiff’s motion for a change in custody/visitation without holding a hearing.  The plaintiff had alleged, among other things, the defendant operated a vehicle in an impaired state, posing a danger to the children:

Here, the plaintiff made the necessary showing entitling him to a hearing regarding those branches of his motion which were to modify the Stipulation so as to award him sole legal custody and suspend the defendant’s visitation with the children, unless supervised …. Furthermore, the record does not demonstrate that the Supreme Court possessed adequate relevant information to enable it to make an informed and provident determination as to the children’s best interest so as to render a hearing unnecessary …. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which sought a modification of the existing custody arrangement, without first conducting a full evidentiary hearing to ascertain the children’s best interests…. Nusbaum v Nusbaum, 2013 NY Slip Op 03307, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

Burden Is On Parent to Demonstrate Exception to Statutory Relief from Making Reasonable Efforts to Reunite

The Second Department explained how the exception to Family Ct Act 1039-b[b], relating to making reasonable efforts to reunite parent and child, works. Once an enumerated condition which eliminates the need to make reasonable efforts to reunite is demonstrated, the burden switches to the parent to show that the exception should be applied:

Here …ACS [Administration for Children’s Services] established that the mother’s parental rights with respect to a sibling of the subject child had been terminated “involuntarily” …. In support of its motion, ACS submitted the judgments terminating the mother’s parental rights with respect to the child’s two elder siblings …. In opposition to ACS’s motion, the mother failed to prove that “reasonable efforts” [to reunite] should nonetheless still be required under the exception provided for in Family Court Act § 1039-b(b). We reject the mother’s contention that the statute places the burden on the social services official to establish the inapplicability of the exception, rather than on the parent to establish its applicability. …Given the text of the statute, as well as its structure, which make the exception applicable to all six enumerated circumstances, some of which involve egregious conduct by the parent, the only reasonable interpretation is that once the social services official establishes the existence of an enumerated circumstance, the burden shifts to the parent to establish the applicability of the exception. Matter of Skyler, 2013 NY Slip Op 03325, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

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Sexual Assault by Son of Homeowners Not an Insured “Occurrence” Under Homeowners’ Insurance Policy

The Second Department determined a sexual assault allegedly perpetrated by the son of the homeowners was not an insured “occurrence” within the meaning of the homeowners’ insurance policy:

Here, Joseph M. allegedly was insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to his parents, which provided personal liability coverage for claims made against an insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an “occurrence.” The policy defined the term “occurrence” as “an accident . . . which result[ed] in . . . bodily injury.”   The complaint in the underlying action alleged that the plaintiff in that action sustained bodily injury due to a sexual assault perpetrated by Joseph M. Since the bodily injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in the underlying action were inherent in the conduct that Joseph M. allegedly engaged in, the alleged sexual assault cannot be construed as an accident within the definition of “occurrence” for which the plaintiff’s policy affords coverage … . State Farm Fire and Cas Co v Joseph M, 2013 NY Slip Op 03318, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

Question of Fact About Property Owner’s Liability for Condition of Sidewalk Raised

The Second Department determined a question of fact had been raised about whether a property owner was liable to a pedestrian who allegedly fell because of the condition of the sidewalk.  Because the sidewalk was essentially part of the defendant landowner’s driveway, the sidewalk was subject to “special use” by the landowner which may impose liability for the condition of the sidewalk:

A landowner will not be liable to a pedestrian injured by a defect in a public sidewalk abutting the landowner’s premises unless the landowner either created the defective condition or caused it to occur because of some special use, or unless a statute or ordinance places the obligation to maintain the sidewalk upon the landowner and expressly makes the landowner liable for injuries occasioned by the failure to perform that duty …. It is undisputed that the ordinance at issue in this case does not expressly make the landowner liable for injuries occasioned by a failure to perform the duty of maintaining sidewalks in good repair. Accordingly, the question to be determined is whether the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the individual defendants created the alleged defective condition or caused it to occur because of some special use.  A driveway can constitute a special use of a sidewalk …. Rodriguez v City of Yonkers, 2013 NY Slip Op 03315, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

SLIP AND FALL

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Property Owner’s Obligation to Remove Snow and Ice from Sidewalk​

The Second Department explained the obligation of the owner of an owner-occupied, two-family, residential house with respect to the removal of ice and snow from the abutting sidewalk:

Since the defendants’ property, a two-family house, was owner-occupied and used exclusively for residential purposes, the defendants were exempt from liability imposed pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210(b) for negligent failure to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk …. Thus, the defendants may be held liable for a hazardous snow and ice condition on the sidewalk only if they undertook snow and ice removal efforts that made the naturally occurring condition more hazardous or caused the defect to occur because of a special use …. Unless one of these factors is present, an abutting owner of a two-family residence may not be held liable for the removal of snow and ice in an incomplete manner …. Rodrigo Texis Cuapio v Skrodzki, 2013 NY Slip Op 03293, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

SLIP AND FALL

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College Had No Duty to Supervise Fraternity “Pledging” Activities

The Second Department affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by a student against his college alleging a failure to supervise a fraternity’s “pledging” activities (resulting in personal injuries).  The Court wrote:

“Absent a duty of care, there is no breach, and without breach there can be no liability” …. The existence of a legal duty presents a question of law for the court … . “New York has affirmatively rejected the doctrine of in loco parentis at the college level and colleges in general have no legal duty to shield their students from the dangerous activity of other students'” …. A duty, however, may be imposed upon a college where it has encouraged its students to participate in an activity and taken affirmative steps to supervise and control the activity ….  * * * [T]he plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that the University defendants’ involvement in the Fraternity’s initiation process was of a degree that gave rise to a duty… . Pasquaretto v Long Is Univ, 2013 NY Slip Op 03308, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

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Jury Need Not Draw the Permissible Inference of Negligence Under Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Even Where Defendant Offers No Proof 

The Second Department explained that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur makes out a prima facie case of negligence but the jury is not required to draw the permissible inference of negligence, even where the defendant offers no proof:

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence to be drawn solely from the happening of an accident, upon a plaintiff’s showing that the event is of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence and was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, without any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff …. “The rule has the effect of creating a prima facie case of negligence sufficient for submission to the jury, and the jury may-but is not required to-draw the permissible inference” …. “[T]he use of res ipsa loquitur does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proof” …. In a res ipsa loquitur case, the jury has great latitude; even when the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and the defendant has offered no proof, the jury nonetheless is entitled to find for the defendant …, subject, of course, to appellate review. Nikollbibaj v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 03306, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13