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PURSUANT TO THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOCTRINE, THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EPIDURAL INJECTIONS WERE DONE NEGLIGENTLY; THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF SIGNED A CONSENT FORM WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this medical malpractice and lack of informed consent action should not have been granted. The plaintiff raised a question of fact re: medical malpractice under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. And the fact that plaintiff signed a consent form was not sufficient to warrant summary judgment on the lack of informed consent cause of action:

… [T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants negligently administered the epidural injections. “To raise a triable issue of fact as to the applicability of that doctrine, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the event is of the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) the instrumentality that caused the injury is within the defendants’ exclusive control; and (3) the injury is not the result of any voluntary action by the plaintiff'” … . Here, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether his injury was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, as Weingarten opined that the plaintiff would not have developed an MSSA infection if the defendants had adhered to the proper performance of “sterile techniques” in accordance with the applicable standards of care … . * * *

“‘To establish a cause of action to recover damages based on lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the person providing the professional treatment failed to disclose alternatives thereto and failed to inform the patient of reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the treatment, and the alternatives, that a reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed in the same circumstances, (2) that a reasonably prudent patient in the same position would not have undergone the treatment if he or she had been fully informed, and (3) that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury'” … . “The fact that a plaintiff signed a consent form, standing alone, does not establish a defendant’s prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law” … . Here, the defendants’ submissions failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was adequately informed of the reasonably foreseeable risks of the epidural injections … . Phillips v Varma, 2026 NY Slip Op 01238, Second Dept 3-4-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to medical malpractice.

Practice Point: Plaintiff’s signing a consent form alone does not warrant granting a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a “lack of informed consent” cause of action.

 

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