Tag Archive for: Second Department

, ,

FOR PURPOSES OF THE “RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE,” A DEFENDANT CAN BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE WORK OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IF THE WORK IS “INHERENTLY DANGEROUS;” THE EXCAVATION WORK WAS “INHERENTLY DANGEROUS;” THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court., determined plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint by adding independent contractors hired in connection with excavation work on adjacent property should have been granted. The excavation work caused plaintiff’s building to collapse. The statute of limitations for the negligence causes of action had run. A defendant can be vicariously liable for the actions of independent contractors if the work is “inherently dangerous.” Because this work was “inherently dangerous,” the defendants and the independent contractors are “united in interest” such that the relation-back doctrine applies:

… [T]he plaintiff satisfied the second prong of the relation-back test with respect to the causes of action sounding in negligence and gross negligence, as the plaintiff established that the proposed defendants and the original defendants were united in interest as to those causes of action. “As a general rule, ‘a party who retains an independent contractor, as distinguished from a mere employee or servant, is not liable for the independent contractor’s negligent acts'” … . However, this general rule is subject to various exceptions, including where the work performed is inherently dangerous … . In this case, the amended complaint and the proposed second amended complaint alleged sufficient facts demonstrating that the work being performed was inherently dangerous and, thus, the original defendants could be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts or omissions of the proposed defendants … . Further, the plaintiff satisfied the third prong of the relation-back test, as the plaintiff demonstrated that the proposed defendants knew or should have known that, but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against them as well … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the amended complaint to add the proposed defendants as defendants with respect to the causes of action sounding in negligence and gross negligence … . Crossbay Assoc., LLC v Singh, 2026 NY Slip Op 03941, Second Dept 6-24-26

Practice Point: A party can be vicariously liable for the work done by an independent contractor if the work is “inherently dangerous.” The excavation work at issue in this case was deemed inherently dangerous.

 

, ,

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED A DEFAULT JUDGMENT, SUA SPONTE, AGAINST A DEFENDANT NOT NAMED IN PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE PHRASE IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION REQUESTING “SUCH OTHER RELIEF” AS IS DEEMED APPROPRIATE CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR DISPOSITIVE RELIEF (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, granted a default judgment against defendant Molina in this foreclosure action. There were two defendants, Pena and Molina. Pena answered the complaint but Molina did not. The notice of motion seeking summary judgment did not mention Molina. Therefore the judge should not have granted relief not demanded by the plaintiff:

“Among the statutory requirements [set forth in CPLR 2214(a) and (b)] is that notices of motion set forth ‘the relief demanded and the grounds therefor.’ The failure to give a party proper notice of a motion deprives the court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion and renders a resulting order void” … . In other words, “[a] court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief against a defaulting party where that relief is not requested in the moving papers” … .

Here, since the plaintiff did not move for leave to enter a default judgment against Molina, the Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, granted that relief … . As the court lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief … , so much of the order … , as, sua sponte, granted leave to enter a default judgment against Molina was rendered void … , “‘warranting vacatur pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4)'” … . As to the court’s reliance on the language in the notice of motion seeking “such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper,” this Court has explicitly held that courts may not “rely upon general relief clauses in noticed motions—’for such other and further relief the court deems just and proper’—to justify the sua sponte [granting of dispositive relief]” … . Citimortgage, Inc. v Pena, 2026 NY Slip Op 03940, Second Dept 6-24-26

Practice Point: The phrase in motion papers requesting “such other relief as is deemed appropriate” cannot be the basis for dispositive relief.​

 

, ,

THE DENIAL OF THE JURY’S REQUEST TO SEE MRI IMAGES ON THE GROUND VIEWING THEM WAS “BEYOND THE KEN” OF THE JURY WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the denial of plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict, determined the judge should not have withheld from the jury MRI images on the ground they were “beyond the ken” of the jury:

… [T]he Supreme Court failed to respond meaningfully to the jury’s request to view all of the infant plaintiff’s MRI images during deliberations … . Although the MRI images were admitted into evidence at trial, the court denied the jury’s request to view the MRI images during deliberations on the ground that viewing them was “beyond the ken of a juror.” … [T]he error deprived the plaintiffs of “substantial justice” with respect to the jury’s finding that Halitsky’s departure was not a substantial factor in causing the infant plaintiff’s injury … . Accordingly, the court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside so much of the jury verdict as was in favor of Halitsky …. J.T.M. v Parrinello, 2026 NY Slip Op 03787, Second Dept 6-17-26

Practice Point: Here the judge should not have refused the jury’s request to view MRI images which were in evidence on the ground they were “beyond the ken” of the jury.

 

, ,

IN A SUIT BY LIMOUSINE DRIVERS AGAINST LIMOUSINE SERVICE PROVIDERS ALLEGING UNDERPAYMENT, THE DEFENDANT LIMOUSINE SERVICES PROVIDERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY WERE ENTITLED TO THE TAXICAB EXCEPTION FROM LABOR LAW WAGE REQUIREMENTS AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE DRIVERS WERE PRECLUDED FROM SUIT BY THE TAX ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE (WHERE A PARTY ASSERTS A POSITION CONTRADICTED BY INFORMATION IN TAX FORMS) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Christopher, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant limousine service providers (XYZ) did not demonstrate they were entitled to the taxicab exception to the wage requirements in the Labor Law and did not demonstrate the plaintiffs-drivers were precluded from suing pursuant to the tax estoppel doctrine. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here:

… [T]he defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiffs were employed or permitted to work as a driver engaged in operating a taxicab (see Labor Law § 651[5][d]; 12 NYCRR 142-2.14[c][6]). * * *

… [T]he plaintiffs’ admissions that they declared themselves “self-employed” on their income tax returns were inadequate to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiffs should be estopped from asserting the existence of an employment relationship. The determination of the existence of an employment relationship “involve[s] a mixed question of law and fact” … , and the plaintiffs’ admissions that they declared themselves “self-employed” on their income tax returns is not inconsistent with their allegations that XYZ exercised control over the plaintiffs’ work, inter alia, by paying the plaintiffs according to XYZ’s own policies and that XYZ, in exercising that control, unlawfully misclassified the plaintiffs as independent contractors … . Abdelhamed v XYZ Limousine, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03770, Second Dept 6-17-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth analysis of the taxicab exception to the Labor Law wage requirements.

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth analysis of the tax estoppel doctrine.

 

, , ,

THE BELATED TURNING OVER OF ROSARIO MATERIAL PREJUDICED THE DEFENSE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the People’s belated turning over of Rosario material to the defense deprived defendant of a fair trial. The Rosario material consisted of notes taken by social workers describing the complainant’s therapy sessions. Defendant was prejudiced by the inability to adequately review the notes or to have an expert review them before the cross-examination of the complainant. The fact that the judge precluded the notes as a remedial measure was not helpful to the defendant:

… [D]efendant correctly contends that he is entitled to a new trial based on the People’s belated disclosure of certain notes between the complainant and social workers describing therapy sessions. The social workers were employed by the People, and their notes at all times had been in the People’s possession. The People must turn over to the defense any prior statements by a witness which relate to the subject matter of that witness’s testimony for use on cross-examination … . The material must be provided at a time when it can be useful to the defense … . When the late disclosure of Rosario material results in substantial prejudice to the defendant, a new trial is required … . Here, the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the late disclosure of these notes, as he was unable to sufficiently review the material or to retain an expert to do so. Moreover, the prejudice was not obviated by the remedial action taken by the Supreme Court, since the preclusion of the notes was not helpful to the defendant … . In light of the substantial prejudice to the defendant that resulted from the late disclosure of the Rosario material, a new trial is required … . People v Ibrahim, 2026 NY Slip Op 03687, Second Dept 6-10-26

Practice Point: The belated turning over of Rosario material deprived defendant of an adequate opportunity to review it before the cross-examination of the complainant warranting a new trial.

 

,

“EXHAUSTION OF REMEMDIES” IS NOT ALWAYS REQUIRED BEFORE AN AGENCY ACTION CAN BE CHALLENGED IN COURT; HERE THE CHALLENGE INVOLVED A PURE QUESTION OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the “exhaustion of remedies” rule does not apply to administrative actions where, as here, an agency’s action is challenged as either unconstitutional or beyond the agency’s power. Here petitioners alleged the respondent NYC Water Board overcharged for excess water consumption. That agency’s procedure was properly reviewed by the court (but the argument was ultimately rejected):

… “[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where an agency’s action is challenged as either unconstitutional or beyond its grant of power, or when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile, or when its pursuit would cause irreparable injury” … . This is because while review of some claims “hinges upon factual issues reviewable at the administrative level [which] must first be addressed to the agency so that a necessary factual record can be established” … , other claims present “a circumstance where the issue to be determined is purely a question of law” … . To the extent the fifth cause of action sought a declaration that the Water Board is acting in contravention of an established statutory scheme for setting rates for excess water consumption, exhaustion was not required … , and the court should not have dismissed that portion of the fifth cause of action on those procedural grounds. Matter of Town of Carmel v New York City Water Bd., 2026 NY Slip Op 03680, Second Dept 6-10-26

Practice Point: This decision presents an example of when a court challenge to an agency action does not trigger the “exhaustion of remedies” requirement. Here the challenge presented a pure question of law which did not require the development of a factual record at the agency level.

 

, ,

HERE THE STATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR TOXIC TORTS ACTIONS WAS PRE-EMPTED BY A FEDERAL “DISCOVERY RULE” WHICH ALLOWS A TOXIC-TORT ACTION TO BE BROUGHT WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER THE DATE PLAINTIFF KNEW OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THE CAUSE OF AN INJURY, EVEN IF MORE THAN FIVE YEARS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE DISCOVERY OF THE INJURY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dowling, determined the federal “discovery rule” for toxic tort actions pre-empts the state statute of limitations. The lawsuit alleged a town landfill near a school emitted toxic materials causing illness among the school’s staff and students:

42 USC § 9658 has been deemed a “discovery rule” … , and “does not purport to create an entirely new statute of limitations framework for state toxic tort actions” … . Instead, the statute provides “a limited ‘[e]xception to State statutes’ [that] applies only if the state statute ‘provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date'” … . Thus, in New York, where suit was not brought within three years of the discovery-of-injury date as provided by CPLR 214-c(2), the primary effect of 42 USC § 9658 is to allow a plaintiff to bring suit within one year after “the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)” the cause of an injury, even if more than five years have elapsed since discovery of the injury … . * * *

… [W]ith respect to those plaintiffs in this action who did not bring suit within three years of the discovery of their alleged injuries (see CPLR 214-c[2]), 42 USC § 9658 applies to allow those plaintiffs to bring suit within one year after “the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)” the cause of an injury, even if more than five years have elapsed since discovery of the injury … . Klaus v Town of Brookhaven, 2026 NY Slip Op 03669, Second Dept 6-10-26

Practice Point: Here the state statute of limitations for toxic tort cases was pre-empted by a federal “discovery rule” which allows suit within one year after “the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)” the cause of an injury, even if more than five years have elapsed since discovery of the injury.

 

,

THE BANK’S NOTICE OF DEFAULT WHICH STATED THE MORTGAGE DEBT WOULD BE ACCELERATED IF THE ARREARS WERE NOT PAID IN 32 DAYS WAS A STATEMENT OF FUTURE INTENT AND DID NOT SERVE TO ACCELERATE THE DEBT; THEREFORE THE NOTICE DID NOT TRIGGER THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIMELY BROUGHT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the notice by the bank stating that the mortgage debt would be accelerated if the defendant did not pay the arrears withing 32 days was merely a statement of future intent and did not serve to accelerate the debt. Therefore the notice did not trigger the running of the six-year statute of limitations and the foreclosure action should not have been dismissed:

… [T]he July 31, 2010 default notice did not accelerate the debt. The language in the default notice, that the mortgage debt would be accelerated if Edmund J. Burns, Jr., did not pay the arrears within 32 days from the date of the default notice, was merely an expression of future intent that fell short of an actual acceleration of the mortgage debt … . The mortgage debt was not accelerated until the plaintiff commenced the first action on December 12, 2012, and elected in the complaint to call due the entire loan amount and demanded payment of the outstanding loan in full … . This action was timely commenced on June 29, 2017, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on December 12, 2018. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v Burns, 2026 NY Slip Op 03658, Second Dept 6-10-26

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, a notice of default which states the mortgage debt will be accelerated if the arrears are not paid in 32 days does not accelerate the debt and therefore does not trigger the six-year statute of limitations.

 

,

DISMISSAL OF A MOTION BECAUSE THE PAPERS DID NOT INCLUDE A WORD-COUNT CERTIFICATION WARRANTED REVERSAL AND REMITTAL TO CONSIDER THE MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion court’s denial of a motion because the papers failed to include a word-count certification warranted reversal a remittal to consider the merits of the motion:

The Supreme Court should have overlooked the appellants’ failure to submit a word count certification with their motion for summary judgment, as no substantial right of any party was prejudiced … . Accordingly, we reverse. Since the Supreme Court did not consider the merits of the motion, we remit the matter … for a new determination on the merits of the motion. Hodges v 37-11 30th St., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03428, Second Dept 6-3-26

 

,

WHEN DOES A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT RUN WITH THE LAND? WHEN IS A RESTRICIVE COVENANT EXTINGUISHED BY MERGER? WHEN IS A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT RENDERED UNENFORCEABLE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1951?

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a restrictive covenant prohibiting the development of land in a conservation district ran with the land, although there remains a question of fact whether the covenant was rendered unenforceable pursuant to RPAPL 1951. Plaintiff sought to build a home on the land:​

“[A] restrictive covenant will run with the land and will be enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of the land when the following requirements are satisfied: (1) it must appear that grantor and grantee intended that the covenant should run with the land; (2) it must appear that the covenant is one touching or concerning the land with which it runs; [and] (3) it must appear that there is privity of estate between the promisee or party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it, and the promisor or party who rests under the burden of the covenant” … . The only one of these requirements at issue on this appeal is the intent of the parties, “which must be determined from the instrument and, if necessary, by looking also to the surrounding circumstances” … .

Here, the 2000 deed did not expressly recite that the restrictive covenant was to run with the land. Although that deed contained language providing that the County conveyed to BPC Holding, and to its “heirs or successors and assigns,” the right to have and to hold the property, subject to the restrictive covenant, the mere presence of that language was not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that the grantor and the grantee intended that the restrictive covenant run with the land … .

Nevertheless, the County defendants and the Town defendants established, prima facie, that the restrictive covenant was intended to run with the land based upon the surrounding circumstances…. . * * *

“In order to state a cause of action pursuant to RPAPL 1951, a plaintiff seeking a declaration that a restrictive covenant is unenforceable must allege that, upon a balancing of the equities, the restrictive covenant is of no actual and substantial benefit to the party seeking to enforce it” … . Here, the County defendants and the Town defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s alleged hardships due to the restrictive covenant did not “tip the balance of equities in favor of extinguishing [the restrictive covenant]” pursuant to RPAPL 1951(2) … . U & Me Homes, LLC v County of Suffolk, 2026 NY Slip Op 03331, Second Dept 5-27-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an in-depth discussion of the criteria for a restrictive covenant which runs with the land, the criteria for extinguishing a restrictive covenant by merger, and the criteria for rendering a restrictive covenant unenforceable pursuant to RPAPL 1951 because of the hardship it imposes.