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Reversible Error to Give a Modified Malpractice Jury Instruction in a Negligent/Defective Design Case

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, over a dissent, reversed a $10 million judgment against Volvo, finding that one of the jury instructions, which was a modified version of the jury instruction for a malpractice case, should not have been given.  The plaintiff lost a leg when the ignition of the manual transmission car was switched on and the car lurched forward, pinning the plaintiff.  A central issue in the trial was whether the car should have been equipped with a device which would have prevented the car from starting when it was in gear.  In addition to the jury instruction issue, the court discussed the redundancy of instructions for negligent design and defective design, the appeal as of right and by permission pursuant to CPLR 5601 and 5602, and the inconsistency of the verdict.  With respect to the malpractice jury instruction, the court wrote:

[PJI 2:15] should not have been given in this case. It was designed for malpractice cases. As the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions says: “The principle stated in the pattern charge is the underlying basis of malpractice actions” (1A NY PJI3d 2:15 at 259 [2014]). The Committee goes on to say that “[t]he principle extends to skilled trades and to professions not generally thought of in connection with malpractice” (id.), but we know of no basis for including automobile manufacturers in that category. This is not a malpractice case, but a negligent design or (what amounts to the same thing) a design defect case.

PJI 2:15 is reserved for malpractice cases because the standards of care applicable to malpractice cases and to other negligence cases are different. In a malpractice case against, for example, a doctor or a lawyer, the defendant is generally held to the level of skill and care used by others in the community who practice the same profession … . In negligence cases generally, by contrast, the jury must compare the defendant's conduct to that of a reasonable person under like circumstances (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 283…). In negligent design/design defect cases, the reasonable-person standard has been given more specific form: the question is whether the product is one as to which “if the design defect were known at the time of manufacture, a reasonable person would conclude that the utility of the product did not outweigh the risk inherent in marketing a product designed in that manner” … .  Reis v Volvo Cars of N Am, 2014 NY Slip Op 04880, CtApp 7-1-14

 

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