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WARRANTS ISSUED TO FACEBOOK UNDER THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CANNOT BE TREATED AS CIVIL SUBPOENAS, UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW THERE IS NO MECHANISM FOR APPEALING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH A WARRANT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a concurring opinion and an extensive dissenting opinion, determined that the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) did not allow a motion to quash a warrant issued pursuant to the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) and did not allow an appeal from the denial of the motion. The motions and appeals were brought by Facebook in response to SCA warrants seeking information about subscriber accounts in connection with criminal investigations. Facebook argued that the warrants were actually subpoenas which could be quashed under civil standards. The Court of Appeals held the warrants were not subpoenas and the CPL therefore controlled:

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That the SCA draws a distinction between warrants and subpoenas, and the content that may be obtained therewith, is of critical significance with respect to a determination of appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the denial of Facebook’s motion to quash. It is a fundamental precept of the jurisdiction of our appellate courts that “‘[n]o appeal lies from a determination made in a criminal proceeding unless specifically provided for by statute'” … . No provision of the Criminal Procedure Law articles that govern appeals — which are among “‘the most highly structured and highly particularized articles of procedure'” … — authorizes an appeal to either an intermediate appellate court or to this Court from an order denying a motion to quash or vacate a search warrant … . Moreover, no civil appeal may be brought from an order entered in a criminal action or proceeding … . * * *

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In the instant matter, Facebook concedes that an order addressing a motion to quash a warrant is not appealable, but Facebook contends — and the dissent agrees — that, despite being denominated as “warrants,” SCA warrants are more analogous to subpoenas than to traditional search warrants involving tangible property because they compel third parties to disclose digital data. Thus, Facebook and the dissent urge us to treat Supreme Court’s first order denying its motion to quash the warrants as an appealable order denying a motion to quash subpoenas. This argument is unpersuasive. Matter of 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02586, CtApp 4-4-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (WARRANTS ISSUED TO FACEBOOK UNDER THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CANNOT BE TREATED AS CIVIL SUBPOENAS, UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW THERE IS NO MECHANISM FOR APPEALING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH A WARRANT)/STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT (WARRANTS ISSUED TO FACEBOOK UNDER THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CANNOT BE TREATED AS CIVIL SUBPOENAS, UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW THERE IS NO MECHANISM FOR APPEALING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH A WARRANT)/SEARCH AND SEIZURE  (WARRANTS ISSUED TO FACEBOOK UNDER THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CANNOT BE TREATED AS CIVIL SUBPOENAS, UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW THERE IS NO MECHANISM FOR APPEALING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH A WARRANT)/SUBPOENAS (STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT, WARRANTS ISSUED TO FACEBOOK UNDER THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CANNOT BE TREATED AS CIVIL SUBPOENAS, UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW THERE IS NO MECHANISM FOR APPEALING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH A WARRANT)/FACEBOOK  (WARRANTS ISSUED TO FACEBOOK UNDER THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CANNOT BE TREATED AS CIVIL SUBPOENAS, UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW THERE IS NO MECHANISM FOR APPEALING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH A WARRANT)

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