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THE GOVERNOR’S EMERGENCY COVID-19 TOLLS OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS EXTENDED THE TWO-YEAR WINDOW FOR FILING CHILD VICTIMS ACT (CVA) CAUSES OF ACTION BY 228 DAYS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Voutsinas, determined the amendment of the Child Victims Act (CVA), which enlarged to window for filing otherwise time-barred actions, did not supersede the governor’s COVID-19 executive orders tolling statutes of limitations. Therefore two-year window for filing CVA actions was extended by the 228-day COVID-19 tolls and plaintiff’s action was timely:

… [T]his Court concludes that the executive orders issued by the Governor and the Legislature’s amendment of the CVA all functioned together to enlarge and enhance the period of time for survivors to commence CVA actions. This Court finds the contention of [defendants] that the CVA amendment supplanted the executive orders unpersuasive. The CVA amendment and the executive orders work in tandem to accommodate the peculiar difficulties precluding survivors of child sex abuse to come forward in pursuit of justice. The extended revival window provided survivors an opportunity to avail themselves of the CVA revival window despite restrictions by the pandemic or personal trauma. To hold otherwise would belie the very intent of the CVA, which was to permit victims additional time to bring their offenders to justice.

Accordingly, this Court holds that the executive orders issued prior to the enactment of the CVA amendment apply to toll the two-year revival window for the time the executive orders were in effect. In conjunction with the executive orders issued subsequent to the CVA amendment’s enactment, which this Court has recently held to be applicable, all of these executive orders impose an aggregate 228-day toll on the closing of the CVA revival window, making March 30, 2022, the latest date by which to commence a CVA action … . Finley v Diocese of Brooklyn, 2026 NY Slip Op 01183, Second Dept 3-4-26

 

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