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PLAINTIFF WAS A CO-PILOT OF A HELICOPTER USED TO PROVIDE AN AERIAL PLATFORM FOR WORK ON POWER LINES; THE HELICOPTER STRUCK A POWER LINE AND PLAINTIFF JUMPED FROM THE HELICOPTER FROM A HEIGHT OF 75 FEET; THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) STRICT LIABILITY CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT (FAA); THE LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; RATHER THE FEDERAL STANDARD OF CARE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ford, determined the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) six causes of action were preempted by the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) but the negligence and Labor Law 200 causes of action should not have been dismissed because the federal standard of care can be applied to them. Plaintiff was the co-pilot of a helicopter which was being used to provide an aerial platform for work on power lines. The helicopter struck a power line and plaintiff jumped out of the helicopter from a height of 75 feet:

Under the federal rules, “[t]he pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft” (14 CFR 91.3[a] …). Various federal courts have held that the pilot thereby has the “sole responsibility to determine whether it is safe or unsafe to undertake the proposed flight” … . * * *

Additionally, under the federal rules, “[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another” (14 CFR 91.13[a]). This rule is “[c]entral” to the FAA’s overarching standard of care …. Common-law negligence cases require a more stringent standard of care, “that of a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances” … . Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law negligence standard … , while Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) “subject contractors and owners to absolute strict liability” … . The standards of care underlying the four sources of liability alleged by the plaintiff—i.e., liability for common-law negligence and under Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6)—thereby conflict with, and are preempted by, the federal recklessness standard. …

Where applicable, the effect of preemption of a state standard of care is not to preclude recovery or “to deprive Plaintiffs of their state remedies, but rather, to substitute a federal standard of care for New York’s reasonably-prudent-person standard” … . Fabia v Power Auth. of the State of N.Y., 2026 NY Slip Op 01489, Second Dept 3-18-26

Practice Point: Here, although the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) preempted the strict liability Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action in this helicopter-accident case, the negligence and Labor Law 200 causes of action should not have been dismissed because the federal standard of care can be applied to them.

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth analysis of the issues raised by preemption of state Labor Law and negligence claims stemming from a helicopter accident by the Federal Aviation Act (FAA).

 

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