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Question of Fact Whether Elevator Company Had Constructive Notice of “Misleveling Condition”/Question of Fact About Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine

The First Department determined questions of fact had been raised about whether an elevator company, which exclusively maintained and repaired the elevator, had constructive notice of the “misleveling condition.”  In addition there was a question of fact about the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine:

An elevator company that agrees to maintain an elevator may be liable to a passenger for failure to correct conditions of which it has knowledge or failure to use reasonable care to discover and correct a condition which it ought to have found … .

Plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants had constructive notice of the misleveling condition or with reasonable care could have discovered and corrected the condition, by submitting the affidavit of their expert, who reviewed defendants’ repair tickets and concluded that they revealed conditions related to the elevator’s leveling function. * * *

Issues of fact exist as to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies here. The expert testimony conflicts as to whether the misleveling of the elevator would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. It is, however, undisputed that defendants were exclusively responsible for maintenance and repair of the elevator, and the record is devoid of any evidence that plaintiff contributed to its misleveling… . McLaughlin v Thyssen Dover El Co, 2014 NY Slip Op 03440, 1st Dept 5-13-14

 

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School District Owed No Duty of Care to Student Struck by Car Before School Bus Stopped to Pick Her Up/Bus Driver Had Missed Student’s Stop, Had Turned Around, and Was Driving Back Toward the Student When She Was Struck

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, over a dissent, determined that a school district did not owe any duty to a student who was struck by a car before the bus stopped to pick her up.  The bus driver mistakenly drove past the stop where the student was waiting.  The driver turned the bus around.  As the driver was heading back toward the student's stop, the student was struck by a car. The Court of Appeals essentially agreed with the dissenting appellate division justices, whose position was described as follows:

The dissenting Justices would have reversed Supreme Court's order and granted the District's motion in its entirety. …[T]hey observed the “well settled” rule that the District's duty flowed from physical custody and control; that at the time of the accident the District did not have physical custody of the child, who thus remained outside its orbit of authority; and that the District therefore “owed no duty to the child in this situation, and, absent duty, there can be no liability” … .

The dissenting Justices rejected plaintiff's contention, endorsed by the majority, that the District “assumed a duty to the child as a consequence of the potentially hazardous situation allegedly created by the school bus driver in turning the bus around after missing the bus stop” … . Williams v Weatherstone, 2014 NY Slip Op 03425, CtApp 5-13-14

 

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Requirements for Notice of Intent Met Despite Flaws in Document

The Fourth Department determined a flawed document which followed the format of a Notice of Claim under the General Municipal Law met the requirements for a Notice of Intent under the Court of Claims Act:

Here, we conclude that the document is a proper notice of intent. We agree with defendant that the document “had all the hallmarks of a notice of claim against a municipality,” rather than a notice of intent against the State, including the title of the document, the stated venue as “Supreme Court,” the references to the General Municipal Law, and the naming of the County of Orleans as a “respondent.” Nevertheless, the document names the State as a “respondent” and alleges that the premises where claimant fell were owned by the State, and claimant served the document on the Attorney General. In addition, we conclude that the mistake in naming the place where the claim arose as the “Orleans County Correctional Facility” (emphasis added) does not require dismissal of the claim. Claimant provided the proper address where the claim arose, which showed that her fall occurred at the Orleans Correctional Facility, and not at the Orleans County Jail, which is located on a different street.With regard to the requisite specificity as to the place where the claim arose, we note that ” [w]hat is required is not absolute exactness, but simply a statement made with sufficient definiteness to enable [defendant] to be able to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances’ ” …. .  Mosley v State of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 03054, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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Emotional Injury Can Constitute “Serious Injury” Within the Meaning of the Insurance Law/On-coming Car Crossed Into Plaintiffs’ Lane—Plaintiffs Entitled to Summary Judgment (Re: On-coming Driver’s Negligence Cause of Action) Under the Emergency Doctrine

The Fourth Department noted a question of fact had been raised about whether post-traumatic-stress disorder constituted a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law 5102 (d).  Plaintiffs, husband and wife, were struck head-on when an on-coming car crossed into plaintiff’s lane.  The driver of the on-coming car was trying to avoid a deer which ran into the road. The court also determined plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the other driver’s negligence action based upon the emergency doctrine, even in the absence of expert evidence:

“[A] causally-related emotional injury, alone or in combination with a physical injury, can constitute a serious injury” …, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) “may constitute such an injury when it is causally related to a motor vehicle accident and demonstrated by objective medical evidence” … . Moreover, “PTSD may be demonstrated without diagnostic testing for purposes of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) by symptoms objectively observed by treating physicians and established by the testimony of the injured plaintiff and others who observe the injured plaintiff” … .

Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs met their initial burden on the issue of serious injury, we conclude that defendants raised an issue of fact sufficient to defeat the motion by submitting the records of [plaintiff’s]  psychologist … . * * *

“Under the emergency doctrine, “when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes [the driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the [driver] has not created the emergency” ‘ … . It is well established that a driver is not required to anticipate that [a] vehicle, traveling in the opposite direction, [will] cross over into his [or her] lane of travel’ ” … . * * * The vehicle operated by decedent entered [plaintiff’s] lane of traffic without warning, and [plaintiff]  applied his brakes and swerved to the right as soon as he saw decedent’s vehicle cross into his lane. The absence of expert evidence on this issue is of no moment inasmuch as, “[i]n a cross-over collision case, a defendant [or a plaintiff seeking dismissal of an affirmative defense] may meet the burden of establishing entitlement to summary judgment [or dismissal of the affirmative defense] under the emergency doctrine even when [t]he only evidence in the record concerning [the movant’s] conduct’ is [his or her] own [deposition] testimony” … . Hill v Cash, 2014 NY Slip Op 03058, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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Police Officer Struck by Plaintiffs’ Decedents When the Officer Was Making a U-Turn to Follow a Car Was Entitled to Summary Judgment Under the Statutory “Reckless Disregard” Standard

The Fourth Department determined summary judgment should have been granted in favor of a police officer (Bluman) who was struck by plaintiffs' decedents when the officer was attempting to make a u-turn to follow a vehicle.  The court determined the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1104 applied and that the officer's “momentary judgment lapse” did not rise to the level of reckless disregard as a matter of law:

At the time of the accident, Bluman was operating an “authorized emergency vehicle” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [a]) and was engaged in an emergency operation by virtue of the fact that he was attempting a U-turn in order to “pursu[e] an actual or suspected violator of the law” (§ 114-b). As the Court of Appeals recognized …, “the reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b). Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence.” We conclude that, by attempting to execute a U-turn, Bluman's conduct was exempted from the rules of the road by section 1104 (b) (4). As a result, his conduct is governed by the reckless disregard standard of care in section 1104 (e).

It is well settled that a ” momentary judgment lapse' does not alone rise to the level of recklessness required of the driver of an emergency vehicle in order for liability to attach” (Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 557). Here, Bluman acted under the mistaken belief that the other southbound vehicles were sufficiently behind him and that it was, at that moment, safe to execute a U-turn. This “constituted a momentary lapse in judgment not rising to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others' “… . Dodds v Town of Hamburg, 2014 NY Slip Op 03060, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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Statutory “Reckless Disregard” Standard in Vehicle and Traffic Law 1103 (b) Applied to the Driver of a Town Truck—The Driver Was Using a Plow to Remove Water and Debris from a Road—Because the Driver Was Acting On His Own and Had Not Been Assigned to Remove the Water and Debris, the Question Raised on Appeal Was Whether the Driver Was Doing “Work” within the Meaning of Section 1103 (b) such that the Statutory Standard, as Opposed to the Ordinary Negligence Standard, Applied

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the statutory “reckless disregard” standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1103 (b), not the ordinary negligence standard, applied to the actions of the driver of a town truck..  The driver, Grzybek,  was using a plow to remove water and debris from a service road.  The water sprayed onto the windshield of the truck, obstructing the driver’s vision and causing the driver to cross into an oncoming lane, striking plaintiffs’ vehicle. Because the driver was not assigned the task of removing water and debris from the road, the dissenters argued the driver was not engaged in “work” within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1103 (b) and, therefore, the ordinary negligence standard, not the “reckless disregard” standard of section 1103 (b), applied:

…[T]he statute exempts “all [municipal] vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway’ . . . from the rules of the road” … . The statute does not state that it exempts only those vehicles engaged in “assigned” work. Plowing water and debris from a road is work, and that work is within the scope of Grzybek’s duties. Plaintiffs do not suggest otherwise. Rather, their contention is that the statute applies only when the vehicles are “performing their assigned work” and that Grzybek was not assigned to plow water and debris from the service road on the day of the accident. In our view, interpreting the statute as the dissent and plaintiffs suggest improperly adds language to the statute by qualifying the word “work.” It is not the function of this Court to usurp the power of the legislature and rewrite a clear and unambiguous statute. Aside from statutory exceptions not relevant herein, all municipal vehicles actually engaged in work are exempt from the rules of the road. Inasmuch as Grzybek’s vehicle was actually engaged in work, albeit unassigned work, the reckless disregard standard of care set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) applies as a matter of law. * * *

…[W]e conclude that plaintiffs, in opposition to defendants’ cross motion, submitted evidence from which a jury could find that Grzybek “had intentionally committed an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk “that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow” and [did] so with conscious indifference to the outcome’ ” … . Gawron v Town of Cheektowaga, 2014 NY Slip Op 03051, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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Causes of Action Against County Personnel Based Upon Negligent Hiring, Training and Supervision Should Not Have Been Dismissed–Plaintiff’s Decedent Was Killed at the Hands of Her Mother and Half-Brother—Complaint Alleged County’s Negligence in Failing to Protect Plaintiff’s Decedent

In a lawsuit alleging county personnel, including deputy sheriffs, were negligent resulting in the death of plaintiff’s decedent at the hands of her mother and half-brother, the Fourth Department determined: (1) governmental immunity could not be determined at the pleading stage because whether the government’s actions were discretionary (and therefore immune) was a question of fact; (2) absent a local law to the contrary, a sheriff can not be held vicariously responsible for the actions of deputy sheriffs under the doctrine of respondeat superior; (3) the causes of action for negligent hiring, training and supervision of county personnel should not have been dismissed; (4) the notices of claim were sufficient to notify the county of the negligent hiring, training and supervision causes of action; and (5) the notice of claim was not defective for failing to name the sheriff in his official capacity.  Mosey v County of Erie, 2014 NY Slip Op 03041, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

Defect Not Trivial as a Matter of Law

The Fourth Department determined defendant failed to establish a defect in pavement was trivial as a matter of law:

Here, we conclude that defendant failed to meet its initial burden of establishing that the defect was trivial and nonactionable as a matter of law … . The photographs submitted in support of defendant’s motion depict a lengthy edge in the pavement that was more than two-thirds of an inch deep and spanned the width of the painted walking area adjacent to the designated handicapped parking space … . Defendant also submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which she testified that her right foot caught on “a quite high ledge” in the pavement at the rear of the parking space … . Although defendant characterizes the edge as “a small, rounded lip in the pavement,” the photographs depict crumbling asphalt, and the edge appears to be irregular, jagged and abrupt as opposed to gradual …, where the trivial defect involved ” a small area’ ” of a ” cracked and crumbly’ ” curb that “had no measurable depth,’ ” plaintiff’s deposition testimony and the photographs in this case, particularly the photographs depicting the area closest to plaintiff’s vehicle, suggest a measurable edge in the pavement that could pose a tripping hazard. Lupa v City of Oswego, 2014 NY Slip Op 03055, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

No Liability for Injury to Child Who Suddenly Darted Out Into Traffic

The Fourth Department determined all causes of action arising from a child’s darting out into traffic should be dismissed. There was no evidence the driver who struck the child (Hosley) was negligent.  And there was no evidence the adults in the car from which the child darted into traffic (Ricks and Still) were negligent.  The driver parked the car intending to escort the child to her school bus:

Specifically, the evidence establishes as a matter of law that, “without looking in the direction of oncoming traffic” …, the child darted from behind the front of Still’s parked vehicle, “directly into the path of” Hosley’s vehicle, leaving Hosley “unable to avoid contact with the [child]” …, and plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact … . Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the record does not establish that there is an issue of fact whether Hosley operated her vehicle in a negligent manner. Rather, the record establishes as a matter of law that Hosley acted as a reasonably prudent person when she slowed her rate of speed immediately upon seeing the parked vehicle ahead, and that she proceeded with caution while attempting to pass it safely on the left … .

With respect to the motion of Ricks and Still, we note that “[t]he operator of a private passenger vehicle owes to his passengers a duty of reasonable care [in] providing a safe place to alight” … . Ricks and Still met their initial burden on their motion by establishing that Ricks did not breach that duty to the child when, intending to escort the child, he parked the vehicle against the curb on a side street. Plaintiff’s “[m]ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations” asserted in opposition to the motion failed to raise an issue of fact … . Green v Hosley, 2014 NY Slip Op 03066, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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Plaintiff Injured Falling Off Operating Table—Record Insufficient to Determine Whether Action Sounded in Medical Malpractice (Rendering It Untimely) or Negligence (Rendering It Timely)

The Third Department determined there was insufficient information in the record to determine whether plaintiff’s action sounded in negligence or medical malpractice.  Plaintiff was injured when she fell off the operating table.  The case hinged on whether the 2 1/2 year medical malpractice of the 3 year negligence statute of limitations applied. Supreme Court determined the medical malpractice statute applied and dismissed the complaint. The Third Department sent the matter back for the service of an amended complaint:

The sole issue here is whether the complaint sounds in medical malpractice such that it is subject to a 2½-year statute of limitations, which would make it untimely, or whether it alleges personal injury claims based on ordinary negligence that are subject to a three-year statute of limitations (compare CPLR 214-a, with CPLR 214 [5]). “Conduct may be deemed malpractice, rather than negligence, when it ‘constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician'” … .

The record here does not contain enough factual information to make such a determination. The complaint contains some language that generally refers to malpractice, such as that the “action arose from a surgery,” that plaintiff was “owed a duty by [d]efendants to use the due care of medical specialists in performing” the surgery, and that plaintiff fell after she “was extubated by the [a]nesthesiologist” or “while extubated by” him. While some of the medical records also indicate that plaintiff’s fall from the operating table may have been substantially related to the rendition of medical treatment, one medical note indicates that plaintiff rolled off the table due to the failure to remove an obstruction that prevented a stretcher from being placed next to the operating table. Plaintiff’s causes of action would sound in medical malpractice if she fell off the table due to improper pressure or movement in the removal of the breathing tube, or the failure to properly evaluate her safety and restraint needs while she was under anesthesia … .

On the other hand, her causes of action would sound in ordinary negligence if she never received any safety assessment, if the hospital staff failed to remove an obstruction between the operating table and stretcher and allowed her to fall between them, or if she was simply dropped by the staff members when they were transferring her from the operating table to the stretcher … . Newell v Ellis Hosp, 2014 NY Slip Op 02992, 3rd Dept 5-1-14

 

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